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This dissertation demonstrates how the relationship between the United States and the 
State of Israel underwent a significant transformation during 1970s and 1980s. After 
more than two decades of limited American aid since Israel declared its independence in 
1948, the United States under Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and 
Ronald Reagan dramatically increased its support for Israel in the wake of the October 
War of 1973. This increased level of support is most apparent in the level of U.S. military 
aid provided to Israel, which Israel received under extremely favorable terms. The 
deepening of U.S.-Israeli ties from 1973 onwards occurred despite the fact that there 
were very real differences between U.S. and Israeli national and strategic interests, 
differences that sometimes erupted into fierce disagreements between American and 
Israeli officials. U.S. support for Israel was based on several factors, including Israel’s 
perceived value as a strategic ally during the Cold War, Americans’ vision of Israel as a 
fellow democracy with similar political, cultural, and religious values, and the large 
number of Jewish and Christian supporters in the United States. The 1970s and 1980s are 
also important for the U.S.-Israeli relationship because these years saw an important shift 
among Israel’s supporters in the United States. While American Jews had traditionally 
been Israel’s strongest backers, from the 1970s onwards American evangelical Christians 
emerged as some of Israel’s most vocal champions in the United States.    
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The October War of 1973 was a turning point in the history of U.S.-Israeli 
relations. When Israeli forces were caught unprepared by Egyptian and Syrian attacks on 
two fronts and suffered heavy losses in the first week of fighting, American officials 
feared that Israel was on the brink of collapse. To turn the tide in Israel’s favor, the 
United States launched a massive aerial resupply effort to deliver thousands of tons of 
military supplies to Israel. When the war ended after three weeks of fighting, the Israeli 
military had fully recovered and pushed back Egyptian and Syrian forces while inflicting 
heavy losses on both countries’ forces. In the months after the October War, the United 
States became deeply involved in negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors to 
bring stability to the Middle East and prevent another war.   
Spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States sought 
to act as an intermediary between the two sides by shuttling back and forth between the 
Israeli and Arab capitals to deliver one side’s position and obtain the other’s response, 
slowly building toward an agreement that was acceptable to both sides. By the spring of 
1975, this effort had produced two limited disengagement agreements, one each with 
Egypt and Syria, and Kissinger was working toward a third with Egypt when negotiations 
with Israel collapsed. After extensive talks with Egypt’s president, Anwar Sadat, 
Kissinger and his team believed that they were on the verge of success. But when Israeli 
negotiators refused to continue talks without an Egyptian commitment of “non-
belligerency,” Kissinger, with the support of U.S. President Gerald Ford, halted the talks 
and returned to the United States. In a letter to Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, Ford 
expressed his “deep disappointment” at Israel’s uncompromising position and told his 
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Israeli counterpart that he was ordering an “immediate reassessment of U.S. policy in the 
area, including our relations with Israel, with a view to assuring that the overall interests 
of America in the Middle East and globally will be protected.”1   
Israel’s intransigence stood in marked contrast to what U.S. officials were hearing 
from Egypt. Under President Sadat, Egypt was slowly distancing itself from the Soviet 
Union and inching closer to Washington. Sadat and his advisers badly wanted to secure 
American economic and military aid and recover the Sinai Peninsula from Israel, and 
they saw Kissinger’s negotiations as the best way to achieve these objectives. Following 
a two-hour meeting with Sadat just days before negotiations with Israel came to a 
standstill, Kissinger wrote in a message to President Ford that, in his judgment, the 
Egyptian president has “carried the political concessions, in return for withdrawal, as far 
as he is able.”2 While the United States’ alliance with Israel had deeper roots than its 
emerging alliance with Egypt, Israel was proving to be a difficult and contentious 
negotiating partner.  
These 1975 talks came at a crucial moment in relations between Israel and the 
United States. After coming to Israel’s aid following Egypt and Syria’s joint attack on 
Israel in October 1973, the United States emerged definitively as Israel’s most important 
Western ally and the dominant outside power in the Middle East. But a close alliance 
with Israel threatened to disrupt broader U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East, which 
 
1 Letter from Gerald Ford to Yitzhak Rabin, Washington, March 21, 1975, Document #156, 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Volume XXVI: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-
1976 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2012), p. 553.    
2 Memo from Deputy National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to President Ford containing a 
message from Secretary Kissinger, Washington, March 18, 1975, Document #151, Ibid., 547.   
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included building a better relationship with the Arab world, maintaining access to the 
region’s oil, and rolling back the Soviet Union’s influence there. While Israel’s 
supporters in the United States argued that Israel could be a valuable strategic partner for 
the United States, the Rabin government’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations 
with Egypt signaled that Israel’s interests were never going to be identical to those of the 
United States.   
At this critical juncture in its burgeoning alliance with Israel, the Ford 
administration faced a choice: it could pursue a strongly pro-Israel policy in the Middle 
East, or it could opt for a more balanced path that did not privilege Israel over its Arab 
neighbors. Under President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, the United States chose the 
former path, a decision that had dramatic consequences for the United States, Israel, and 
the broader Middle East for decades to come. By signing a secret memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) on September 1, 1975, the Ford administration committed the 
United States to supporting Israel’s occupation of Arab lands and supplying its security 
and energy needs for the foreseeable future. This step was consistent with a longer trend 
toward closer relations between the two countries since the early 1960s, but the mid-
1970s saw a distinct and dramatic shift toward a closer alliance that went further than 
anything that came before.  
In this dissertation I argue that the bilateral relationship between the United States 
and the State of Israel changed dramatically during the 1970s. Rooted in their efforts to 
preserve U.S. global influence in a changing global environment, President Richard 
Nixon and his senior adviser Henry Kissinger made Israel a key part of their efforts to 
check and roll back Soviet influence in the Cold War. As a result of this outlook, which 
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positioned Israel as a piece in a broader U.S. strategy, efforts to reach a comprehensive 
settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict were buried under geopolitical concerns. This 
dynamic of seeing the U.S.-Israeli alliance as strategically beneficial to U.S. goals in the 
Cold War continued even after the nature of the Cold War shifted in the late 1970s and 
into the 1980s.   
Beginning with the U.S. airlift to resupply Israel with military equipment during 
the October War of 1973, American military aid to Israel increased significantly in the 
1970s, and that upward trend continued into the twenty-first century. In fact, according to 
a 2020 report from the Congressional Research Service, Israel has been the largest 
recipient of U.S. military aid in the world since the end of World War II, with most of 
that aid coming from the 1970s onwards.3 By the end of the 1970s, it was no longer a 
question of whether Israel would receive American military aid, but how much and what 
kind. This shift occurred under presidents of both political parties.     
While the U.S. alliance with Israel deepened significantly during these years, the 
tensions that prevented these two countries from coming together sooner remained 
unresolved. American officials still worried that developing closer ties with Israel would 
undermine the U.S. position in the Arab world as it tried to maintain access to Middle 
Eastern oil and build alliances with Arab countries who could act as buffers against the 
Soviet Union and, after 1979, radical Islamist regimes such as Iran. Furthermore, 
American officials continued to point out that the interests of Israel and the United States 
 
3 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service Report 
RL33222, updated November 16, 2020. (URL: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33222). 
(Accessed 6/2/21).   
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were not always identical. This situation was further complicated by domestic politics in 
the United States, where pro-Israel activists and organizations pressured government 
officials and politicians to deepen U.S.-Israeli ties and cried foul at any sign that U.S. 
policy might endanger Israel’s security. The fact that there was no analogous pro-Arab or 
pro-Palestinian body in the United States gave these groups a distinct advantage in their 
efforts to influence U.S. policy. By failing to resolve those fundamental contradictions, 
American leaders ensured that, regardless of the friendly and upbeat rhetoric that U.S. 
and Israeli officials regularly used in public statements and in press conferences, the 
United States and Israel continued to clash regularly over their differing priorities and 
concerns.    
For their part, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to any sign that the 
American commitment to Israel was not absolute. Their concerns about U.S. support 
were rooted in deep anxieties about Israel’s survivability as a state surrounded by Arab 
nations, fears about the survivability of the Jewish people after the Holocaust, and the 
fact that the United States was home to the largest Jewish population in the world outside 
Israel. From U.S. officials’ statements about Israeli settlement activity in 1976 to 
American plans to sell sophisticated military aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1981 and beyond, 
Israeli leaders protested loudly at any indication that U.S. support for Israel seemed to be 
wavering. The same was true of Israel’s supporters in the United States, who objected 
when both Democratic and Republican administrations adopted policies that seemed to 
threaten Israel’s interests. In this tense climate, any incident could precipitate a crisis in 
U.S.-Israeli relations, which would have to be smoothed over before meaningful relations 
could resume. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis was correct in February 1982 
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when, after months of repeated disagreements between American and Israeli officials on 
a host of issues, he described U.S.-Israeli relations as “inherently tender and prone to 
crisis.”4 
While this dissertation is primarily an analysis of Israel’s place in U.S. foreign 
policy during the second half of the twentieth century, it also aims to embed that story 
into larger narratives of Middle Eastern, international, and U.S. domestic history. 
Likewise, just as U.S.-Israel ties are closely related to U.S. policies in specific regions, 
they are also inseparable from the context of international relations during the post-World 
War II period. Specifically, the Cold War conflict between the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and their respective allies had an enormous impact on the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship. Certainly, from the American perspective, the Cold War confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union has long been the dominant paradigm for 
understanding American foreign policy throughout the world in the second half of the 
twentieth century. But when scholars switch their emphasis from the superpowers to local 
actors in places like Southeast Asia and Latin America, the Cold War appears much less 
influential in shaping regional realities than it does from an American or Soviet 
perspective. Instead, it is local politics, culture, and economics that take center stage. 
Several historians have also expanded our perspective of the Middle East by shifting the 
focus away from the superpowers’ relations with individual local actors and toward 
regional and global analyses. Historian Rashid Khalidi, for instance, argues that the Cold 
 
 4 Telegram from Ambassador Lewis to the State Department re “U.S.-Israeli Relations: Prone to 
Crises,” February 27, 1982, “Israel (2/24/82-3/2/82),” National Security Council, Executive Secretary – 
Country Files, RAC Box 38, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RPL). 
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War prevented the United States from understanding the nuances of Middle East politics 
and led American presidents to adopt policies that were detrimental to the whole region.5 
And as Nathan Citino observed in a recent survey of the literature on the Cold War in the 
Middle East, historians of the Middle East will never be able to ignore the American-
Soviet rivalry completely.6 
Though the U.S. built a close and, according to some, “special” relationship with 
Israel, this development cannot be separated from the U.S. relationship to the broader 
region, especially U.S. ties with the Arab world. U.S. support for Israel, particularly its 
support for Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands and its treatment of the Palestinian 
people, proved to be a significant complication for American efforts to build closer ties to 
Arab and Muslim countries around the world. Likewise, U.S.-Israeli relations need to be 
understood in the context of Israeli politics and society, which underwent a significant 
political shift in 1977 when the long-dominant Labor party was defeated by the right-
wing Likud party of Menachem Begin. Finally, American concerns about access to 
Middle Eastern oil shaped U.S. policy in the region and its relationship to Israel. As the 
oil embargo of 1973-1974 made clear, U.S. support for Israel could have serious 
diplomatic and economic consequences. As Avi Shlaim noted at the end of the 1988, the 
 
5 See Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2009).  
 6 Nathan J. Citino, “The Middle East and the Cold War,” Cold War History, 19:3 (2019), 456. For 
more on the Cold War in the Middle East see also the essays in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (editors), The 
Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). On the Middle East and the global Cold 
War, see Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of 
the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold 
War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) and The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), and Lorenz M. Luthi, 
Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020). 
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end of the period covered by this dissertation, by the end of the Cold War there was still 
no consensus over how to reconcile close U.S.-Israeli relations with the need to contain 
the Soviet Union, maintain good relations with the Arab world, and ensure that the West 
had access to Middle Eastern oil.7  
The U.S. relationship with Israel also affected U.S. relations with Europe, 
especially after the 1973-1974 oil embargo, which had a much greater impact in Europe 
than it did on the U.S. itself, the ostensible target of the embargo. From the 1970s 
onwards, as the United States deepened its ties with Israel, European governments were 
going in the opposite direction. European nations, for instance, were much quicker to call 
for a Palestinian state than the United States. In fact, historian Tony Judt, writing at the 
beginning of the war in Iraq in March 2003 when global anti-American sentiment was 
very high, went so far as to call the gap between American and European views of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict “the biggest impediment to transatlantic understanding 
today.”8  
One of the most common rationales for developing a closer alliance between the 
two countries, one that Israeli officials repeatedly emphasized over the years, was Israel’s 
potential as an American ally against Soviet influence in the Middle East. Some of the 
strongest proponents of this view were neoconservatives, a group of intellectuals and 
politicians who became disenchanted with détente, the Nixon administration’s effort to 
reduce tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s. These 
 
7 Avi Shlaim, “The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, V 
ol.17, No. 2 (Winer, 1988), 15-16.    
8 Tony Judt, “The Way We Live Now,” printed in Judt, When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995-
2010 (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), 209.  
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neoconservatives, whose numbers included many prominent Jewish intellectuals, urged 
successive administrations to deepen U.S. ties with Israel against their shared enemies, 
the Soviet Union and Islamic terrorism.  
Finally, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be separated from cultural, 
political, and economic developments within the United States during the second half of 
the twentieth century. The 1960s saw the end of more than two decades of steady 
economic growth in the United States after World War II, a highly unpopular war in 
Southeast Asia, massive protests calling for basic civil rights for African Americans, and 
the emergence of a conservative backlash against New Deal liberalism. Together these 
and other factors created a new political and cultural environment in the United States. 
As with any other issue abroad, U.S. foreign policy can never be separated from 
developments within the United States, and Americans’ attitudes toward Israel are closely 
linked to their views on a host of other issues, including concerns about energy, race, 
religion, antisemitism, and the place of Jews in American society. 
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the beginnings of an important shift in Israel’s 
base of support in the United States. Following Israel’s declaration of independence in 
1948, the American Jewish community represented Israel’s strongest supporters in the 
United States and remained so throughout the 1950s and 1960s. American Jews’ support 
for Israel reached its peak in the late 1960s and 1970s following the Six-Day War of June 
1967 and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. But after the election of the right-wing 
Likud prime minister Menachem Begin in 1977 and especially after the 1982 Israeli 
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invasion of Lebanon, many American Jews began to question whether the Israeli 
government deserved their full and unyielding support.9  
One of the most important factors that shaped the American public’s views of 
Israel was the emergence of widespread public interest in the Holocaust. During World 
War II and in subsequent years, American Jews were of course intensely interested in the 
fate of European Jews. But despite its prominent place in American culture today and its 
emergence as a prominent academic field in American universities, it took more than a 
decade after the end of World War II for the Holocaust to become a subject of wide 
interest among the broader American public. That changed in the 1960s following a 
series of events that increased Americans’ knowledge of the Holocaust, including the 
publishing of books such as The Diary of Anne Frank and Elie Wiesel’s memoir Night, 
the trial of perpetrators like Adolf Eichmann, and the emergence of the first serious 
academic studies of the Nazi effort to eliminate Europe’s Jewish population, starting in 
1961 with Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews. Later the 1978 NBC 
miniseries Holocaust brought the experience of European Jews during the 1930s and 
1940s to an even larger audience in the United States and around the world.   
Research conducted in recent years by social scientists helps shed a light on the 
relationship between American Jews and Israel. With a few exceptions, American Jews 
generally gravitated to the left of the American political spectrum since the early 
 
9 On Jewish Americans’ complex and shifting views of Israel since the 1970s, see Steven T. 
Rosenthal, Irreconcilable Differences: The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel 
(Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, Published by the University Press of New England, 2001), Ofira 
Seliktar, Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and the Peace Process (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 
and Dov Waxman, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2016).  
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twentieth century, a fact that has had little to do with their views on Israel. While several 
Jewish intellectuals were very prominent in the neoconservative movement mentioned 
above, they did not represent a majority of American Jews. Instead, most American Jews’ 
politics had (and continue to have) much more to do with domestic issues than with U.S. 
foreign policy.10  
As Jewish Americans grappled with the actions of Israel’s leaders in Lebanon and 
the Occupied Territories, another group in the United States was beginning to take a 
greater interest in Middle Eastern affairs. After keeping a low profile in American politics 
for decades, white evangelical Protestants emerged as a newly significant force in U.S. 
domestic politics in the 1970s. In addition to a host of domestic social and cultural 
priorities, conservative evangelicals also took up the cause of Israel, to the point where it 
became one of their highest foreign policy priorities, alongside resisting the Soviet Union 
and communism abroad.11 This trend did not go unnoticed by Israeli leaders, who had 
recognized long ago the value of having allies in the United States who were not in 
government but could put pressure on Congress and the President when U.S. policy 
threatened Israeli interests and goals. Starting with Likud Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin and continuing up through the era of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli officials and 
politicians have made it a point to develop strong relations with conservative 
evangelicals. They do so in spite of the fact that some of Israel’s strongest Christian 
 
 10 See Kenneth D. Wald, The Foundations of American Jewish Liberalism (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019) and Herbert F. Weisberg, The Politics of American Jews (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 2019).  
11 On the importance of Israel to American evangelicals, see Mark R. Amstutz, Evangelicals and 
American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), especially Chapter 6.  
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supporters believed that Israel’s rise and success were part of a much larger divine plan 
that presaged the Second Coming of Christ and the onset of a new biblical age, beliefs 
that Israelis do not share. This created an ironic situation in which American evangelicals 
embraced the same right-wing Israeli leaders who made American Jews reluctant to 
whole-heartedly support the policies of the Israeli government.  
While American evangelicals’ intense interest in Israel is a recent development, it 
has its roots in the much older tradition of Christian Zionism, a belief that calls for the 
return of the Jewish people to Palestine, a region with deep religious significance for 
Christians and Jews as well as Muslims.12 Religion has strongly influenced both 
American and British thinking about Palestine and the Middle East for centuries. As 
historian Rashid Khalidi notes in his recent survey of a century of Palestinian history, the 
deep historical and religious resonances of the region have blinded Jews and many 
Christians to the fundamentally modern and colonial elements within the history of the 
modern state of Israel.13  
American support for Israel has been strong in both major political parties since 
the 1960s, but more recently it has become an increasingly partisan issue in American 
politics. The Democratic Party, where American Jews have largely made their political 
home throughout the twentieth century, has shown some willingness to challenge Israel 
on its continued occupation of Palestinian lands. On the other hand, some of Israel’s 
strongest supporters are conservative evangelical Christians, who remain one of the most 
 
12 For a useful recent survey of Christian Zionist beliefs, see Samuel Goldman, God’s Country: 
Christian Zionism in America (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).  
13 See Rashid Khalidi, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism 
and Resistance, 1917-2017 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020), 9.  
13 
 
important constituencies of the Republican Party. While support for Israel is a major 
concern of many evangelicals, research by political scientists Kenneth Wald, Herbert 
Weisberg, and others show that the politics of American Jews are often shaped by 
domestic issues more than by foreign policy concerns such as the American alliance with 
Israel.14 
Surveying the Historiography of U.S.-Israeli Relations 
In American Orientalism, his history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East 
since World War II, Douglas Little captured the complexity of U.S.-Israeli relations when 
he wrote that a “careful examination of the ambivalent and informal alliance that 
emerged between the United States and Israel during the fifty years after 1945 reveals 
that, more often than not, both simple arithmetic and differential calculus were at 
work.”15 Yet despite the richness of the subject, only two books tackle the entire length 
and breadth of U.S-Israeli relationship since 1948. Both were published in 1993, before 
many important diplomatic records were opened to researchers and before a new 
generation of historians brought new eyes to this “special relationship.”16 Political 
scientists are also deeply interested in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations and the unique 
challenges it poses for international relations (IR) theories.17 Much like traditional 
diplomatic historians, political scientists have been particularly concerned with the views 
 
 14 See Weisberg, Chapter 9 and Wald, Chapter 8. See also Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli 
Conflict in American Political Culture (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
 15 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 78.  
16 David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993) and Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  
17 For an early influential analysis, see Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981).  
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and actions of presidents and senior policymakers.18 Besides historians and political 
scientists, policymakers have also brought their expertise to bear on the history of U.S.-
Israeli relations to argue for or against the continuation of close U.S.-Israeli relations.19 
Most works that address U.S.-Israeli relations focus on very specific aspects of 
that relationship during narrow timespans. In recent years historians have produced a 
wide range of studies that analyze U.S.-Israeli relations as well as the United States’ 
broader relationship with the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. Much of this research 
has focused on the development of cultural ties between the United States and Israel. 
Building on the pioneering interdisciplinary scholarship of Melani McAlister, several 
historians have studied depictions of Israel in journalism, films, novels, and other sources 
to show that cultural ties between the United States and Israel are heavily based on their 
common democratic political systems, a similar European heritage, and a shared Judeo-
Christian religious tradition.20 Other works have used newly-declassified records from 
 
18 See George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1990), Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle 
East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), and William B. 
Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C. 
and Berkeley, CA: The Bookings Institution and California University Press, 1993).  
19 For an older analysis that is deeply skeptical of close U.S.-Israeli relations, see George W. Ball 
and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992). For a recent and much more sympathetic account, see 
Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israeli Relationship from Truman to Obama (New York: 
Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2015).  
20 See Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 
1945-2000 (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How America 
Came to View Israel as an Ally (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), Shaul 
Mitelpunkt, Israel in the American Mind: The Cultural Politics of US-Israeli Relations, 1958-1988 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), and Amy Kaplan, Our American Israel: The Story of 
an Entangled Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).  
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the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations to examine how U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East shaped and was shaped by individuals and groups in the Arab world.21 
Historians have also produced a rich literature on the place of Israel in American 
domestic politics. Much of the emphasis here is on the individuals, groups, and 
organizations that support Israel and pressure the U.S. government to adopt pro-Israel 
policies. In his 2019 book Israel’s Armor, Walter Hixson has written the first history of 
the pro-Israel lobby in the United States based on archival sources. Hixson’s work 
emphasizes that during the early decades of Israel’s history the strongest voices calling 
for closer U.S.-Israeli relations came from American Jews. However, the pro-Israel lobby 
in the United States has never been an exclusively Jewish effort. As conservative 
evangelicals became more prominent voices in American politics and society, they 
emerged as important allies of pro-Israel organizations such as the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Studies by Caitlin Carenen and Daniel Hummel trace the 
history of American Christians’ support for Israel from its earliest iteration among 
mainline Protestant denominations in the 1940s to conservative evangelicals from the 
1970s to the present.22 
 
21 See for instance Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), Paul Thomas 
Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the 
Making of the Post-Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), Roham Alvandi, Nixon, 
Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), James R. Stocker, Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967-
1976 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), Salim Yaqub, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, 
and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), and Seth 
Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2018).  
22 See Walter L. Hixson, Israel’s Armor: The Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the 
Palestinian Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), Caitlin Carenen, The Fervent 
Embrace: Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, and Israel (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 
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Most recently, Kenneth Kolander’s 2020 book America’s Israel illuminates the 
important role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping U.S.-Israeli relations during 
the years 1967-1975. By focusing on Congress rather than of the executive branch, 
Kolander aims to unite all the factors that shaped U.S.-Israel relations, from national 
security and the Cold War to domestic politics and Americans’ sympathy for Israel, into a 
single narrative. Kolander ultimately argues that Congress, not the White House, was the 
critical force in pushing the United States into a closer relationship with Israel. He 
concludes that “At the end of the day, U.S. presidents basically threw up their hands and 
realized that U.S. policy would become more pro-Israel, like it or not, and that going with 
that development was the path of least resistance.”23 Kolander is right to emphasize the 
importance of Congress, but this line of argument has its limits. For example, Ronald 
Reagan’s successful effort to push the sale of Air Warning and Control Systems 
(AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia through the Senate in 1981, over the vocal objections 
of the Israeli government and Israel’s U.S. supporters, is a sign that presidents have not 
ceded the initiative in shaping the U.S.-Israeli relationship to Congress completely.  
Despite all that has been written about U.S.-Israeli relations in recent years, there 
are still important aspects of this area of U.S. foreign policy to explore. First, historians 
have written a great deal about the State Department’s role in shaping U.S.-Israeli 
relations, but much less has been said about the role of the Department of Defense. 
Among American officials who questioned the need and advisability of establishing a 
 
and Daniel G. Hummel, Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.-Israeli Relations (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).  
23 Kenneth Kolander, America’s Israel: The US Congress and American-Israeli Relations, 1967-
1975 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2020), 184.  
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closer diplomatic and military relationship with Israel, some of the loudest voices came 
from both uniformed and civilian officials in the Defense Department. Their arguments 
are important because they often arrived at their conclusions based on the judgments of 
professional military and intelligence reports comparing Israel’s military capabilities to 
those of Israel’s real and potential adversaries. These instances and others further 
emphasize the divisions within the U.S. government about U.S.-Israeli relations. 
Additionally, the fact that Israel has been the largest recipient of American 
military aid provides a unique opportunity to examine military aid as a tool of foreign 
policy. A deeper investigation into the national security documentation from the 
administrations studied here reveals that U.S. officials debated just about every aspect of 
U.S. military aid to Israel, from the level of aid (in terms of U.S. dollars), the types of 
military equipment the U.S. would provide, and the mechanism by which that aid would 
be provided. The latter usually took the form of loans or grants, which involved the U.S. 
providing Israel with the funds to purchase American weaponry, in what amounted to a 
government subsidy for the U.S. arms industry.24  
Another aspect of U.S.-Israeli relations that has received little attention to date is 
the role of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. Apart from one 2018 article in 
Diplomatic History, historians have not closely examined how the Israeli settler 
movement, which began after the 1967 war and grew steadily from the 1970s onward, 
 
24 Kolander makes this point in his new book, see America’s Israel, 15. It was also made by 
Haaretz journalist Anshel Pheffer in a recent episode of the podcast Haaretz Weekly, Episode 95, 
September 6, 2020.   
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affected the U.S.-Israel alliance.25 This is particularly important because the persistence 
and growth of Israeli settlements emerged during the 1970s was one of the most 
significant barriers to successful Arab-Israeli negotiations, making it a major concern of 
American negotiators.   
Finally, this dissertation delves into the ways in which the Ford, Carter, and 
Reagan administrations tried to use their efforts to build closer U.S.-Israeli relations in 
order to develop, strengthen, or rebuild the administration’s relationship to the American 
Jewish community. Despite American Jews’ complex feelings toward the State of Israel, 
political operatives in the Ford administration, for instance, concluded that U.S. relations 
with Israel were the most important issue for American Jews and thus the key to securing 
a larger share of the Jewish vote in the 1976 election. White House officials in the Carter 
and Reagan administrations held similar beliefs and acted accordingly.  
Archival Research 
 This dissertation draws on a wide variety of documents from research in 
published and digitized collections and archival holdings around the United States. 
During the summer of 2019, I conducted extensive research at the Gerald Ford, Jimmy 
Carter, and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries in collections focused on both foreign 
policy and domestic politics. That summer I also visited the Spencer Research Library at 
the University of Kansas in Lawrence to access their collection of newspapers and 
periodicals published by domestic political organizations such as the Moral Majority. 
Although I was unable to visit them in person, I also incorporate materials from the 
 
25 Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, “Distraction and Deception: Israeli Settlements, Vietnam, and the Johnson 
Administration,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June, 2018), 456-483.  
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digital collections of several other archives, including the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential 
Library.  
In addition to these archival collections, I draw extensively on several important 
published primary source collections. Foremost of these is the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series published by the State Department’s Office of the Historian. Despite 
their convenient accessibility, FRUS volumes represent only a fraction of the available 
documentation on U.S. foreign policy. They are a curated window into the inner 
workings of U.S. foreign policymaking, and the Office of the Historian has not published 
as many volumes of documents as historians would like.26 Nonetheless, this collection is 
an extraordinarily useful resource for historians of U.S. foreign policy, and I draw heavily 
on volumes from all the presidential administrations covered throughout this dissertation. 
They are an essential starting point for research into U.S.-Israeli relations. Additionally, 
publications such as the Department of State Bulletin, the Public Papers of the 
Presidents, and the Congressional Record are invaluable sources for U.S. officials’ 
speeches, public statements, and comments at press conferences.  
I also utilize a wide range of other published primary sources, including oral 
histories, memoirs, diaries, journalistic accounts, novels, periodicals, and newspapers. 
Diaries and memoirs from officials are an important source in my research, though they 
must be used with caution and in conjunction with other sources. While memoirs and oral 
histories provide an individual’s post facto view of events they participated in, diaries, 
 
26 For instance, several volumes from the Reagan administration that deal with the Middle East 
have been completed but are still under declassification review. See the “Status of the Foreign Relations of 
the United States Series” page on the Office of the Historian’s website. (URL: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/status-of-the-series). (Accessed 6/2/2021).  
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newspapers, and archival records compliment these types of sources by showing what 
those same individuals thought and wrote in the moment. Periodicals such as Foreign 
Affairs, Commentary, and the New York Review of Books provide further windows into 
how concerned individuals (including intellectuals, journalists, and former government 
officials) reacted to events as they were happening and in their immediate aftermath.  
Chapter Summaries 
This dissertation primarily focuses on the more recent history of the 1970s and 
1980s, but the story I tell has much deeper roots. In Chapter One, I survey the longer 
history of the role that the territory of Palestine (in which Israel was created) and Jews 
have played in American culture, politics, and diplomacy from the end of the eighteenth 
century to the middle of the twentieth. It links the pre-1945 years to what came 
afterwards while at the same time emphasizing that the foundation of the state of Israel in 
1947-1948 marked the start of a distinctly new phase in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East. While the United States under President Harry Truman took the important steps of 
voting to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states in late 1947 and recognized 
Israel when it declared its independence in 1948, U.S. officials did not immediately see 
Israel as a useful strategic partner in the Middle East. The Truman administration’s 
approach to Israel continued throughout the first of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency.  
Chapter Two picks up the story in the second half of the 1950s and tracks the 
development of ties between the United States and Israel from the second term of Dwight 
D. Eisenhower to the end of the 1960s and the election of 1968. This chapter explores 
how American officials began to soften their opposition to aligning more closely with 
Israel and selling Israel American military equipment. In 1956, American officials were 
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outraged at Israel’s participation in the joint British-French effort to seize the Suez Canal, 
but nonetheless impressed with Israel’s military capabilities. Eisenhower’s successors 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, two politicians who were deeply sympathetic 
to Israel, were the first to authorize the sale of sophisticated weapons to Israel including 
surface-to-air missiles, tanks, and attack aircraft. This chapter also delves into the parallel 
developments in American culture during these same years, which saw the American 
people develop a deeper knowledge of and sympathy for the Jewish state, and the 
domestic developments in American society that enabled this shift.  
Before his election in 1968, Richard Nixon did not have a special connection to 
Israel or a strong relationship to American Jewry. Yet he presided over a vitally 
important era in U.S.-Israeli relations. As I describe in Chapter Three, though Nixon’s 
highest foreign policy priorities during his time in the White House were the U.S. war in 
Vietnam and relations with the Soviet Union, his administration presided over significant 
increases in U.S. military aid to Israel, culminating in the U.S. airlift during the October 
War of 1973. Richard Nixon’s role in deepening U.S.-Israeli ties is doubly ironic given 
that he routinely used antisemitic language to refer to Jewish politicians and journalists 
who criticized his policies. The Nixon administration is also important because it made 
Henry Kissinger, a German-born Jewish academic, one of the most powerful and 
controversial diplomats in the history of U.S. foreign relations. Kissinger played a vital 
role in shaping U.S.-Israeli relations during his tenure in government.    
Chapter Four analyzes the brief but influential tenure of Gerald Ford as president 
and the role of his administration in deepening U.S.-Israeli ties. In many ways the Ford 
administration was a continuation of the Nixon administration, including the fact that 
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Kissinger remained Secretary of State, and Ford generally deferred to his more 
experienced adviser. Nevertheless, several important developments occurred during the 
years 1974-1976 that merit wider discussion. Most importantly, it was during the Ford 
administration that Kissinger negotiated the Sinai II Accords, a limited disengagement 
between Israel and Egypt that would have long-lasting consequences for U.S.-Israeli 
relations and the Middle East region. Ford’s brief tenure in office also saw controversies 
related to Israeli settlement building and antisemitism within the U.S. government.  
Gerald Ford’s successor, Jimmy Carter, is well-known for his efforts to achieve 
Arab-Israeli peace in the Middle East. Through his negotiations at Camp David in 
September of 1978, Carter successfully concluded a peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt, the first such treaty between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. But while this 
effort was a major development in the history of U.S. foreign policy and Middle East 
politics, it was not as transformational as Carter and others hoped for. Chapter Five 
explores U.S. diplomatic initiatives before, during, and after the Camp David 
negotiations, but broadens the lens for understanding U.S.-Israeli relations during these 
years. In addition to examining the Carter administration’s efforts to achieve peace in the 
Middle East, it examines how U.S. policy toward Israel fits into the larger context of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf. It also explores how, in 
the domestic climate of American politics, American Jews, neoconservatives, and 
American evangelicals criticized the Carter administration for taking such a tough line 
with Israel. This deepening animosity was one factors that contributed to Carter’s loss in 
the 1980 presidential election to Ronald Reagan. By looking at how U.S.-Israeli relations 
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played into both domestic politics at home in the U.S. and American foreign policy in the 
Persian Gulf region, this chapter situates U.S.-Israeli relations into these larger contexts.   
The final chapter, Chapter Six, explores U.S.-Israeli relations during the 
administration of Ronald Reagan. On the one hand, the Reagan administration seemed 
primed for a deepening of U.S.-Israeli ties. After all, Reagan had on many occasions 
expressed his sympathy for and support of Israel, and his first secretary of state, 
Alexander Haig, was a prominent supporter of Israel. As if to confirm this deepening of 
the U.S.-Israeli alliance, U.S. and Israeli officials signed a new memorandum of 
understanding at the end of 1981 that called for greater strategic cooperation between the 
two countries. But a series of events during Reagan’s first term in office demonstrated 
that this was not to be. Between the American sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, 
the Israeli government’s decision to annex the Golan Heights, and Israel’s 1982 invasion 
of Lebanon, events in the Middle East signaled that U.S.-Israeli ties remained troubled by 
the same differences as in previous years.    
The Conclusion follows up on many of the themes discussed throughout this 
dissertation by offering a brief survey of U.S.-Israeli relations from the 1980s to the 
present day. It will also review the major themes of this dissertation and suggest some 




Chapter 1: The United States, the Middle East, and Israel From the 18th Century to 
the 1950s 
 On May 14, 1948, Elihu Epstein, the representative of the Jewish Agency in the 
United States, sent a message to President Harry Truman informing him that an 
independent Jewish state had been proclaimed in Palestine. Citing the “deep bond of 
sympathy which has existed and been strengthened over the past thirty years between the 
Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine,” Epstein expressed 
his hope that the United States would immediately recognize Israel and welcome it into 
“the community of nations.”27 That same day, Secretary of State George Marshall 
announced on behalf of the President that “The United States recognizes the provisional 
government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.”28 With this brief 
statement, the United States became the first country to recognize the new state of Israel 
and began a new phase of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The Soviet Union 
followed three days later, setting up a Cold War rivalry in the region.  
 But while this moment set the stage for decades of U.S.-Israeli relations, it did not 
come out of nowhere. To fully understand the United States’ relationship with Israel in 
the decades after 1948, it is necessary to explore the longer history of American 
involvement in the Middle East before that fateful moment. Although American 
policymakers’ interest in the Middle East increased dramatically in the twentieth century, 
especially following the Second World War, Americans have long been fascinated by the 
 
27 Epstein to Truman, May 14, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, 
Volume V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing 
Office, 1976), 989.  
28 Marshall to Epstein, Washington, May 14, 1948, Ibid., 992.  
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region for its religious and cultural significance, its energy resources, and its role in 
geopolitics. This chapter surveys the history of American interest and involvement in the 
Middle East, especially regarding Palestine and Israel, from the late eighteenth century to 
the mid-1950s.   
The United States and the Middle East before the Twentieth Century 
 Historians have identified American interests in the Middle East going all the way 
back to the origins of the United States in the eighteenth century. In his analysis of the 
long breadth of American involvement in the Middle East throughout American history, 
historian Michael Oren argues that, from the very beginning, American involvement in 
the region was shaped by three related and often-intervening factors: power, faith, and 
fantasy. Long before the United States became a major world power, Americans saw the 
Muslim world in what would later be called the Middle East as a stark contrast to the 
United States, an inverted image of the society they were trying to build in North 
America. The Middle East was also the scene of one of the United States’ first foreign 
policy crises when pirates from North Africa’s Barbary states attacked American ships 
and kidnapped American sailors for ransom at the end of the eighteenth century and in 
the early years of the nineteenth. Americans’ views on racial slavery in the United States 
and their views of the indigenous peoples in North America shaped their views of 
foreigners from the very beginning of these encounters. This crisis forced Americans to 
address the vulnerabilities of their new nation.29  
 
 29 See Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007). On Americans’ views of Islam in the early history of the 
United States, see Robert J. Allison, The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World 
1776-1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). On Americans and the Barbary crises in the Early 
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Jewish people were among the first European settlers to reach North America, 
though their numbers remained small until the nineteenth century. For Jews living in 
North America during the first decades of the United States in the late eighteenth century, 
their status in a new democracy was foremost in their minds, much more so than the 
status of the small number of Jews living in Palestine or the prospect of reestablishing a 
Jewish state. Far more pressing was the need to carve out a place in the new nation whose 
people were mostly Christian and saw Jews as either outliers or potential converts.30  
 Religion was one of the most important lenses through which white Americans 
viewed the Middle East during the nineteenth century. This manifested itself in a variety 
of ways. Firstly, as historian Karine Walther points out, Americans saw religion, and 
specifically Islam, as the key defining feature of Muslim societies in the Middle East and 
elsewhere, regardless of local history, culture, and economics. These predominantly 
Protestant Americans saw their own faith as inherently superior to Islam, and this led 
them to conclude that the only way to improve the lives of those living in the Middle East 
was through foreign intervention. To that end, American Protestant evangelists launched 
missions to the Arab-speaking Middle East to convert the local population to Christianity. 
As historians such as Ussama Makdisi have shown, these efforts to convert Muslims to 
Christianity were largely unsuccessful, but missionaries did leave their mark on the 
region, especially through their construction of schools and universities in cities such as 
Beirut and Cairo. Finally, Jews, who made up a very small percentage of the U.S. 
 
Republic, see Lawrence A. Peskin, Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 
1785-1816 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).  
30 See Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), Preface-
Chapter 1.  
27 
 
population before the nineteenth century,31 played an important role in American 
diplomacy in the Arab world during these early years as official representatives and 
unofficial intermediaries.32  
 Tourism was another lens through which Americans interpreted the Middle East. 
One of the most famous accounts of an American in the Middle East from the nineteenth 
century was Mark Twain’s 1869 travelogue The Innocents Abroad. Twain, author of such 
classic American novels as The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, traveled to Palestine, then a poor and isolated province of the Ottoman 
Empire, in 1867 as part of a larger foreign trip that also took him to Europe. Like many 
Americans, Twain was steeped in stories from the Bible, and expected to step into the 
world of the Old and New Testaments. But when he came to Palestine, he was shocked at 
how much his image of the place differed from the reality. Trying to understand this 
discrepancy, Twain wrote that perhaps “it was because I could not conceive of a small 
country having so large a history.”33 The American writer was particularly disappointed 
in the Holy City of Jerusalem, writing that “Renowned Jerusalem itself, the stateliest 
name in history, has lost all its grandeur, and is become a pauper village.”34  
 
31 The American Jewish population grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century, but 
experienced dramatic growth during the massive waves of immigration from southern and eastern Europe 
from 1890-1914. For exact figures, see “Total Jewish Population in the United States (1654-Present,” 
Jewish Virtual Library, (URL: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-population-in-the-united-states-
nationally). (Accessed 6/24/2021).  
 32 See Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy; Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American 
Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); 
and Karine V. Walther, Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821-1921 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).  
33 Mark Twain, Innocents Abroad, or The New Pilgrim’s Progress (Washington, D.C.: American 
Publishing Co., 1869), 486.  
34 Ibid., 607.  
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Twain was not the last American who was forced to reconcile his vision of 
Palestine with the reality of the place itself. Seeking to capitalize on the many American 
Christians who could not afford to travel to the Holy Land but were willing to pay to 
experience it indirectly, entrepreneurs sought out ways to bring the Holy Land to them. 
Through scholarly publications, maps, and images, Americans could see glimpses of the 
Holy Land in their own country, without having to travel thousands of miles. These 
representations were as much a reflection of the time and place in the United States 
where they were created as they were of the Biblical history they depicted.35  
 Closer to home, some American Christians were developing new ideas about the 
land known as Palestine. Even before organized Zionism became a significant political 
and ideological force in American, European, and Jewish politics, some devoutly 
religious Protestants in the United States (and a few in Great Britain) foresaw an 
important role for Jews and the Holy Land. These Christians believed that the Bible 
should be read literally according to their particular interpretations, and that it laid out 
how the end of the world would arrive. A key component in the Second Coming of Christ 
was the return of the Jewish people to the land known as Palestine, a development that 
was necessary for Christ to return. One of the most significant figures in this nineteenth-
century movement was John Nelson Darby (1800-1882), an Anglo-Irish pastor who first 
articulated the idea that human history was divided into distinct eras or dispensations, a 
theology known as dispensationalism. 
 
35 On this theme, see Burke O. Long, Imagining the Holy Land: Maps, Models, and Fantasy 
Travels (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003).  
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Another important figure was an American evangelist named William Blackstone 
(1841-1935), author of a document called the “Blackstone Memorial.” Addressed to 
world leaders including the U.S. president Benjamin Harrison, the “Blackstone 
Memorial” was a plea for world leaders to facilitate the return of the Jews to Palestine. 
Dated March 5, 1891, the message read in part:  
Why not give Palestine back to [the Jews] again? According to God’s distribution 
of nations it is their home – an inalienable possession from which they were 
expelled by force. Under their cultivation it was a remarkably fruitful land, 
sustaining millions of Israelites, who industriously tilled its hillsides and valleys. 
They were agriculturalists and producers as well as a national of great commercial 
importance – the center of civilization and religion.36  
 
The letter to Harrison was signed by many prominent Americans from powerful 
industrialists like John D. Rockefeller Sr. and politicians like House Speaker Thomas 
Reed, but Blackstone received no formal response from the White House.  
In addition to their humanitarian concerns, some American evangelicals also 
hoped to convert Jews to Christianity. Throughout the history of Jewish-Christian 
relations, Christian missions to Jewish communities in the United States was a significant 
part of that relationship and a major source of tension between Christians and Jews. For 
many American evangelical Christians, the return of the Jews to the Holy Land was part 
of their own unique vision of God’s plan for the world, and would later be known as 
Christian Zionists. In the second half of the twentieth century, they emerged as some of 
Israel’s strongest American supporters.37  
 
36 “‘To Show Kindness to Israel’: William Blackstone’s Memorial,” updated July 1, 2020. (URL: 
https://fromthevault.wheaton.edu/2020/07/01/to-show-kindness-to-israel-william-blackstones-memorial/). 
(Accessed 11/25/20).  
 37 On Christian missions to Jews in American history, see Yaakov Ariel, Evangelizing the Chosen 
People: Missions to the Jews in America, 1880-2000 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000). On the 19th century origins of Christian Zionism in Great Britain and the United States, see Victoria 
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In imagining “the Middle East” as a place of historic and religious wonder and its 
people, both Christians and Jews, as at times both admirable and inferior, Americans of 
the nineteenth century were adding their own voices to a broader European intellectual 
discourse about the region. Surveying primarily British and French writings, the 
Palestinian literary scholar and critic Edward Said labeled this discourse “Orientalism.” 
According to Said, British and French writers treated the region now called the Middle 
East (which included much of the Arab world) not on its own terms but solely in relation 
to Europe or “the West.” Significantly, the “Orient” was also positioned as inherently 
weaker and thus under the domination of the West, including colonial powers such as 
Great Britain and France.38 
From Zionism to the Rise of Nazi Germany 
Elsewhere in the world, the end of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of 
Zionism, the organized global movement to establish an independent Jewish state in 
which Jews from around the world could be safe from antisemitism. Zionists discussed 
several potential locations at different times, but they ultimately settled on Palestine, then 
part of the Ottoman Empire, as the location for a future Jewish state. While the notion of 
Jews returning to their ancestral homeland was not new in Jewish tradition and thought, it 
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38 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), especially 5-6. For a 
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had diminished by the nineteenth century as many European governments reduced 
restrictions on Jewish commercial and political activity. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, many Jews had successfully integrated themselves into predominantly Christian 
societies of Western Europe and the United States, though antisemitism never 
disappeared entirely.39  
The appearance of peaceful assimilation into Western European society was 
severely challenged by widespread antisemitism in the Russian Empire in eastern Europe, 
where the largest Jewish population in Europe lived. Jewish communities in Russia were 
frequently victims of pogroms, large-scale violence directed against Jewish communities, 
including waves of violence in 1881-1882 and 1903-1906 that were especially severe. 
Even Western Europe was not immune. In France, antisemitism was at the root of the 
1895 court-martial of a French army officer, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was falsely 
accused of spying for Germany, charges Dreyfus himself consistently denied. The 
Dreyfus affair, pogroms in Russia, and other incidents convinced many Jews that Jewish 
acceptance and safety in Christian European society was impossible. All this occurred 
against the backdrop of rising nationalist movements around the world and especially in 
Europe as national groups chafed under the rule of weaking Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman empires.40  
 The most important figure of the early Zionist movement was a man named 
Theodor Herzl (1860-1904). Born in what was then the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Herzl 
 
39 For a comprehensive analysis of European Jewish history during the “long nineteenth century,” 
see David Vital, A People Apart: The Jews in Europe 1789-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
 40 On the Dreyfus affair, see Eric Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics 
(London and New York: Longman, 1996).  
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came from a well-off Jewish family and worked as a lawyer, journalist, and writer. But 
Herzl’s most important contribution to Jewish history was as an activist for creating a 
Jewish state in Palestine. He articulated his views most clearly in the 1896 pamphlet Der 
Judenstaat, or “The Jewish State,” in which he called on the world to “Let sovereignty be 
granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of 
a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves.”41 While Herzl came from a highly 
assimilated background, he saw the Dreyfus case as evidence that European antisemitism 
remained strong, and that the only way for Jews to be safe to live as Jews was to create an 
independent Jewish state. In addition to seeking Jewish support for immigration to 
Palestine, Herzl and other Zionists also sought political and financial support from major 
Western European powers, especially France and Great Britain.42  
 Though large numbers of Jews had been expelled from Palestine by the Roman 
Empire during the first and second centuries CE, a small Jewish community remained in 
Palestine, living under successive Muslim regimes in the Holy Cities of Jerusalem, 
Tibereas, Safad, and Hebron. By the eighteenth century, these Jews were living under the 
rule of the Ottoman Empire and were vastly outnumbered by the Muslim population of 
the region. Their numbers began to grow as Jewish immigration to Palestine increased 
significantly in response to the Zionist movement and the waves of anti-Jewish violence 
in Russia around the turn of the twentieth century. Waves of Jewish immigration to 
 
 41 Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: Dover Publications, 1988), 92.  
 42 On Herzl’s background, see Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1980), Chapter 3. On his importance to the Zionist movement, see Benny Morris, 
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Palestine or “Aliyahs” (literally translated as “going up,” or returning to the Land of 
Israel) closely followed anti-Jewish violence in Russia, with the first two major waves 
arriving in the 1880s and in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the help of 
wealthy Zionist allies, Zionist activists purchased land in Palestine from absentee Muslim 
and Christian landlords, built settlements, and established a new governmental structure 
known as the Yishuv.43  
 Jewish settlement in Palestine during this era was shaped by the kibbutz 
movement. Originating in the early twentieth century and heavily influenced by Russian 
socialist political ideals, the kibbutz movement was dedicated to building agricultural 
settlements in Palestine on land purchased by Jews from absentee Arab landlords. The 
kibbutz movement played a critical role in bringing Jews to Palestine, establishing new 
Jewish settlements there, and protecting them from outside interference or attack. These 
new and growing Jewish settlements coexisted uneasily with the local Palestinian Arab 
population, which still far outnumbered the region’s Jewish population. By 1914, the 
same year that World War I began, there were around 60,000 Jews living in Palestine, 
among a Muslim population of over 500,000. The early twentieth century also saw the 
emergence of what would become a distinct Palestinian national identity, largely (but not 
exclusively) in reaction to Zionism.44  
 
 43 On the early years of the Yishuv, see Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapters One-Two. 
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Palestine was not the only destination of Jewish migrants fleeing Europe and 
Russia in search of safety and opportunity. Thousands more emigrated to the United 
States during the final decades of the nineteenth century. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, Jews battled economic hardship, antisemitism, and religious discrimination to 
build a prosperous and vibrant community. While prejudice against Jews in the United 
States would never disappear entirely, one of the factors that contributed significantly to 
its decline was the gradual acceptance of European Jews (who were the majority of the 
Jews entering the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) 
as racially white. As Jews “became white” instead of racially “Jewish,” they could, in the 
American racial hierarchy of the era, be assimilated into white society instead of 
remaining permanent outsiders.45 This is deeply ironic given that religious communities 
around the world that identify with Judaism do not fit neatly into the American racial 
schema.46 
Perhaps because of their remarkable success in the United States, American Jews 
never fully embraced Zionism to the extent that Jews elsewhere did. Instead, Zionism 
remained a relatively small movement in the U.S. until the 1930s, when the rise of the 
Nazi regime in Germany with its increasingly troubling anti-Jewish rhetoric and policies 
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alarmed many American Jews. But despite greater political and especially financial 
support, divisions within the Zionist movement in the U.S. prevented it from coalescing 
into a unified force that could effectively lobby the U.S. government until after World 
War II. Even after Israel declared its independence and became a viable state, very few 
American Jews left the United States to make Aliyah to live in a Jewish state.47  
 The First World War had a significant impact on the future of the Middle East. 
Eager to break up the Ottoman Empire, an ally of Germany, and enlarge their own 
colonial possessions, allies Great Britain and France conducted extensive negotiations 
with Arab representatives to encourage them to revolt against Ottoman rule. The British 
also negotiated with Zionist leaders, promising them a Jewish homeland in Palestine in 
exchange for their assistance during World War I. To that end, Britain’s foreign 
secretary, Arthur Balfour, wrote in a letter to Lord Rothschild, a prominent British Jew 
and Zionist, in November of 1917 that “His Majesty’s Government view with favor the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object.”48 This document, which 
became known as the Balfour Declaration, and was greeted with excitement by Zionists 
and outrage by Arabs in Palestine, was an important turning point in the history of the 
Middle East. For the first time, a European power had committed itself in writing to 
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establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. But despite British promises, events took a 
different course when the war ended in November of 1918.  
 Both the British and French broke their promises to both Arabs and Zionists after 
World War I as they set about building a postwar world. In the Middle East, the British 
and French divided the region up between them into “mandates,” which amounted to 
territories controlled by one empire or the other but were not designated formal colonies. 
As was the case elsewhere with other national and ethnic groups hoping for independence 
from Great Powers such as Great Britain and France, the views and desires of the local 
populations in Palestine were largely ignored at the Versailles peace conference in 1919. 
The Americans, who entered World War I in 1917 and fought alongside British and 
French forces throughout 1918, remained largely absent from these post-war discussions 
on the fate of the Middle East. Though American U.S. president Woodrow Wilson had 
voiced support for Zionism, the U.S. mostly drew back from trying to shape international 
affairs following the end of the war.49 
 The First World War and its aftermath shaped the emerging conflict between 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine over the territory’s future. Faced with a majority-Muslim 
Arab population angry about Britain’s wartime promise of a Jewish state, the British 
government pulled back from its own words in the Balfour Declaration. The 1920s and 
1930s saw a sharp rise in violence between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, including major 
clashes in 1920-1921, 1929, and 1936-1939. Feeling betrayed by the British, Jewish 
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leaders in Palestine turned the Yishuv into a shadow Jewish government in waiting and 
built up Jewish military forces in preparation for a future struggle for independence. In 
response to these outbreaks of violence, a need to maintain stability in a region with vital 
oil supplies, and concerns about the growing power of Nazi Germany in Europe, British 
authorities set strict limits on the number of Jewish immigrants who were allowed to 
enter Palestine in 1939. Though this restriction seemed to favor Palestinians who opposed 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, the British also took steps to make sure that Arabs, who 
were still the majority of the population, never gained real political power in Palestine.50   
 As British authorities restricted Jewish entry into Palestine, the rise and 
consolidation of the Nazi regime in Germany under Adolf Hitler was making Europe a 
much more dangerous place for Jews. After Germany’s defeat in World War I, the 
government of the Kaiser was replaced by a democratic government under a new 
constitution signed in the city of Weimar in August of 1919. The Weimar Republic, as 
Germany’s government of the 1920s became known, was beset by economic difficulties 
and political challenges from both the right and the left throughout the decade. One group 
vying for power in Weimar Germany was the National Socialist German Workers’ party, 
better known as the Nazi party, led by Adolf Hitler, a charismatic orator and Austrian-
born veteran of World War I. After years as a minority party in Weimar politics, the 
Nazis made significant gains in the election of 1932. Thinking that they could control 
Hitler and the Nazis by including them in the government, conservative German 
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politicians agreed to make Hitler chancellor in 1933. But once in power, Hitler did not 
relinquish it until his death in 1945.51  
Two of the core tenants of Nazi ideology were a vision of a “pure Aryan German 
race” and a view of the Jewish people as true and irrevocable enemies of the German 
nation. Once in power, Hitler and the Nazis took steps to restrict the rights of Germany’s 
Jews. This effort culminated in the passage of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, which 
stripped “non-Aryans” of their German citizenship and forbade Jews from inter-marrying 
with other Germans. German Jews were victims of state-sanctioned violence under the 
Nazi regime, including the events of Kristallnacht on the night of November 9-10, 1938, 
when hundreds of synagogues and Jewish-owned businesses were attacked and burned. 
Thousands of Jews who could escape Germany fled to any place they could get to, 
including Palestine, Western Europe, and the United States.52   
 During the 1930s, the United States took few steps to aid European Jews or to 
increase the number of refugees allowed to enter the United States from Europe. While 
some critics blamed antisemitism within the State Department and the administration of 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt for the United States’ inaction, careful research by 
historians such as Richard Breitman, Alan Kraut, and Allan Lichtman reveals that the 
reality was more complicated. While antisemitism did play a role in some cases, 
especially for some senior officials of the State Department, it is not the only explanation 
for American refugee policy during the 1930s. Instead, it was a combination of 
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bureaucratic opposition to change, popular resistance to increased immigration, and 
President Roosevelt’s unwillingness to take political risks that resulted in the United 
States taking in only a small percentage of Jews trying to reach the United States from 
Europe. Unfortunately for European Jews, these restrictions came at the very moment 
when many were trying to flee persecution in Europe in the 1930s. Among those 
European Jews who did escape to the United States was the family of future Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, who reached the United States from Germany with the help of a 
cousin in New York City.53  
World War II, the Holocaust, and the Birth of the State of Israel 
 The rise of the Nazi regime in Germany under Adolf Hitler in 1933 and the onset 
of World War II in 1939 inaugurated the most devastating and tragic era in the history of 
the Jewish people. Nazi persecution of Jews began almost immediately after Hitler came 
to power in 1933 and escalated over the coming years. Once World War II began, 
German authorities in Nazi-occupied territories began large-scale efforts to deport 
European Jews from their homes and into ghettos. This process began in Poland, which 
was conquered by German forces in 1939, and repeated in other countries captured by 
German forces. In addition to ghettoization, the Nazi occupation of Poland also saw the 
first mass executions of Jews by German occupation forces.  
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 Nazi efforts to exterminate European Jewry expanded dramatically following the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Initially executions were carried 
out by German military and occupation forces using small arms and with the help of local 
collaborators; some scholars have called this early phase of the Holocaust on the Eastern 
Front the “Holocaust by Bullets.” The first death camp was established in late 1941, and 
the pace of killings increased dramatically throughout 1942 and into 1943 as Jews from 
other parts of Europe were deported to death camps in German-occupied Poland. Nazi 
efforts to exterminate European Jews continued right up until the end of the war in 
1945.54 
 News of mass killings of Jews on in Europe began reaching Jews in the United 
States in 1942. Despite later accusations that American Jews were indifferent to the 
suffering of their co-religionists across the Atlantic Ocean, the vast majority of American 
Jews had relatives living in Europe and were thus deeply concerned with events there. 
Desperate to aid European Jews, American Jewish organizations pressured the Roosevelt 
administration to do what it could to aid European Jews. But either because their 
priorities were elsewhere or because there was little they could do to halt the mass killing 
of Jews short of defeating the Nazi regime, Roosevelt and the U.S. government did little 
specifically to aid European Jews until relatively late in the war, by which time it was too 
late to save the millions who had already perished. The two most prominent examples of 
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American efforts to aid European Jews during the Holocaust were the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee (known simply as the Joint or JDC), which conducted 
extensive operations in Europe to assist European Jews both before and during World 
War II, and the War Refugee Board, a governmental body established to coordinate state 
and private relief efforts to save European Jews and to aid Jewish refugees fleeing the 
Nazis. Though their own government did comparatively little to aid the victims of the 
Holocaust, American Jews’ efforts were impressive given the challenges they faced.55  
 The end of World War II was the beginning of a new era in the history of 
American foreign relations and in the politics of the Middle East. As the only major 
industrial nation that went largely untouched by the destruction of the war, the United 
States was able to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to 
fight the Germans, Italians, and the Japanese, and supply much of its allies’ military 
equipment. By the end of the war, the United States had the largest military in the world 
and its economy grew dramatically during the war, boosting American recovery from the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. American allies on the other hand, including Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union, were in much worse shape. Their economies were badly damaged, 
and their civilian populations had been devastated (especially the Soviet Union, which 
suffered the most casualties of any country in World War II). But while the United States 
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had rejected an international role following the First World War, American officials acted 
differently this time around.    
 In a dramatic break with its pre-war foreign policy, the United States took on a 
new role as the world’s most important political, diplomatic, and economic power after 
World War II and took concrete steps to increase its influence around the world. With the 
Marshall Plan, the U.S. dispatched millions of dollars to help rebuild the devastated 
economies and infrastructures of Western Europe. But despite the wartime alliance 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, growing tensions between the two major powers 
led American officials to conclude that even the smallest Soviet advance or challenge to 
the United States, its interests, or to American allies anywhere in the world had to be met 
with an American response. To this end, President Harry Truman pledged American aid 
to Greece and Turkey to stave off Soviet domination in what became known as the 
Truman Doctrine. The United States also began building a military alliance among 
Western European allies that later became known as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). The Truman administration also deployed American military 
forces to defend South Korea in 1950 as part of the Korean War to defend against what 
American officials saw as an attack on an American ally by a Soviet ally. Finally, the 
United States also reorganized its entire foreign policy apparatus with the National 
Security Act of 1947, establishing among other things, an independent air force, the 
National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and a new cabinet-level 
civilian post, Secretary of Defense, to oversee this massive new military capability.56   
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 Along with Western Europe and East Asia, the Middle East was another area 
where the Truman administration was extremely worried about expanding Soviet 
influence. The Middle East was a concern for several reasons, starting with the fact that it 
was home to some of the world’s largest oil reserves. While the United States in the 
1940s produced oil for domestic consumption and exported oil to its allies during World 
War II, it was becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. could not continue to supply its 
own oil indefinitely, sooner or later, it would need to import oil from abroad. 
Furthermore, Middle Eastern oil was a vital resource for the recovering economies of 
Western Europe and Japan, which the United States was helping to rebuild following the 
devastation of World War II. As a result, American policymakers took a special interest 
in the Middle East because of its energy resources. Maintaining Western access to the 
region’s energy resources emerged as a major goal of American foreign policy.57 
 At this early juncture, the Truman administration hoped that the United States 
could rely on its ally, Great Britain, to protect American interests in the Middle East. The 
British had significant interests in the Middle East stretching back to the nineteenth 
century and especially in the aftermath of World War I when they and the French had 
carved up the region between them. After World War II, the British first tried to maintain 
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their influence in the region, but gradually it became clear that this would be impossible. 
With its infrastructure and economy devastated by war and a diminishing domestic 
appetite for an overseas empire, many British officials were looking for ways to cut back 
Britain’s overseas commitments. One of those places was Palestine, which had no 
important oil resources and was the site of tense and increasingly violent relations 
between Palestinian Arabs and Jews.58 
 But support for a close American ally and a desire to ensure that the West had 
reliable access to the region’s oil were not the only factors behind the growing American 
interest in the Middle East after World War II. While senior American policymakers were 
focused on the geopolitical implications of the region, a growing number of American 
Jews were eager for the United States to become more deeply involved in the region for 
different reasons. Chief among them was American Jews’ support for establishing a 
Jewish state in Palestine that would serve as a refuge for Jews fleeing the Holocaust and 
would be a safe place for these refugees to live as Jews in the years to come.   
 The Holocaust had galvanized American Jews. While American Jews were 
limited in what they could do to help the victims of Adolf Hitler’s genocide in Europe 
during World War II, after the war they were determined to do more. Prior to 1945, only 
a small number of American Jews had supported Zionist causes, but that was about to 
change dramatically as more details emerged about the Nazi effort to eliminate European 
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Jewry during World War II. Given the news of German atrocities committed against 
European Jews during the war and the plight of Jewish refugees in Europe after the war 
had ended, American Jews’ support for a Jewish state in Palestine increased dramatically. 
This support took the form of both political activism and financial contributions to 
Zionist organizations and causes.59   
 American and British officials disagreed about what to do with the massive 
number of Jewish refugees, many of whom had survived death or concentration camps. 
Despite the damage done to Britain’s military and economic standing by World War II, 
the British were initially eager to reassert their power and influence in the Middle East 
because of the region’s vital energy resources. This effort was undermined by an influx 
of Jewish refugees who illegally entered Palestine, a violation of strict immigration 
quotas that British authorities set back in 1936. This alarmed Palestinian Arab leaders, 
who strongly opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. While the British 
wanted to keep the issues of Jewish refugees and the fate of Palestine separate, this 
proved impossible. Disagreements between the American and British governments over 
what to do about Jewish refugees created a rift between the two allied powers. American 
President Harry Truman was a critical figure here. In addition to calling for 100,000 
Jewish refugees to be settled in Palestine, Truman tacitly endorsed the Zionist goal of a 
Jewish state in Palestine.60  
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 While the struggle between Arabs and Jews in Palestine had cooled down 
considerably during World War II, it quickly heated up again when the war ended. Faced 
with enormous domestic challenges and growing unrest between Arabs and Jews in early 
1947, the British government turned to the newly established United Nations for help in 
solving their Palestinian dilemma. Before the UN had made a final decision, British 
leaders decided in the fall of that year to withdraw all British forces from Palestine 
regardless of the UN’s decision. Ultimately, UN officials proposed a partition plan to 
create separate Jewish and Palestinian states and put the plan to a vote on November 29, 
1947. In a historic vote, members of the UN voted to approve the partition plan, including 
both the United States and the Soviet Union.   
 James Forrestal, the United States’ first Secretary of Defense, was particularly 
concerned about the United States’ ability to access the vast oil resources of the Middle 
East. In addition to his other duties overseeing the emergence of the post-war U.S. 
military, Forrestal was also in charge of ensuring that the United States and its allies had 
reliable access to oil, a responsibility that carried over from his previous position as 
Secretary of the Navy during World War II. During World War II the U.S. supplied to 
both its own citizens and military forces as well as those of its allies, but by the end of the 
war American oil reserves were exhausted.61 In a diary entry from October 9, 1947, 
Forrestal wrote that “The greatest field of untapped oil in the world is in the Middle 
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East.”62 Given the tense situation in Palestine at this time, Forrestal was very concerned 
that the United States was going down the wrong path with its vote in favor of the United 
Nations plant to partition Palestine. Forrestal, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
senior officials of the State Department, worried that such a pro-Zionist policy would 
anger Arab leaders in the Middle East and threaten American access to the region’s oil.   
 Truman ordered the United States’ UN representative to vote in favor of 
partitioning Palestine over the vehement objections of his most senior foreign policy 
advisers. In addition to James Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the senior leadership 
at the Department of State also opposed recognizing Israel. They included George 
Marshall, the Secretary of State and the U.S. Army’s chief of staff during World War II, 
his deputy and future Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, and Loy Henderson, a senior 
foreign service officer who was then director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, the 
department’s office with responsibility for Palestine. Henderson was particularly vocal in 
his opposition to any hint of U.S. support for a Jewish state in Palestine. According to 
Henderson’s biographer H.W. Brands, Henderson’s views were not motivated by 
antisemitism but by a genuine fear that U.S. support of a Jewish state would alienate the 
Arab world and jeopardize the world’s oil supply.63  
 In addition to his concern about how U.S. policy in Palestine would affect Arab 
countries’ willingness to sell oil to the United States and its allies, James Forrestal also 
worried that the debate around Palestine in the U.S. had become too heavily politicized. 
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In meetings with President Truman and other senior officials, he repeatedly called for the 
Palestine issue to be “lifted out of politics.” In early December of 1947, after the United 
States voted in favor of partition in Palestine, Forrestal confided his frustration with the 
Truman administration over Palestine to his diary. Recalling a meeting with James 
Byrnes, a former senator from South Carolina and briefly secretary of state, he wrote that 
“I thought it was a most disastrous and regrettable fact that the foreign policy of this 
country was determined by the contributions a particular bloc of special interests might 
make to the party funds.”64 While pro-Zionist forces in the United States strongly 
criticized the Secretary of Defense for his views and called them antisemitic, Forrestal’s 
biographers Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley denied that his views were 
motivated by prejudice.65 
 With Truman’s decision made, senior Defense and State officials resigned 
themselves to American support for a Jewish state and resolved to carry out the 
President’s policies. But they did take the important step of moving to impose an arms 
embargo on the entire Middle East region. In a November 10, 1947, memorandum to 
George Marshall, Loy Henderson wrote that, given the tense situation in Palestine 
following the partition vote, the U.S. should not allow the export of arms to any of the 
players in the region, Arab or Jewish. “Otherwise,” he warned, “the Arabs might use 
arms of U.S. origin against Jews, or Jews might use them against Arabs. In either case, 
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we would be subject to bitter recrimination.”66 This move angered Zionists in both 
Palestine and the United States, who had hoped that after its historic vote the Truman 
administration would supply their forces in Palestine with military equipment and 
advisers. Marshall agreed with Henderson, and an arms embargo was promptly imposed.  
Following the historic United Nations vote, leaders of the Jewish Agency, which 
would shortly evolve into the first government of the state of Israel, announced that they 
would declare Israel’s independence in 1948. As with the UN vote, Harry Truman was 
conflicted over how to respond: many voices were calling on the President to refuse to 
recognize an Israeli state, and the strongest opposition was coming from his own State 
Department. On May 12, 1948, only days before Jewish Agency leaders declared Israel’s 
independence, Truman met with some of his closest advisers to discuss how the 
administration would response to such a declaration. Those present included George 
Marshall and his deputy, Robert Lovett, two of the President’s closest foreign policy 
advisers, and Clark Clifford, a senior presidential aid. Clifford strongly supported 
recognizing a new Israel as soon as possible, calling it inevitable. Lovett and Marshall, on 
the other hand, strongly disagreed, warning that such a move looked like a transparent 
effort to win the Jewish vote in the 1948 presidential election and would damage the 
prestige of the Presidency. Lovett cautioned that the U.S. would not know what kind of 
government Israel would have and called premature recognition akin to “buying a pig in a 
poke.” Marshall was even more blunt. According to a record of the meeting, Marshall 
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told Truman that “if the President were to follow Mr. Clifford’s advice and if in the 
elections I were to vote, I would vote against the President.”67 
Ultimately, Truman ignored the advice of his closest foreign policy advisers and 
recognized the State of Israel when it declared its independence on May 14. Contrary to 
what Marshall, Lovett, and others believed, the President’s action was not a simple 
political action. Rather, Truman was motivated by a combination of his own personal and 
political views and pressure from some of his own aides such as Clark Clifford who were 
sympathetic to Israel.  Like many Americans, President Truman was moved by the 
images of Jewish refugees and Holocaust survivors in displacement camps in Europe to 
do what he could to provide a haven for the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. Truman 
was also, like most Americans at the time, a religious person and, as at least one historian 
has argued, that religious faith and a knowledge of the Bible, especially the Old 
Testament, predisposed the president and many Americans to support a homeland for the 
Jewish people in Palestine.68  
At the time Truman was under intense pressure from American Jewish groups to 
recognize the new Jewish state. Zionist organizations in the United States and around the 
world lobbied the White House to come out in support of establishing a Jewish state in 
Palestine. While some commentators accused Truman of recognizing Israel to win votes 
in a tough reelection campaign in 1948, his actions were more complicated than simply 
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trying to win Jewish votes. Regardless of his motives, Truman’s actions would have far-
reaching consequences. One author went so far as to argue that Truman’s conduct set the 
tone for U.S.-Israeli relations for the next sixty-plus years. But despite making decisions 
that contributed significantly to the emergence of a Jewish state, Truman was far from an 
uncritical Zionist; in fact, he became intensely annoyed with pro-Israel lobbyists, to the 
point of telling his staff that he did not want to deal with any more spokesmen for the 
“extreme Zionist cause.”69  
 The UN’s vote to partition Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states quickly 
led to violence. At first this was largely confined to fighting within Palestine between 
organized Jewish and Arab forces. The Jewish government of Palestine, the Yishuv, was 
well-prepared for this, having built up its military forces throughout World War II and 
developing an effective government structure that could quickly step up to lead a Jewish 
state. Less than six months after the UN vote, the state of Israel declared its independence 
on May 14, 1948, and fighting began the following day between Israelis and forces from 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israeli forces, which were consistently better armed, trained, 
and equipped than Arab forces at the time, prevailed in fighting throughout 1948 and 
quickly captured more territory than the proposed Jewish state was granted under the 
partition plan approved at the UN in the November 29 vote. In addition to being poorly 
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armed and organized, Palestinian Arabs were also deeply divided among themselves and 
thus unable to mount an effective resistance to the new Israeli state.70  
 Israel’s military operations during the 1948 war created a massive refugee crisis 
as nearly a million Palestinians fled their homes and sought refuge in makeshift camps in 
neighboring Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Israeli authorities initially blamed the 
Palestinian refugee problem on the Palestinians themselves and their Arab allies, an 
interpretation that went unchallenged in Israel for several decades. This changed in the 
1980s as a group of Israeli historians gained access to records on the 1948 war that were 
hidden away in Israeli archives. Using these newly available primary sources, Israel’s 
“new historians” such as Benny Morris and Ilan Pappe showed that the flight of 
Palestinian refugees from territory seized by forces of the newly independent Israeli state 
was not voluntary at all, but rather a response to Israeli actions rooted in Zionist ideology, 
which aimed to create an exclusively Jewish state and land. While Morris and Pappe did 
not find a specific document from Israeli leaders to military commanders ordering them 
to remove Palestinians from their homes, they argue that this was the unspoken goal of 
Israeli political leaders and battlefield commanders. Israel, the Middle East, and the 
world are still dealing with the consequences of these events. While this emerging 
literature effectively challenged Israel’s nationalist narrative, it did not delve into the 
Palestinian perspective of these events.71    
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 In a November 29, 1948, letter to Chaim Weizman, Israel’s first president, 
President Truman celebrated both his reelection and the new State of Israel’s military 
success against invading Arab armies. Noting that they had both overcome steep odds 
that year, he emphasized that he saw his victory on November 3 as “a mandate from the 
American people to carry out the Democratic platform—including, of course, the plank 
on Israel. I intend to do so.”72 He then pledged that the United States would assist Israel 
with economic aid and by working to resolve its conflicts with its Arab neighbors. But 
Truman’s advocacy of Jewish statehood in the Middle East did not translate into a 
smooth diplomatic and political relationship with the new Jewish state. On the contrary, 
despite his own critical role in recognizing Israeli independence, American relations with 
Israel remained distant and tense for the remainder of Truman’s presidency. Instead of 
support for Israel, the primary American interest in the Middle East during the second 
half of the 1940s was to prevent its new adversary in the Cold War, the Soviet Union, 
from gaining any further influence in this critical region.73 Truman’s successor as 
President would face many of the same challenges throughout the 1950s.  
The United States and the Middle East in the Early 1950s 
 In January of 1953, shortly before Dwight Eisenhower took the oath of office as 
President of the United States, analysts at the State Department put together a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that examined the challenges facing the United States in the 
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Middle East at the start of the new year. The authors noted that the United States had a 
significant interest in the region because of its strategic location and extensive energy 
resources and had a strong incentive to prevent Soviet influence from growing in the 
Middle East. However, the report warned, a number of factors made Arab governments in 
the region wary of the United States and the West, including the perception that the 
United States was responsible for maintaining Israel’s security. “US association with 
Israel,” the State Department’s analysts warned, “is a continuing irritant in US-Arab 
relations and the major obstacle to the acceptance of US influence in the Middle East.”74 
This view of Israel would remain strong throughout the remainder of the decade.  
 Even before his election to the White House in 1952, Dwight David Eisenhower 
was an extraordinarily popular figure in the United States. During his two terms as 
president, Eisenhower presided over American domestic and foreign policy for the 
remainder of the decade, which saw significant developments in everything from civil 
rights to U.S.-Soviet relations. In fact, one historian recently went so far as to call the 
years 1945-1961 the “age of Eisenhower,” during which the thirty-fourth president was 
one of the most admired and consequential Americans in public life and oversaw 
tremendous changes in many areas of American society.75 In addition to all the other 
challenges he faced while in office, Eisenhower presided over an important period in the 
history of U.S.-Israeli relations. Among the many foreign policy priorities facing the 
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Eisenhower administration during the 1950s was the need to craft an effective foreign 
policy for the Middle East.  
When it came to Israel, the Eisenhower administration shared many of the views 
and frustrations of its predecessor. A career military officer who had commanded Allied 
forces in Europe during World War II, Eisenhower knew the value of the Middle East’s 
oil reserves. To the disappointment of Israeli leaders who hoped that a new American 
administration would improve relations between the two countries, Eisenhower was more 
interested in maintaining cordial relations with the oil-producing Arab countries of the 
region than in developing closer ties with Israel. In his calculation, if the United States 
were to develop closer relations with the Jewish state, it would hurt the administration’s 
ability to deal with Israel’s Arab neighbors, whose oil was considered an important 
strategic asset in the Cold War.76  
 American officials were particularly keen on cultivating ties with conservative 
regimes ruled by monarchs, and eager to oppose “revolutionary” regimes that might fall 
prey to Soviet influence. The desire to preserve access to oil and prevent a radical regime 
from damaging American interests was a major factor behind the Eisenhower 
administration’s covert action to overthrow the nationalist regime of Mohammed 
Mossadegh in Iran. With the help of American and British intelligence operatives, a 
military coup in Iran overthrew the nationalist government of Mohammed Mossadegh 
and replaced him with Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, returning a conservative, pro-Western 
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monarch to power in a country with significant oil reserves. More than a simple 
geopolitical calculation, this effort aligned with a long-standing American tradition of 
opposing revolutionary change around the world, especially in what was then called the 
“developing world.”77 
Following Israel’s victory in the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war, it turned to the 
international community for military and economic assistance to build up its defenses. 
The Israelis had the most success with European countries, especially with Great Britain 
and France. The French would go on to become Israel’s most important supplier of 
military equipment, and a key contributor to Israel’s nascent and highly secretive nuclear 
program. But while these European alliances were key to Israel’s military development 
during its early years, Israeli leaders always had their eye on a larger prize, an alliance 
with the United States. For Israel’s first two prime ministers, David Ben-Gurion and 
Moshe Sharrett, cultivating closer ties with the U.S. was a signature foreign policy 
objective. International divisions created by the Cold War made this a difficult challenge. 
As a democracy, Israel was ideologically aligned with the West, but the large numbers of 
Jews in the Soviet Union initially made Israeli leaders reluctant to align themselves too 
closely with the United States, at least at first. Hoping that these Soviet Jews would one 
day emigrate to Israel and increase the country’s population, Israeli leaders pressured the 
Soviet Union to allow these Jews to immigrate to Israel. But the Soviet Union’s close 
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alliance with Israel’s enemies in the Arab world only reinforced the need for an alliance 
with the United States.78  
Israel’s diplomats in the United States worked hard to build a deeper relationship 
between Israel and the United States. They did so by working with pro-Israel 
organizations and individuals in the United States to pressure the U.S. government to 
strengthen its ties with the Jewish state.79 Israel’s second ambassador to the United 
States, Abba Eban, was a key figure in Israeli efforts to shape American policy towards 
Israel by influencing the American public. Eban, who was both Israel’s official envoy in 
Washington and its ambassador to the United Nations in New York throughout the 1950s, 
saw his role as much more than that of a regular ambassador. As he wrote in his 1977 
memoir, Israel’s ambassador in Washington was Israel’s liaison not only to the U.S. 
government but also to the American Jewish community. But perhaps even more 
crucially, Eban also tried to reach the broader American public to create sympathy for 
Israel that might someday tip official U.S. Middle East policy in Israel’s favor. “My 
vocation,” he wrote, “was to develop an American-Israeli tradition based on a public 
sympathy that might transcend, and sometimes correct, the direction of official policy.”80   
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 One area where the United States and Israel were cooperating extensively was in 
the world of secret intelligence and covert operations. During the 1950s, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Israel’s foreign intelligence service, the Mossad, 
developed close ties. With the help of American intelligence officials such as the CIA’s 
long-serving chief of counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, the cooperation between 
the CIA and the Mossad yielded beneficial results for both countries. For the United 
States, intelligence cooperation with Israel brought valuable information on the Soviet 
Union that American sources had been unable to procure on their own. Two notable 
examples of this were the text of Nikita Khrushchev’s historic 1956 speech denouncing 
Joseph Stalin, smuggled out of Eastern Europe by Israeli agents, and a new Soviet Mig-
21 fighter aircraft, acquired from a defecting Iraqi air force pilot. For Israel, intelligence 
cooperation served as a backchannel between the Israeli and American governments that 
circumvented traditional diplomatic channels.81  
 Having alternative channels to communicate with American leaders and the 
American public was important to Israel because it enabled them to bypass major 
bureaucracies of the U.S. government that dealt with Middle East policy. As exemplified 
by James Forrestal’s and George Marshall’s opposition to Harry Truman’s decision to 
recognize Israeli independence, there was significant opposition to Zionism and 
recognizing Israel among bureaucrats and experts in the State and Defense Departments. 
This was particularly true among so-called Arabists, State Department diplomats who had 
spent their careers serving in Arab countries and rose to senior positions in the State 
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Department during the Cold War. At least some of this opposition was rooted in 
antisemitism.82  
 Early in the first Eisenhower administration, the President and his Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, tried to develop an anti-Soviet military alliance in the Middle 
East by cultivating ties with different nations in the region. This alliance, whose members 
included Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan along with Britain and the United States, later 
became known as the Baghdad Pact. But the Baghdad Pact was beset by internal rivalries 
among these nations, for whom resisting Soviet influence was a lower priority than local 
regional and internal concerns. One important nation that never joined the alliance was 
Egypt, the largest and most populous country in the Arab world.83  
 Egypt’s refusal to join the Baghdad Pact had much to do with the rising tide of 
Arab nationalism and especially with the man who would soon become synonymous with 
Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Born in 1918, Nasser had served as an officer in 
the Egyptian army and was one of a group of officers who overthrew Egypt’s King 
Farouk in a 1952 military coup. Nasser soon emerged as the leader of the country and 
would remain a powerful figure in Arab politics until his sudden death in 1970. When 
Dulles visited Egypt in May of 1953 to try to enlist Egypt in an anti-Soviet military 
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alliance, Nasser told him that Egyptians were more concerned with ending British 
influence in Egypt than checking Soviet influence in the Middle East. Egyptian leaders 
also rejected American aid for a project to build a dam on the Nile River near Aswan.84  
 As American relations with Egypt deteriorated in the wake of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s rise to power, the Soviet Union saw a chance to increase its influence in the 
Middle East. While long-time Soviet leader Joseph Stalin never formulated a coherent 
Soviet foreign policy in the region, his successors, beginning with Nikita Khrushchev, 
saw Arab nationalists as potential allies in their effort to pursue Soviet goals in the 
Middle East. In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union cultivated close relations with several 
Arab nations, especially Egypt and Syria. As part of these alliances, the Soviets sent large 
amounts of military equipment to their new Arab allies and thousands of advisers to train 
Syrian and Egyptian troops in the use of Soviet military equipment and tactics. But while 
Soviet leaders considered their alliances with Arab nationalist regimes to be major 
diplomatic achievements, their foreign policy toward the Arab world remained closely 
tied to their Cold War concerns about how the United States would react to these 
alliances. Soviet leaders were willing to provide their allies in the Arab world with 
economic and military aid, but they were careful not to appear too aggressive in 
challenging American influence in the Middle East, which might lead to a superpower 
disagreement that could escalate into military confrontation. This reticence did not 
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always go over well with Syrian and Egyptian leaders, who as a result never fully trusted 
their Soviet allies.85 
 But while American officials at the highest levels were trying to craft an effective 
American policy toward Israel and the larger Middle East region, significant 
developments were also taking place closer to home that would have profound 
implications for U.S.-Israeli relations in the decades to come.  
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Chapter 2: From Exodus to the Six-Day War 
 Near the end of Exodus, his epic 1958 novel about the birth of Israel, author Leon 
Uris included an episode in which two American pilots, Stretch Thompson and Foster T. 
“Tex” MacWilliams, are hired to transport Jewish refugees from Aden to Palestine. At 
first the Americans, who initially cannot even find “Israel” on a map, only reluctantly 
agree to undertake the mission. But as Thompson and MacWilliams fly make more and 
more trips, during which they witness scenes that alternately recall tales from Arabian 
Nights and the Old Testament, they become attached to the Yemeni Jews, a “docile little 
people with olive skins and delicate features.”86 By the end of the chapter, which did not 
make it into the 1960 film directed by Otto Preminger, both men were fully committed to 
the mission of transporting Jews from elsewhere in the Arab world, Africa, and Europe. 
Thompson even settled down to marry an Israeli-born woman and took an apartment in 
Tel Aviv.  
 This episode in Uris’ novel helps capture an important shift in both the diplomatic 
relationship between Israel and the United States on the one hand, and the cultural 
relationship between the American and Israeli peoples on the other. As Eisenhower era of 
the 1950s gave way to new presidents and new challenges for the United States at home 
and abroad, the American perception of Israel shifted dramatically among everyone from 
average Americans to senior policymakers and presidents.  
This chapter analyzes the development of U.S.-Israeli relations from the late 
1950s to the end of the 1960s. While the United States largely kept its distance from 
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Israel during the early years of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency, that began to change 
during Eisenhower’s second term in office and especially with Eisenhower’s successors 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. It was under these two presidents that the 
United States first sold sophisticated military equipment to Israel. This chapter also 
surveys a related and parallel development in U.S.-Israeli relations that began much 
earlier but truly came to fruition during the years covered here. This was the deepening of 
cultural ties between the United States and Israel.   
A Shift in American Cultural Perceptions of Jews and Israel 
 Throughout the 1950s and beyond, major cultural developments reshaped the U.S. 
relationship with Israel. The decline of antisemitism in the United States and the embrace 
of Judaism as part of a Judeo-Christian front against communism softened gentile 
Americans’ attitudes toward the Jewish people and, by extension, Israel. American Jews’ 
changing attitudes toward Israel, as seen through deepening cultural ties between the two 
countries and the rise of an organized pro-Israel lobby in the United States, further 
contributed to growing American sympathy for the state of Israel. One important feature 
of the history of American foreign relations is that domestic politics and culture in the 
United States are never far removed from American actions and policies abroad. The 
United States’ relationship with Israel is no exception in this regard.  
 Antisemitism was a common feature of American life for many years and rising 
steadily in the 1930s before peaking in 1945. During the same period however, there was 
a growing movement in the United States among progressive Christians and Jews to 
reconcile the two faiths and emphasize a shared history and biblical heritage. During 
World War II, groups like the American Jewish Committee and the National Conference 
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of Christians and Jews called for unity among Christians and Jews in the face of racist, 
antisemitic, and antidemocratic regimes in Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial 
Japan. Many films produced during World War II, for instance, emphasized religious (if 
not racial) harmony in American society by portraying military units of diverse 
Americans working together to fight a common enemy.87  
The years following the end of World War II saw a remarkably rapid decline in 
prejudice against the American Jewish community, especially among Catholics and 
Protestant Christians of many denominations. The postwar years saw American Jews 
enter educational and professional worlds in unprecedented numbers and more 
sympathetic portrayals of minority groups (including Jews) in popular culture. Rather 
than an experience unique to Jews, this gradual acceptance was part of a larger pattern in 
the history of American immigration that saw white European migrants achieve gradual 
acceptance as full members of American society following a period of discrimination and 
progress.88  In the American film industry, for instance, Jews had risen to powerful 
positions in Hollywood, but much of their focus had been on assimilating into American 
culture instead of telling specifically Jewish stories.89 This changed in the aftermath of 
World War II and the Holocaust and continued in subsequent decades. 
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 The 1950s was also a period of intense religiosity for Americans of all faiths. 
Although Protestant Christianity remained the largest broad religious category for 
Americans, this era also saw religious groups such as Roman Catholics and Jews make 
unprecedented strides into mainstream American society. A significant factor in this 
growing religious pluralism in the United States was the fear of communism and the 
United States’ Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. In this climate of fear, a growing 
number of American commentators began speaking of the United States as a “Judeo-
Christian” country to contrast it with the Soviet Union, a society which nominally 
rejected all religion outright. Though the term had its roots in the 1930s, it became much 
more widely used after World War II to emphasize the common roots of the three major 
faith traditions in the United States. In this formulation, Judaism formed an essential 
piece of the United States’ religious foundation and achieved unprecedented theological 
legitimacy.90  
 Just as American Jews reached new levels of acceptance in American culture, 
their attitudes toward the state of Israel were also shifting. American Jews read about 
events in Israel in the media, but they also encountered Israel in a wide variety of cultural 
activities and products, from music and folk dances to books, fashion, and other 
consumer goods. American Jews were also generous financial donors to organizations 
that supported Israel and were a vital economic lifeline in the early years of the Jewish 
state. But more broadly speaking, the cause of Israel emerged as a rare source of unity in 
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the American Jewish community, which was becoming simultaneously more secular and 
diverse in the second half of the twentieth century.91 
 One of the most important cultural moments in the development of close U.S.-
Israeli ties was the arrival of author Leon Uris’s historical novel Exodus in American 
bookstores in 1958. Exodus tells the story of dashing and heroic Israeli soldiers such as 
the fictional Ari Ben-Canaan, a tough, masculine Haganah fighter who transported 
Jewish refugees to Palestine during and after World War II, and later fought heroically to 
defend Jews against invading Arabs following Israel’s declaration of independence. 
Uris’s heroic portrait of Israelis is matched only by his negative portrayals of Arabs. But 
one of the novel’s most prominent characters is not an Israeli or even a Jew, but an 
American Protestant nurse, Kitty Fremont. Initially skeptical of Palestinian Jews, over the 
course of the novel Kitty practically becomes obsessed with them, first through a young 
girl named Karen whom she first tries to take back to the United States, and later through 
Ari, with whom she falls in love.  
Fremont’s presence in the plot allowed Uris’s American readers, especially non-
Jewish readers, to experience the founding of Israel through a sympathetic character who 
was experiencing the birth of Israel first-hand. By including Kitty and several other 
Americans, from an American Jewish woman who has moved to Palestine to a pair of 
American pilots who risk their lives to bring Jewish refugees from around the world to 
Israel, Uris provides numerous opportunities for American readers to identify with the 
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Israeli people through American characters who are coming to their aid. On the other 
hand, Uris presents numerous negative orientalist portrayals of Arabs as lazy, 
incompetent, brutal, and sex-crazed, providing a stark contrast to the pure and heroic 
Jews.92 Through these polar-opposite descriptions, Uris establishes Israelis as a people 
who are very similar to Americans.  
 In her ground-breaking research into the cultural dimensions of American-Israeli 
relations in the 1950s, historian Michelle Mart demonstrates that, in addition to 
geopolitical calculations, cultural products shaped the views of American policymakers 
toward Israel during that decade. Using works such as Exodus, she shows that Americans 
came to see Israel not as a nation of foreigners, but rather one of kindred spirits and 
“surrogate Americans.” Furthermore, she shows that the story of Israel’s “heroic” 
resistance to its Arab enemies transformed the image of both American Jews and Israelis 
from weak minorities to tough fighters who were worthy of American respect and 
support.93 
 Exodus sold millions of copies, but Leon Uris’s characters and story reached an 
even wider audience in 1960 when the novel was adapted into a feature film starring Paul 
Newman as Ari Ben-Canaan and Eva Marie Saint as Kitty Fremont. Directed by the 
Jewish Austro-American Otto Preminger, the movie was filmed on location in Cyprus 
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and Israel, which added authenticity to the film’s drama. Preminger’s movie, which 
softened some of Uris’s anti-Arab views, nonetheless preserved the novel’s core message 
of heroic Israelis fighting against impossible odds to build a new country. Together, Uris 
and Preminger were two of a growing number of Americans who visited Israel in search 
of artistic inspiration.94  
 Ever since Israel gained its independence, government officials recognized the 
propaganda value of large-budget Hollywood studios shooting films in Israel about life in 
the young Israeli state and its history. Israeli officials were involved with the Exodus 
project from the very beginning. They provided extensive assistance to Leon Uris during 
his research trip to Israel in 1956, including arranging for transportation, lodging, 
interviews with Israeli military veterans and political leaders, and a minder from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later, when director Otto Preminger filmed scenes for the 
film on location in Israel and Cyprus, the Israeli government did much to facilitate the 
American filmmakers’ work. Government officials acted as liaisons between the 
filmmakers and Israeli businesses and religious institutions, provided security, and help 
arrange for extras when necessary. Though the Israeli government did not control the 
final product, what appeared in theaters in 1960, according to historian Giora Goodman, 
“fit almost perfectly with Israeli international propaganda themes.”95 
 Another critical feature of changing ideas about Israel in the United States was the 
emergence of a well-organized political movement to advocate on behalf of Israel. While 
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there is no single specific “pro-Israel lobby” organization, historian Walter Hixson 
recently defined the Israel lobby as a “continuous campaign of advocacy on the part of 
Israel and its American supporters to secure US foreign policies that are perceived as 
favorable to the Israeli national interest.”96 One organization, the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1951, later emerged as one of the largest and 
most powerful pro-Israel organizations in the United States, and one of the most powerful 
lobbying organizations of any kind. Isaiah I. Kenen, AIPAC’s first director and the 
organization’s leader from 1951-1975, stressed in his memoirs that the Israel lobby was 
an organic effort by American Jews with the support of Christian leaders in the U.S. to 
support economic and military aid for Israel. This effort, Kenen later wrote, was “in the 
moral, economic, and strategic interests of both countries.”97 
 The existence and power of a pro-Israel lobby in the United States was most 
recently and controversially highlighted by two political scientists, John Mearsheimer 
and Stephen Walt, first in a lengthy 2006 article in the London Review of Books and then 
later in a full-length and extensively researched book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. While Mearsheimer and Walt made some compelling arguments in this book, 
their focus was on the implications of the Israel lobby for American foreign policy in the 
twenty-first century, and not the lobby’s history. As a result, one of the most serious 
flaws in their research was that it was based largely on published sources and not 
grounded in archival sources. More recently several historians have filled this gap by 
 
 96 Walter L. Hixson, Israel’s Armor: The Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestinian 
Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1.  
 97 I.L. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington (Buffalo, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 1981), 3.  
70 
 
going beyond contemporary debates about the power of the pro-Israel lobby to explore its 
origins in the 1950s at a time when Israeli leaders were eagerly seeking American 
patrons.98  
The Suez Crisis: A Turning Point in the Middle East 
 The Suez Crisis of late 1956 was the most serious conflict in the region since the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1948. But unlike the 1948 war, this crisis involved the direct 
participation of European colonial powers in a Middle East war. At this point in the 
1950s, both the British and the French were still trying to preserve their international 
influence, particularly in the Middle East, where both had interests stemming from their 
energy needs and their dwindling colonial empires. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s move to nationalize the Suez Canal in late July of 1956 was the final straw for 
the British and French governments. Fearing the loss of the canal for good, the leaders of 
both countries resolved to remove Nasser from power and regain control of this vital 
economic lifeline.  
 Fearing that Nasser’s action would permanently damage their influence in the 
Middle East, the two fading colonial powers joined together to plan a military operation 
to seize control of the Suez Canal and secure their individual interests. The British and 
French also enlisted Egypt’s neighbor Israel in their scheme. The Israelis, for their part, 
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were concerned about Egypt’s growing power in the region and the rise in cross-border 
infiltrators from Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Infiltrators, mostly Palestinian refugees 
returning to their former homes, had been entering Israeli territory since the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war ended, but the 1950s saw a rise in violent attacks on Israeli settlements and 
towns by Palestinian guerillas and Egyptian soldiers. Israeli leaders authorized reprisal 
attacks by Israeli forces, but these efforts did not lead to a decline in violence. Believing 
that stronger action was necessary, Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion and his 
advisers saw the joint British-French scheme as a chance to check Egypt’s military 
growth and preserve Israel’s military dominance in the Middle East. The Israeli 
contribution to the British-French effort, called Operation Musketeer, would be to initiate 
the conflict by invading the Sinai Peninsula, creating a crisis that Nasser could not handle 
and creating an excuse for outside intervention. Using the Israeli attack as a pretext, 
French and British forces would seize control of the Suez Canal to “secure” it and ensure 
that it remained open.99  
 Israel’s attack on the Sinai began on October 29, 1956 and was followed two days 
later by British and French attacks on Egypt. The entire scheme caught the Americans, 
especially President Dwight Eisenhower, by surprise. At the time, the American 
administration was responding to a crisis in Hungary, where Soviet troops were in the 
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midst of crushing a popular revolt in Budapest, Hungary. The Suez crisis also came less 
than two weeks before the 1956 presidential election in the U.S. While British and French 
military operations were more limited, Israeli forces advanced rapidly, easily defeating 
the Egyptian military and capturing the Gaza Strip and much of the Sinai Peninsula. 
Furious with Britain, France, and Israel for what looked like a blatant act of imperialism, 
Eisenhower demanded a swift end to the fighting and an immediate withdrawal of all 
three countries’ military forces, which they all did in the next few months. He backed up 
his words with harsh economic measures intended to punish the British and French for 
their actions. Britain’s and France’s actions convinced Eisenhower that those countries 
could no longer be counted on to secure the Middle East, and only the United States 
could perform that job.100 In a rare point of superpowers finding common ground, the 
Soviets also denounced the Sinai campaigns of France, Great Britain, and Israel.  
 Following the disastrous events of late 1956, the Eisenhower administration 
launched a new initiative in the Middle East. In a message to Congress on January 5, 
1957, President Eisenhower outlined what has since become known as the “Eisenhower 
Doctrine,” a blueprint for American policy in the Middle East. Though Eisenhower’s 
speech emphasized a desire to preserve peace in the Middle East and prevent the Soviet 
Union from increasing its influence in the region, the Eisenhower Doctrine also had 
significant implications for local actors. At the core of this new policy was a commitment 
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to resisting the pan-Arab nationalism of Egypt’s Nasser and supporting U.S.-friendly 
regimes in the region with political, economic, and military aid. Asserting that the United 
States sought peace in the region, Eisenhower told his audience that “The occasion has 
come for us to manifest again our national unity in support of freedom and to show our 
deep respect for the rights and independence of every small nation—however great, 
however small.”101 In practice those regimes included conservative monarchies such as 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia.102  
 The most prominent demonstration of the Eisenhower Doctrine was the American 
response to a series of crises in the Middle East in 1958. A military coup in Iraq and 
unrest in two pro-Western countries, Jordan and Lebanon, led the Eisenhower 
administration to fear that the entire region was on the verge of a serious crisis. In July 
1958 Eisenhower ordered U.S. Marines ashore in Lebanon to prop up the conservative, 
Christian-led regime of Camille Chamoun and prevent the outbreak of civil war in that 
fragile country. The British also deployed paratroops to Jordan to support the regime of 
King Hussein against forces that threatened his regime. Like the Americans and the 
British, the Israelis also had an interest in preserving pro-Western regimes in 1958 and 
used the crises of 1958 as an opportunity to develop closer ties with the Maronite 
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Christian community in Lebanon and with Great Powers such as the United States and 
Great Britain, with limited results.103  
 While American and European observers often highlight the Arab-Israeli conflict 
as the driving force behind all conflict in the Middle East, it is important to remember 
that there were other factors shaping events in the Arab world. In fact, Arab nations that 
seemed to be on the same side of the Arab-Israeli conflict were deeply divided when it 
came to other issues. Throughout the 1950s, supporters of Arab nationalism tried to 
cultivate a unified front among Arab nations, but the struggle between local national 
identity (be it Egyptian, Iraqi, or Syrian) and an Arab nationalism that transcended 
national borders remained. One major line of division was between countries such as 
Syria and Egypt, which were ruled by “revolutionary” regimes, and countries such as 
Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which continued to be ruled by tradition-bound 
monarchies. One area where these internal divisions within the Arab world took on global 
dimensions was in the civil war in Yemen, which began in 1962. Seeking to support the 
revolutionary government there, Egypt’s President Nasser sent thousands of troops to 
Yemen where they suffered hundreds of casualties with little apparent gain for Egypt. 
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Nasser’s intervention in the Yemeni civil war damaged his country’s relations with other 
Arab states and hurt the Egyptian’s military’s ability to challenge Israel in the 1960s.104 
 Despite the tensions that existed between the United States and Israel at the 
beginning of the Eisenhower administration, relations began to warm between the two 
countries as the 1950s came to an end. This was a response to crises in the Middle East in 
places like Lebanon and Jordan, where generally pro-American regimes seemed on the 
brink of collapse in 1958. In spite of their anger at Israel’s invasion of the Sinai, 
American officials were impressed with the performance of Israel’s military in that 
conflict. In this troubling climate, the Eisenhower administration began to see Israel, with 
its powerful and competent military forces, as a potential strategic asset in the region 
rather than a strategic liability.105  
The 1960s: Kennedy, Johnson, and Israel 
 This trend toward closer U.S.-Israeli relations continued under Eisenhower’s 
successor, John F. Kennedy. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy came to the White House as a 
firm supporter of Israel stretching back to his days in Congress. Before his presidency 
was cut short by his assassination in November 1963, Kennedy and his administration 
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took important steps that moved the United States closer to Israel, culminating in the first 
American sale of sophisticated weapons to Israel. But American officials also clashed 
with Israeli leaders on a number of issues, including Israel’s covert efforts to build a 
nuclear program (initially with French assistance) at a time when the United States was 
trying to limit the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the existing nuclear powers.106  
 Israeli leaders continued their efforts to acquire sophisticated American weaponry 
after Kennedy took office, hoping that their efforts would meet with greater success with 
a friendlier President in the White House. Their efforts were aided by the presence of 
several White House aides and advisers such as Meyer Feldman who advised President 
Kennedy and were sympathetic to Israel. These efforts bore fruit in 1962, when the 
United States finally agreed to provide Israel with sophisticated weapons for the first 
time. This first arms deal involved Hawk surface-to-air missiles. The Kennedy 
administration’s unsuccessful overture to President Nasser to try to mend relations 
between the U.S. and Egypt further encouraged the trend toward friendlier relations with 
the Jewish state.107 
 While Israel may have had a more sympathetic friend in President Kennedy than 
in his predecessor, Israeli leaders were not prepared to abandon other measures to ensure 
their military superiority in the Middle East even if it meant angering U.S. leaders. 
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Before Israel had even declared its independence, David Ben Gurion, who later became 
Israel’s first prime minister, became extremely concerned that a Jewish state in Palestine 
would face an overwhelming invasion from the hostile Arab nations that surrounded it. 
Ben Gurion and others feared that such an invasion would quickly strangle a nascent 
Jewish state and perhaps lead to a slaughter of Jews on par with the Holocaust. To 
prevent this doomsday scenario from playing out and to build a deterrence capability 
against foreign invasion, Israel began developing a nuclear program in the 1950s. Israel 
initially received significant assistance from France, Israel’s primary source of military 
equipment since the 1950s. To this day, Israel has never publicly acknowledged its 
nuclear program, but through the efforts of historians like Avner Cohen and journalists 
such as Seymour Hersh and Michael Karpin, we know a great deal about the origins of 
Israel’s nuclear program. These authors and others have benefited enormously from 
recently declassified materials, especially from American archives such as the Kennedy 
and Johnson presidential libraries.108 
 American intelligence officials only confirmed the existence of Israel’s nuclear 
program in December 1960 as officials of the Eisenhower administration were preparing 
to hand over responsibility to Kennedy and his advisers. Several factors combined to 
make the 1960s a vital era for Israel’s nuclear program. To begin with, Israel’s 
 
 108 On the early decades of Israel’s nuclear program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998). On American intelligence agencies’ efforts to uncover Israel’s 
nuclear program, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi 
Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), especially Chapter Six. 
For two journalists’ investigations into Israel’s nuclear program, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Sampson 
Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991) and 
Michael I. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What That Means for the 
World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).  
78 
 
relationship with the United States became more important as its relationship with France 
deteriorated. As France under President Charles de Gaulle brought its war in Algeria to 
an end and sought better relations with the Arab world, it distanced itself from Israel. 
Without French military assistance, Israeli leaders intensified their efforts to obtain 
sophisticated military equipment from the United States, but Israel’s nuclear program 
made this a challenging proposition. While soliciting American aid, successive Israeli 
prime ministers refused to abandon their nuclear program in return for promises of U.S. 
aid. To get around this impasse, American and Israeli officials engaged in extensive 
discussions throughout the 1960s to avoid a rupture in relations between the two 
countries.109  
 Competing priorities complicated the Kennedy administration’s relationship with 
Israel. On the one hand, Kennedy and many members of his administration were 
sympathetic to Israel and wanted to extend greater aid to the Jewish state. On the other 
hand, Kennedy entered office publicly committed to halting nuclear proliferation around 
the world. Fortunately for Israel, Kennedy’s commitment to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons was not as strong as his public statements suggested. Instead of a blanket 
opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, Kennedy’s spotty record on non-
proliferation was part of a larger pattern in American nuclear policy during the Cold War. 
In what historian Shane Maddock has called an “atomic hierarchy,” Israel was included 
among the countries, especially the United States’ Western European and NATO allies, 
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that were deemed worthy of nuclear weapons. Countries of the decolonized world, 
including the Arab world, were deemed unworthy of possessing such powerful weapons. 
More recently, political scientist Galen Jackson has even suggested that American 
officials of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw a nuclear-armed Israel as 
advantageous to the United States in the Middle East, since it would enhance the power 
of an American ally against Soviet-backed Arab countries. The Israeli response to 
American qualms about Israel’s nuclear program was to cover up its existence at all costs 
to give the Kennedy and Johnson administrations cover for supplying Israel with military 
aid while maintaining their public opposition to nuclear proliferation.110  
 Like his predecessor, President Lyndon B. Johnson was also a strong supporter of 
Israel going back to his days as a powerful senator from Texas. Israel’s longtime 
ambassador to the United States Abba Eban wrote in his memoirs that Lyndon Johnson 
could get very emotional when the subject of Israel came up. As Eban recalled decades 
later, “For all his calculated show of virile toughness there was something about Israel 
that stirred [Johnson’s] pious memories. When he spoke of our cause there would be a 
halt in the gruffness, and an untypical tenderness would come into his eyes and voice.”111  
As he finished out John F. Kennedy’s term and began serving one of his own 
following the 1964 election, Johnson repeatedly and publicly proclaimed his support for 
Israel. As Olivia Sohns argued in 2017, Lyndon Johnson’s sympathy for Israel predated 
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his ascension to the Presidency. In fact, it stretched all the way back to his childhood in 
Texas, and then evolved into a major concern during Johnson’s years in the House and 
Senate, a unique development for a politician whose major concerns were domestic.112 In 
1966, Johnson approved another major arms sale, this time consisting of A-4 Skyhawk 
attack aircraft, thus continuing the trend Kennedy had started of approving sales of 
advanced weapons systems to Israel, something which Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower had long resisted.  
While officials in the Executive Branch were often very open about their support 
for Israel, the same was not true of many officials in the State and Defense Departments. 
In fact, two of the strongest opponents of Harry Truman’s decisions to support the UN 
partition of Palestine in 1947 and to recognize Israel in May 1948 came from his two 
most senior foreign policy advisers, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Secretary 
of State George Marshall. When State and Defense officials failed to convince President 
Truman to follow their advice, they settled for implementing an arms embargo on the 
entire Middle East region that would severely restrict American military aid to Israel and 
other countries in the region. This debate continued into the 1960s.  
As was the case in 1947-1948, career officials in the State and Defense 
Departments during the 1960s were much more wary of deepening American ties to 
Israel than many politicians in the White House and Congress. In early 1964, officials of 
the Johnson administration were considering an Israeli request for 500 of the United 
States’ most sophisticated tanks to replace its aging armored forces, as well as other 
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pieces of sophisticated military equipment. In their report to the National Security 
Council on the potential consequences of such a sale, State and Defense officials argued 
that providing Israel with so much American firepower would do serious harm to other 
American interests and objectives in the Middle East. In addition to undermining 
American arms control initiatives, they warned, agreeing to Israel’s requests would 
damage American relations with Arab countries (some of which were Soviet allies) and 
link U.S. foreign policy too closely with that of Israel.113 Furthermore, as General Earle 
Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in a memo to Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in March 1964, Israel’s military was already better supplied and 
trained than any of its Arab neighbors. “There is,” Wheeler wrote, “no need for Israel to 
augment its tank strength at this time.”114 Despite the intensity of this debate, Lyndon 
Johnson’s views eventually won out and the U.S. did supply Israel with more and 
increasingly sophisticated weaponry, but this was not because there was a consensus 
among American officials about the proper level of American aid to Israel.115 
 In 1966 the Johnson administration took another important step in moving the 
United States toward a closer military and strategic alliance with Israel when it agreed to 
sell A-4 Skyhawk aircraft to Israel. But this was not a simple case of the United States 
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bowing to Israel’s requests for additional military equipment. Instead, American officials 
took this step in response to the Soviet arms to Syria and Egypt. Selling arms to Israel 
and Jordan, a moderate and pro-Western Arab nation on Israel’s western border, 
American officials believed, would help preserve the balance of power in the Middle East 
between pro-Western regimes and the Soviet-backed Arab countries arrayed against 
Israel. The sale of Skyhawks to Israel also served to reassure Israel of American support 
in the face of arms sales to one of Israel’s potentially hostile neighbors. Despite this 
important step, the Johnson administration still tried to argue that the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship had not fundamentally changed.116 While this was an important step in the 
evolution of U.S.-Israeli relations, events in the first half of 1967 were about to 
dramatically alter the situation in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.  
June 1967 
 The Six-Day War of June 5-11, 1967, utterly transformed the Middle East and set 
the stage for the conflicts and negotiations that would occupy Israel, the Arab world, the 
United States, and other international players for decades to come. In addition to 
demonstrating its military capabilities against the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, 
Israel also occupied large swaths of territory from each of these countries (including the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Gaza 
Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt). Besides the war’s massive impact on the region, 
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these events touched off intense reactions within the United States among the American 
public.117   
 The long-range causes of the Six-Day War stretched back to the beginning of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. Ever since Israel declared its independence in 1948, Arab 
leaders loudly proclaimed their desire to remove the Jewish state from the Middle East, 
though they took only limited steps throughout the 1950s and 1960s to achieve this goal. 
Likewise, Israeli officials feared that at any moment they could be attacked from different 
directions simultaneously. This fear made many Israel’s leaders, especially its military 
commanders, believe that Israel needed to strike first. As historian Ahron Bregman notes, 
the strength of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was, despite its name, offensive 
warfare.118 
Events in the spring of 1967 convinced Israeli leaders that war with one or more 
of Israel’s neighbors was close at hand. To the north, Israeli forces repeatedly clashed 
with Syrian troops in retaliation for attacks against Israeli towns and settlements and to 
the Syrian effort to divert the flow of the Jordan River. To the south, tensions on Israel’s 
border with Egypt were also increasing. In May, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser 
ordered UN forces in the Sinai Peninsula to withdraw and dispatched Egyptian troops to 
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the Sinai. He also ordered a blockade of the Straits of Tiran, a vital economic lifeline for 
Israeli shipping. These steps made Israeli leaders believe that Egypt was preparing for 
war. To meet these challenges, Israeli leaders took the unusual step of forming a national 
unity government with all opposition parties, bringing some religious and right-wing 
ministers (including future prime minister Menachem Begin) into government for the 
first time. They also called up Israel’s military reserves, ensuring that as many soldiers 
were in uniform and deployed to the front lines as possible in the event of hostilities.   
 At the end of May, with war seemingly only weeks away, several Israeli officials 
visited Washington to pressure the Johnson administration to take a stronger public 
stance in support of Israel and for specific commitments of military support. Though 
Johnson himself was a vocal supporter of Israel, his administration was deeply emersed 
in the American war to preserve South Vietnam and resisted Israeli pressure to become 
more involved in the brewing crisis in the Middle East. At the time, Johnson and his 
advisers were received intelligence reports indicating that Egyptian actions intended to be 
defensive. Furthermore, contrary to Israeli worries that their forces were inadequate to 
meet the threat from Egypt, IDF forces, according to American intelligence agencies, 
“maintain qualitative superiority over the Arab armed forces in almost all aspects of 
combat operations.”119 During a meeting with Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban, 
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Johnson called on the Israelis to hold back, stressing several times that “Israel will not be 
alone unless it decides to go it alone.”120  
 Rather than heed Lyndon Johnson’s warning, Israeli leaders opted for preemptive 
war. The Israeli attack began on June 5, with a massive air attack on Egypt’s air forces 
and air defenses. Catching the Egyptians completely by surprise, the Israeli strike quickly 
destroyed Egypt’s air force on the ground. Over the next five days, Israeli forces 
advanced rapidly into the Sinai Peninsula, seized control of the entire West Bank, 
including the Old City of Jerusalem, and captured the Golan Heights on the border with 
Syria. After six brief days of fighting, a United Nations ceasefire ended the conflict on 
June 11. The war was a military triumph for Israel and a humiliating defeat for Israel’s 
Arab neighbors.  
 One of the most puzzling events of the Six-Day War occurred on June 8 as Israeli 
forces were preparing to attack Syria. On that day, Israeli aircraft and patrol boats 
attacked an American ship, the U.S.S. Liberty, as it was sailing in international waters in 
the Mediterranean Sea. An electronic intelligence-gathering vessel, the Liberty had been 
sent to the area to monitor Israeli and Egyptian communications as war between the two 
countries seemed increasingly likely. In the ensuing attack, which Israel later claimed 
was a tragic accident, twenty-five American sailors were killed, dozens more wounded, 
and the Liberty was badly damaged. Though many details of this incident remain 
classified, American intelligence reports from the weeks following the attack concluded 
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that the attack on the Liberty was most likely an accident caused by Israeli commanders’ 
failure to inform the proper units that the Liberty was an American vessel.121  
The Middle East After 1967 
 On November 22, 1967, the United Nations passed UN Security Council 
Resolution 242, a document that would set the terms for negotiations between Israel, 
Arab nations, and the United States for decades to come. Seeking to address the concerns 
of both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Resolution called for an end to belligerency; 
the termination of all territorial claims and acknowledgment of each state’s territorial 
sovereignty, integrity, and political independence; and affirmed each state’s right to live 
in peace within secure and internationally recognized borders. Resolution 242 also called 
for a UN Special Representative to be appointed to take charge of negotiations to achieve 
peace in the Middle East.122 
 Within Israel, the IDF’s quick and overwhelming victory was greeted with 
tremendous enthusiasm and celebration. In an essay published in The New Republic 
thirty-five years after the events of June 1967, the historian Tony Judt wrote that during 
the six years between the end of the Six-Day War and the start of the October War in 
1973, Israelis became “dizzy with success.” Recalling a visit to a junior officers’ living 
quarters on the Golan Heights, Judt observed “an astonishingly quick transition from 
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quiet confidence to an air of overwhelming superiority” among the Israeli military.123 The 
feeling among enlisted Israeli soldiers was more complicated, however. In a series of 
candid interviews recorded shortly after the Six-Day War ended, junior Israeli soldiers 
and reservists expressed deep concerns about what Israel’s overwhelming victory meant 
for its future.124 But despite these discordant voices, the feeling of overconfidence and 
military superiority among Israel’s senior leaders would carry over into Israel’s next 
major war, with disastrous consequences.  
 The events of June 1967 had a dramatic impact on how people around the world 
viewed Israel. While many who were sympathetic to Israel rejoiced at Israel’s military 
accomplishments, others were in no mood to celebrate. What Israel’s supporters saw as a 
remarkable victory in the face of Arab provocations against more numerous Arab armies, 
others saw as an aggressive and unprovoked war of conquest by Israel. This vision of 
Israeli actions had a dramatic effect on perceptions of Israel in sub-Saharan Africa, a 
decolonizing region where Israeli diplomats had worked hard to establish a presence in 
the 1950s and early 1960s.125 The same was true of Israel’s image in Western Europe, 
where Israel initially was viewed very sympathetically among European leaders because 
of the Holocaust. West Germany was a major supporter of Israel during its first two 
decades. In fact, according to a recent study by Daniel Marwecki, West Germany was a 
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more important ally of Israel than either France or the United States before 1967.126 For 
both African and Western European nations, the 1967 war was a turning point, the 
beginning of a more distant and tense relationship with Israel.127   
 Another significant development in the Middle East following the Six-Day War 
was the beginning of a new era of Palestinian political and militant activity. The primary 
Palestinian political and military body, the Palestine Liberation Organization or PLO, 
was formed in 1964, and was already involved in attacks on Israel from bases in 
neighboring countries. But Israel’s swift and overwhelming victory over Arab armies in 
1967 pushed the PLO to adopt a much more aggressive strategy to achieve its objectives. 
Before 1967, Palestinian militants had looked to other Arab nations, especially Egypt 
under President Nasser for support, but Arab militaries’ extremely poor performance 
against Israel convinced Palestinian leaders that they could not wait for Arab leaders to 
defeat Israel and that they needed to act on their own. Palestinian militant activity took 
several forms, including cross-border raids by fedayeen guerillas into Israel from bases in 
Jordan and Lebanon. Palestinian militants also began launching terrorist attacks on 
civilian targets outside the Middle East, especially in Europe, where Israeli and 
international civilian airliners became frequent targets. These attacks were intended to 
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raise international awareness of the Palestinian plight by attacking poorly defended 
targets and drawing the attention of the global media.128   
 The Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank 
was one of the most important and long-lasting consequences of the Six-Day War. 
Contrary to Israeli pronouncements that its attacks on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were not 
aimed at territorial conquest, recently historians have shown that territorial expansion was 
at least part of the reason, if not a significant reason, why Israeli leaders went to war in 
June of 1967.129 And despite some reports that Israel immediately offered to return the 
captured territory in return for peace, recent scholarship casts doubt on Israel’s 
willingness to exchange land for peace as called for under in the war’s immediate 
aftermath and was later codified in UN Resolution 242.130 
 Following the Six-Day War, Israeli leaders were divided over what to do about 
the occupied territories. One solution proposed by Yigal Allon, then Israel’s labor 
minister, was for Israel to annex two sections of territory along the Jordan River, creating 
a buffer zone between Israel and neighboring Jordan. Israel would then build settlements 
and military bases within these territories and the remainder of the territory would be 
returned to Jordan. While the Allon Plan, as it became known, was never formally 
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adopted by the Israeli government, it became the basis for Israel’s policies in the 
occupied territories for the next few years.131  
 Officials of the Johnson administration were committed to the land for peace 
formula as sketched out in Resolution 242. But after the end of the Six-Day War, 
American attention, especially that of the President, turned back to one of its other major 
concerns, the war in Vietnam. At a time when Israel’s settlement policy was still 
vulnerable to outside pressure, the United States missed an opportunity to limit or prevent 
Israelis from settling in the occupied territories. Instead of calling on the Israelis to 
withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, the 
Johnson administration determined that the onus was on the Arabs, not the Israelis, to 
make concessions before calling on Israel to withdraw from the territory it seized in June 
of 1967. In what Gershom Gorenberg called the “Bundy Doctrine,” named for McGeorge 
Bundy, the American official who was responsible for the policy, American officials 
decided that the United States would not pressure Israel to withdraw or make concessions 
unless it was offered peace from Arab nations in return. Absent actions by American and 
Israeli leaders to remove them, settlements became a contentious part of future peace 
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.132  
 Senior Israeli leaders and American officials were not the only ones with their 
eyes on the occupied territories. While Israeli leaders were debating what to do about the 
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occupied territories, grassroots activists were taking matters into their own hands. Secular 
Israelis seeking to recreate the adventure of their Zionist forefathers and religious Israelis 
seeking to settle in what they called “Greater Israel” established small settlements in the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights soon after the fighting ended. Although the settler 
movement initially included both religious and secular Israelis, the religious element 
came to dominate the movement in later years. As more Israelis moved into the 
settlements, they became more entrenched and more resistant to removal as part of any 
peace negotiations that involved exchanging land for peace.133    
 The June 1967 war also transformed the Cold War in the Middle East. The brief 
war altered the Soviet Union’s relationship with its Middle Eastern allies, especially 
Egypt and Syria. After sending years of sending economic and military aid to Egypt and 
Syria, Soviet leaders were shocked by the Arab militaries’ poor performance against 
Israeli forces. In response, the Soviets broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and 
significantly increased the amount of military aid going to the Middle East (especially to 
Egypt) and dispatched more military advisers to the region to train Arab military 
forces.134 While most scholars see these Soviet moves as reactive, Isabella Ginor and 
Gideon Remez argue that the Soviet Union was actively working with their Arab allies to 
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undermine the Israeli state. These findings, which rely heavily on accounts from Soviet 
veterans who served in the Middle East, have not been widely accepted by historians.135 
The Impact of the 1967 War in the United States 
 The events of June 1967 had a dramatic effect on several groups within the United 
States. Israel’s dramatic victory in June 1967 set off a burst of enthusiasm and support for 
the Jewish state in the United States. For many elite commentators in the United States, 
Israel’s swift and overwhelming military victory was more than a demonstration of the 
Jewish State’s military prowess, it reflected Israeli society itself. At a time when more 
and more Americans were protesting the war in Vietnam, Israel appeared to many 
American observers to be a nation of heroic citizen-soldiers who rose to defend their 
country in the face of what was perceived to be an existential threat from hostile Arab 
nations. As historian Shaul Mitelpunkt writes, “The romantic, fictionalized picture of 
Israel these elite US commentators shaped was to a large extent based on nostalgia for an 
imagined, harmonious post-World War II consensus. In adoring Israel, they mourned the 
demise of their own society’s once proud citizen-soldier model.”136 
Pro-Israel sentiment was particularly intense among American Jews, who were 
simultaneously concerned that Israel faced an existential threat in 1967 and overjoyed at 
its dramatic victory. While Jews in the United States had been supportive of Israel since 
its founding in 1948, only a small number of American Jews had moved to Israel, and 
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both American Jews and their major organizations generally focused on causes closer to 
home.137 By 1967, however, American Jews were more fully integrated into American 
society than they had ever been and felt freer to identify with Israel without fear that they 
would be seen as Americans more loyal to Israel than to their home country.  
 For some Jewish intellectuals, support for Israel threatened to undermine another 
deeply held belief, opposition to the American war in Vietnam. One such individual was 
Hans Morgenthau, a prominent political scientist, a proponent of the “realist” school in 
international relations, and author of Politics Among Nations, a seminal work of 
international relations theory. Morgenthau was highly critical of the United States’ 
destructive war in Vietnam. But he came to a different conclusion when looking at 
Israel’s behavior in 1967.138 Writing in the New Leader less than two weeks after the war 
ended, Morgenthau blamed U.S. policy in the aftermath of the 1956 war for helping to 
create the present situation, and reasoned that Israel was acting as any nation under threat 
would under similar circumstances.139 In her analysis of the relationship between the Six-
Day War and the Johnson administration’s war in Vietnam, Judith Klinghoffer goes even 
further to argue that the Six-Day War was a critical moment for those intellectuals who 
would later be identified as neoconservatives because it opened the door for them to 
support a tougher American foreign policy if it included support for Israel.140  
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 American Jews’ newfound enthusiasm for Israel did not emerge out of nowhere. 
While it was certainly motivated by genuine concerns about the security of Israel, it was 
also a response to several other long-term trends that were coming to fruition during the 
1960s. One of these trends was the growing popular and academic awareness of the 
Holocaust, Nazi Germany’s massive effort to exterminate European Jewry during the 
Second World War. While many scholars have written that American Jews paid 
relatively little attention to the Holocaust until the 1960s, historian Hasia Diner argues 
that, on the contrary, American Jews from across the religious and political spectrums 
made the Holocaust an integral part of their community’s life.141 Israel, where many 
survivors fled after World War II ended, went through its own process of coming to terms 
with the Holocaust. American Jews’ growing consciousness of the Holocaust and the 
dramatic events of June 1967 in the Middle East combined to make Israel and the 
Holocaust two of the most important aspects of American Jewish life and culture.142 
 Two authors whose works had much to do with the growth of Holocaust 
consciousness in the United States and around the world were Anne Frank and Elie 
Wiesel. Frank’s diary of her family’s years hiding in an attic in Amsterdam during World 
War II before their discovery and eventual execution was published in English in 1952. 
By the end of the decade, it had been made into an award-winning play and film. 
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Wiesel’s memoir Night, which detailed his family’s experience during the expulsion of 
Hungarian Jews to the death camps, was published in English for the first time in 1961. 
Both Night and The Diary of Anne Frank became widespread texts in American schools, 
exposing generations of young Americans to the horrors of the Holocaust.  
 The Holocaust dramatically returned to global public consciousness in the spring 
of 1961 when the trial of Adolf Eichmann began. Eichmann, a mid-level official in 
Heinrich Himmler’s SS during World War II, had organized deportations of European 
Jews from German-occupied countries first into ghettos and later to death camps on the 
Eastern Front. While many senior figures from the Nazi regime were tried and convicted 
at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, many other junior officials like 
Eichmann escaped prosecution. Like several other former Nazi officials and perpetrators, 
Eichmann escaped to Argentina after the collapse of the Nazi regime and lived in hiding 
for several years. Alerted to his hiding place by German prosecutor Fritz Bauer, Israeli 
intelligence operatives kidnapped Eichmann on May 11, 1960, and brought him back to 
Israel for trial. The trial was covered widely in the international press, including the 
political-theorist-turned-reporter Hannah Arendt. Commissioned by the New Yorker 
magazine to write a series of articles on the trial, Arendt wrote insightfully and critically 
of the Israeli government’s efforts to try Eichmann in 1961. Her observations were later 
published in an influential and controversial book, Eichmann in Jerusalem.143   
 In the 1960s the academic community was also starting to reckon with the 
Holocaust as a distinct area of study. In 1961, the same year that the Eichmann trial 
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began in Jerusalem, Raul Hilberg published The Destruction of the European Jews, the 
first comprehensive study of how Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime in Germany sought to 
expel and eventually eliminate Jews from Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. An Austrian 
Jew whose family left Vienna for the United States just before World War II began, 
Hilberg earned a doctorate in political science at Columbia University and set about 
turning his dissertation on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust into a book. Hilberg’s 
analysis focused on the Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust, especially the bureaucrats 
who made it possible. After struggling to find a publisher, The Destruction of the 
European Jews was eventually released by Quadrangle, a small publisher in Chicago. 
Though not a popular success, the book received widespread notice and mixed reactions 
from reviewers. Hilberg’s comments on Jewish collaborators were particularly 
controversial, especially since his book came out around the same time as the Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem. In the years since, The Destruction of the European Jews became the 
foundation for an entire tradition of historical scholarship.144  
 In addition to their ongoing efforts to come to terms with the Holocaust, 
American Jews’ reaction to the events of June 1967 was also shaped by their involvement 
in the American New Left, the civil rights movement during the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
anti-Vietnam War movement. Throughout the twentieth century, and especially since the 
1930s and the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, American Jews had taken an 
active part in liberal causes, especially the struggle to obtain equal rights for African 
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Americans. But the political relationship between American Jews and African Americans 
grew more tense in the mid-1960s as many younger black civil rights leaders moved 
away from measured and gradual efforts to achieve equality and toward the more 
confrontational and militant tactics of the Black Power movement. In this context of 
assertive racial and ethnic pride, American Jews’ commitment to Israel became an 
assertion of Jewish identity. For some African Americans, on the other hand, voicing 
support for the Palestinians served as a vehicle for asserting black solidarity with 
oppressed peoples around the world. Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands during the 
Six Day War brought these tensions to the surface.145 
 In this complex domestic environment, Israel’s triumph in the Six-Day War of 
June 1967 gave American Jews the chance to celebrate their pride in the Jewish state and, 
by extension, their pride in their own Jewish identity. In his analysis of American Jews’ 
views of foreign policy throughout U.S. history, Michael Barnett writes that the Six-Day 
War, coming on the heels of protests against the Vietnam War, the shifting nature of the 
civil rights movement, a growing interest in the plight of Soviet Jews, and increasing in 
the Holocaust as a subject of historical and moral analysis, inspired an intense outburst of 
enthusiasm for Israel. The war, Barnett argues, “not only gave American Jews a glimpse 
 
 145 On American Jews and liberalism in the 20th century, see Marc Dollinger, Quest for Inclusion: 
Jews and Liberalism in Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) and Michael E. 
Staub, Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002). On relations between American Jews and African Americans in the 1960s and 
beyond, see Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American 
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) and Dollinger, Black Power, Jewish Politics: 
Reinventing the Alliance in the 1960s (Brandeis, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2018). On African 
Americans and the Palestinian cause, see Michael R. Fishbach, Black Power and Palestine: Transnational 
Countries of Color (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019). On the tensions within the American 
Left specifically, see Fischbach, The Movement and the Middle East: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Divided the American Left (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020).  
98 
 
of life without Israel, [Israel’s] victory also instilled in them a self-respect they never 
knew they had been missing.”146    
 A small number of American Jews were so inspired by Israel’s victory in 1967 
and so concerned for its safety that they emigrated to Israel and became key participants 
in the Israeli settler movement. According to Sara Yael Hirschhorn, more than 60,000 
American Jews joined the settler movement in the years after 1967. These American 
Jewish settlers were often characterized as oddballs or fanatics. For instance, in the 
lengthy story “Judea” in Philip Roth’s collection The Counterlife, one character describes 
settlers from America as “either religious or crazy or both.”147 However Hirschhorn 
paints a much more complicated picture. For these American Jews, emigrating to an 
Israeli settlement was both a religious and political act. These Americans were often 
young observant (but not necessarily Orthodox) Jews who were deeply involved in the 
civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements of the 1960s. These American settlers’ 
efforts to transport their values of tolerance and inclusion often ran into serious obstacles 
as Israeli settlements became increasingly controversial parts of peace negotiations and 
often clashed with local Palestinians who objected to their presence.148 
 American Jews were not the only Americans inspired by Israel’s military feats in 
June 1967. Israel’s quick victory, and especially its capture of the Temple Mount in the 
Old City of Jerusalem, was an important moment for some evangelical Protestants as 
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well. Among a certain subset of conservative Protestant evangelicals, the return of the 
Jews to their ancestral homeland in Palestine was seen as a vital component of God’s 
plan for humanity, something that had to happen for God’s plan to be realized. Part of 
this was realized in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel, but it was Israel’s 
“miraculous” victory in June of 1967 that seemed to be definitive proof to some 
evangelicals that God’s plan for humanity was playing out before their eyes in the Middle 
East.149 
 These American evangelicals’ enthusiastic reaction to Israel’s victory in the Six-
Day War took place against the backdrop of a broader change in the relationship between 
American Jews and evangelicals. While for decades evangelical outreach to the Jewish 
community had focused on converting Jews to Christianity, American evangelicals 
developed a more positive view of Judaism in the 20th century and gradually moved away 
from (but never fully abandoned) conversion efforts and negative stereotypes about 
Jewish people. Together, these new views of the Jewish people combined with 
enthusiasm for Israel’s victory in 1967 to set the stage for conservative evangelicals’ 
embrace of Israel in the 1970s and beyond.150  
 
 
 149 On the relationship between American evangelicals and Israel since 1948, see Caitlin Carenen, 
The Fervent Embrace: Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, and Israel (New York: New York University 
Press, 2012) and Daniel G. Hummel, Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.-Israeli Relations 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019). For a more theological study, see Timothy P. 
Weber, On the Road to Armageddon: How Evangelicals Became Israel’s Best Friend (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2004). On the importance of prophecy in American religion, especially in the twentieth 
century, see Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992).  
 150 On the evolving relationship between Evangelicals and Jews in the United States since the 
nineteenth century, see Yaakov Ariel, An Unusual Relationship: Evangelical Christians and Jews (New 




 With racial unrest across the country and a highly unpopular war in Vietnam still 
raging, the Middle East was not a major issue in the 1968 presidential election. Lyndon 
Johnson made waves when he announced on March 31 that he would not seek or accept 
his party’s nomination for a second term as president. Like the man they were trying to 
replace, the men vying for the Democratic nomination were all strong supporters of 
Israel. Hubert Humphrey, who emerged as the Democratic nominee for president, was a 
strong supporter of Israel ever since his days in the Senate. Robert Kennedy, brother of 
the assassinated John F. Kennedy and a Democratic Senator from New York, was shot 
and killed in retaliation for Kennedy’s support of a proposed sale of fifty F-4 Phantom 
fighter-bombers to Israel that was being debated that fateful year.151 
 Lyndon Johnson made his final contribution to the development of U.S.-Israeli 
relations near the end of his presidency when he approved that sale of Phantom aircraft to 
Israel in October of 1968. Israeli leaders had been pressing the United States to sell them 
Phantom aircraft for several years, but so far, the Johnson administration had refused. 
Though the Israelis had decimated Arab air forces in the June 1967 war, Israeli prime 
minister Levi Eshkol remained concerned that Israel’s air superiority in the Middle East 
would not last. As was the case two years earlier, when American officials were debating 
whether to sell Israel A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, the decision to approve the sale was not a 
simple one. According to David Rodman, the Johnson administration’s decision to 
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approve the Phantom sale was born out of a feeling that it was the best way to advance 
American interests in the broader region, not a specific desire to enhance Israel’s military 
might.152   
 While officials within the Johnson administration had mixed feelings about taking 
such a dramatic step to strengthen Israel’s military might, members of Congress were 
much less conflicted. As Kenneth Kolander argues in his new book America’s Israel, the 
1967 war was an important turning point for senators and congressmen from both parties. 
Officials at the Defense Department were on the other hand strongly opposed to selling 
Phantom aircraft to Israel in the aftermath of the June 1967 war. While the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were willing to accept some aid to Israel as part of an effort to maintain a military 
balance in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbors, they felt that Phantoms 
would tip the balance decisively in Israel’s favor.153 
 As this chapter has demonstrated, there were important developments in the 
emergence of the U.S.-Israeli relationship during the late 1950s and 1960s. But there was 
still a long way to go before that relationship transformed into a close military alliance. 
Two strongly pro-Israel presidents in John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson approved 
the sale of major weapons systems to Israel, but these steps, while major departures for 
the U.S., were still seen as distinct individual measures, not part of an ongoing aid 
program. That was all about to change in the 1970s, under the leadership of a man, 
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Richard Nixon, who did not share Kennedy or Johnson’s affection and sympathy for the 




Chapter 3: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Israel, 1969-1974 
 When Richard Nixon landed at Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv on the afternoon 
of June 16, 1974, he was the first American president to visit the State of Israel. Nixon’s 
visit came during a larger trip to the Middle East that also took him to Syria and Egypt, 
two other important countries involved in the Nixon administration’s efforts to facilitate 
negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries. The man who spearheaded those 
negotiations, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, traveled with the President. In his brief 
remarks, Nixon said that he was proud to be standing in Israel, “because our two 
countries have been joined together in friendship from the time of Israel’s birth as a 
nation in our modern times.” He praised the Israeli people for their “courage, their 
tenacity, their firmness in the face of very great odds,” and reassured them that the United 
States was proud to stand with Israel in times of trouble, and would continue to do so in 
the future, hopefully in times of peace.154 Neither the President of the United States nor 
his Israeli welcoming party, which included Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and President 
Emphraim Katzir, mentioned the ongoing Watergate crisis in the United States, which 
ended the Nixon presidency less than two months later.  
 This first presidential trip to Israel came at a perilous time for both Nixon’s 
political future and the future of Arab-Israeli negotiations in the Middle East. Nixon, 
Kissinger, and their entourage arrived less than a year after the October War of 1973, in 
which Israel had suffered thousands of casualties repulsing a surprise attack from Syria 
 
 154 Document 184: Remarks on Arrival at Tel Aviv, Israel, June 16, 1974, Public Papers of the 
Presidents (hereafter PPP), Richard Nixon: 1974, page 516. (URL: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/). 
(Accessed 5/26/20).  
104 
 
and Egypt. Israel’s counterattack was fueled by a massive airlift of military equipment 
from the United States, an act of support that infuriated much of the Arab world and led 
to an oil embargo against the United States and its European allies. Henry Kissinger had 
spent the months leading up to this visit flying back and forth between capital cities of the 
Middle East to broker negotiations between Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian leaders, and had 
successfully concluded two limited disengagement agreements. But despite the lofty and 
positive rhetoric from the leaders of both countries at the airport welcome ceremony, the 
national mood in Israel was nowhere near as upbeat. Alexander Haig, an officer in the 
U.S. Army who was then serving as Nixon’s chief of staff, recalled seeing a country 
“deeply shaken” by the recent conflict and whose young people had seen enough of war. 
As he wrote in his memoirs, “There was too much anxiety and the memories of sacrifice 
were too fresh for anything beyond routine expressions of gratitude to the visitors.”155  
 The 1970s was a particularly significant decade for American foreign policy in 
the Middle East. This chapter surveys the development of American foreign policy in the 
Middle East, especially the evolving relationship with Israel, from the time that Richard 
Nixon took office in January 1969 to his resignation in the summer of 1974. As this 
chapter shows, the United States and Israel drew significantly closer during these years, 
though the relationship between the two countries remained rocky and never as close as it 
was often portrayed in Israeli and American leaders’ public statements. Nevertheless, 
American support for Israel, especially in terms of military and economic aid, increased 
dramatically between 1969-1974. In the words of historian Avi Shlaim, “During the 
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presidency of Richard Nixon the relationship between the two countries gradually 
developed into a close strategic partnership.”156 
 American military aid to Israel had been on the rise since the early 1960s, but it 
increased substantially under Richard Nixon, culminating in the unprecedented American 
resupply effort during the 1973 October War. In the negotiations that followed, the 
United States made a series of new commitments to Israel in order to secure two limited 
but ground-breaking disengagement agreements, first between Israel and Egypt, and then 
between Israel and Syria. These agreements, which came as part of Henry Kissinger’s 
shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, were some of the first successful negotiations 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, who by 1974 had been in a state of war with each 
other for more than two decades. The administration’s efforts to broker negotiations in 
the Middle East culminated in Nixon’s tour to the region. Unfortunately for Nixon, these 
limited foreign policy successes could not save his presidency from the Watergate 
scandal, which produced the first presidential resignation in American history.  
 Though Richard Nixon was one of the most important figures in American 
politics during the 1970s, it was Henry Kissinger, an unelected adviser, who would have 
as much impact on American foreign relations during the decade as the presidents he 
served, perhaps more. Born in 1923 to an Orthodox Jewish family in Germany, Kissinger 
escaped with his family to the United States in 1938 at the age of fifteen. He served in the 
U.S. Army during World War II, earned a PhD in political science at Harvard (where he 
also became a professor), and produced scholarship designed to be directly relevant to 
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American foreign policy in the Cold War before he entered government service. First as 
National Security Adviser and later as Secretary of State, Kissinger became one of the 
most important figures in American diplomatic history, and one of the most controversial. 
By publishing three giant memoirs, Kissinger did much to shape the narrative about his 
service in government and his legacy, although these works need to be read in 
conversation with the archival record. Even before the end of the Cold War, historians 
and journalists have been grappling with Kissinger’s influence over American foreign 
relations during the 1970s and continue to do so in the 2020s.157   
Though less celebrated in popular culture than the 1960s, the decade of the 1970s 
was just as impactful for the United States both at home and abroad. Since at least 2001, 
historians of the United States and of U.S. foreign relations have produced a large body 
of scholarship that underscores the importance of the 1970s as a transformational era of 
American diplomacy, politics, and culture. Coming on the heels of the dramatic political 
and social upheavals of the previous decade, from the assassination of John F. Kennedy, 
major achievements in civil rights legislation and backlash against them, and the 
escalation of the American war in Vietnam, the 1970s saw a wide range of changes in 
American domestic political, social, economic, and cultural life come to fruition. These 
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included everything from changing notions of gender and sexuality to economic and 
energy crises, a growing distrust of government, and the rise of a powerful conservative 
political movement.158 
 Internationally, the 1970s were an important turning point for global politics and 
for American foreign policy. The Cold War conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union that dominated international relations since the end of World War II 
continued, but the 1970s saw the beginning of a new phase in U.S.-Soviet relations. 
Specifically, through a policy that came to be known as détente, American and Soviet 
leaders sought to find ways to cooperate with each other on issues of mutual interest, 
such as trade and nuclear weapons.159 Many studies of détente focus on the American 
side and draw predominantly on American sources, but sources from Soviet archives 
reveal that Premier Leonid Brezhnev also played a key role in shaping this new chapter in 
the Cold War.160 While the United States and the Soviet Union were embarking on a new 
course in their diplomatic relations, other factors such as the end of European colonial 
rule in Asia and Africa, the rise of non-state actors such as human rights groups and 
 
 158 For histories of the United States during the 1970s that focus on domestic affairs, see Bruce J. 
Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: The Free 
Press, 2001); Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New 
York: The New Press, 2010); Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974-1980 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2010); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories 
for Finances in the Seventies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010); and Meg Jacobs, Panic at the 
Pump: The Energy Crisis and The Transformation of American Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 2016). 
For a study that puts American political, economic, and cultural developments during the 1970s into a 
global context, see Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic 
Inequality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
 159 On the evolution of détente throughout the 1970s, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and 
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1994). For a more recent analysis of the origins of détente, see Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: 
Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
 160See Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), especially Chapter 7.  
108 
 
terrorist organizations, globalization, and the growing demand for a shrinking oil supply 
made it clear that the Cold War was not the only force shaping international relations.161  
Though they came from very different backgrounds, Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger held a similar view of the United States’ place in the world. Both believed that 
the United States was a central player in global affairs and should remain so, despite the 
challenges it faced in the 1970s. They also believed that geopolitical issues, especially the 
Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, should be the United States’ top priority. 
This view had enormous implications for American foreign policy in the Middle East 
during the 1970s, for both men saw events in this vital region through the lens of the Cold 
War and how matters such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the global energy supply 
affected U.S.-Soviet relations. But geopolitics and grand strategy were not the only 
factors that shaped how Nixon and Kissinger understood the Middle East and U.S.-Israeli 
relations. Both men were also influenced by their respective backgrounds and previous 
experiences.  
Richard Nixon came to the White House in 1969 with a fully developed view of 
the United States’ role in the world, including its role in the Middle East. The new 
president had previously dealt with Israel as Vice President under Dwight Eisenhower 
and later visited the country as a private citizen in the 1960s. Recalling his visit to Israel 
in June 1967 in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, Nixon wrote in his memoirs that he 
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“was impressed by the courage and toughness of the Israeli leaders and people,” but also 
worried that Israel’s dramatic military success made the Israelis overconfident in their 
own abilities.162  He saw the Middle East primarily through the lens of the Cold War, 
where the influence of Soviet-supported Arab countries like Egypt and Syria needed to be 
counterbalanced by pro-Western states such as Jordan and Israel. This volatile region 
could, he feared, erupt into another regional war or, more seriously, a direct confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.163  
In addition to his view of Israel’s place in Cold War international relations, 
Nixon’s view of the Jewish state was also shaped by his own personal experiences with 
Israelis and his personal views of Jewish people. On the one hand Nixon at times 
expressed deep admiration for Israelis and their leaders. In his memoir, the former 
president wrote that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir “conveyed simultaneously the 
qualities of extreme toughness and extreme warmth; when the survival of her country 
was involved, the toughness was predominant.”164 But on the other hand, as both people 
who knew him and the White House taping system attest, Nixon routinely used 
antisemitic language as part of his everyday vocabulary.  
Nixon’s antisemitic remarks, which first leaked to the press in the early 1970s, 
were often linked to his responses to criticisms from critics in the Democratic Party or in 
the media such as long-time New York Times editor Max Frankel, who happened to be 
Jewish. According to Leonard Garment, a lawyer who worked on Nixon’s 1968 
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presidential campaign and then later as a White House aide, Nixon’s antisemitism was 
not particularly strong, a 15 or 20 on a hypothetical 100-point scale. Garment, who was 
Jewish, described Nixon’s view of Jewish people as mixed, “better than most, worse than 
some, like the rest of the world.”165 Nixon’s own White House taping system tells a more 
complicated story. According to Stephen Whitfield, the tapes reveal that Nixon’s 
antisemitism was deeply held and frequently expressed, but they also do not show that 
these views had an impact on public policy.166 It was ironic then that Henry Kissinger, 
Nixon’s highest-profile adviser, was Jewish.  
Like Nixon, Henry Kissinger had visited Israel during the 1960s as a private 
citizen. He also taught Yigal Allon, an Israeli deputy prime minister and foreign minister, 
in one of his seminars at Harvard. Although he came from an Orthodox Jewish family, 
Kissinger did not practice Judaism as an adult. Nevertheless, according to historian 
Jeremi Suri, his family’s Jewish faith was an important factor in shaping both his identity 
and his view of the world.167 Regarding Israel and the Middle East, this translated into a 
deep sympathy for Israel, but importantly it did not mean that Kissinger believed that 
Israel and the United States had the same interests. Nixon’s antisemitism was a source of 
tension between the President and his National Security Adviser. But as a student of 
international relations and U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, Kissinger agreed that 
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the United States should play a central role in shaping global affairs and that the Middle 
East was a particularly dangerous region for U.S. Cold War priorities.  
A few years after leaving government service, Kissinger wrote that the Middle 
East was “at the vortex of international politics” during the second half of the twentieth 
century. Even before oil became such a pressing international issue, it was the Soviet 
Union’s efforts to expand its influence in the Middle East that worried Kissinger the 
most. In White House Years, his first memoir, Kissinger recalled that “I had always 
believed it essential to reduce the scope of Soviet adventurist policies in the Middle 
East.”168 Although it would be a few years before Kissinger achieved significant 
influence over U.S. policy in the Middle East, this concern with the Soviet Union 
dominated Kissinger’s approach to the region for the remainder of his years in 
government.  
Détente, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Middle East 
 Nixon and Kissinger came to the White House with two significant and closely 
related foreign policy objectives. The first of these was to extract the United States from 
the deeply unpopular war in South Vietnam at minimal cost to U.S. global standing. But 
ending the Vietnam War was part of Nixon and Kissinger’s second priority, a much 
broader effort to reshape the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. This effort, which was often referred to as détente, nominally involved working to 
reduce tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union by finding ways for the 
superpowers to work together on issues of mutual interest. But while “détente,” a French 
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term meaning the relaxation of tensions, implies a lofty goal of easing the tensions that 
had, at times, pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war, Nixon and Kissinger saw 
things differently. For them, “détente” was a specific strategy to maintain American 
global power and reduce Soviet influence around the world. While American officials 
may have described détente in grander terms, for Nixon and Kissinger it was part of the 
United States’ ongoing strategy to maintain its global power in a rapidly changing 
world.169  
 This twin effort by the Nixon administration to pull back from Vietnam and 
refocus on the Great Power competition with the Soviet Union seemed to take practical 
form in a policy Nixon outlined on July 25, 1969. At an informal press conference on the 
island of Guam during a visit to the Pacific, Nixon’s answer to a reporter’s question 
described a plan for the United States to continue to play a major role in the Pacific 
region while at the same time reducing American military involvement in South Vietnam 
and elsewhere in Asia. Nixon said that the United States “must avoid that kind of policy 
that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts 
such as the one that we have in Vietnam.”170 Instead of deploying tens of thousands of 
American troops on the Asian mainland, the U.S. would provide assistance from afar so 
that local governments could fight their own battles.   
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 Reporters covering the president’s trip saw these remarks as a major policy 
pronouncement, and White House officials played along by starting to refer to this policy 
as the “Nixon Doctrine.” But despite the fuss generated by Nixon’s comments on Guam 
at the time, the Nixon Doctrine was more of a summary of the President’s own private 
thinking about American foreign policy than a detailed vision for a new American role in 
the world. Today, historians are divided on the doctrine’s long-term significance. Jeffrey 
Kimball, a historian of the American war in Vietnam, doubts whether the “Nixon 
Doctrine” was ever a fully articulated guiding principle for American foreign policy. 
Daniel Sargent on the other hand, in his major recent reevaluation of American foreign 
relations in the 1970s, sees the Nixon Doctrine as part of a broader effort to reconcile 
long-standing commitments with the new challenges to American foreign policy in the 
1970s.171 
 While discussions of the Nixon Doctrine at the time focused on American 
involvement in Southeast Asia, the principle of minimizing American military 
commitments in other areas had major implications for the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf. With its vital importance to the world’s oil supply, American policymakers had 
long considered the Persian Gulf to be a region of critical strategic importance. If the 
United States was not going to station its own military forces in the Gulf, it had to rely on 
regional surrogates to secure its interests there, and this prompted the Johnson 
administration to develop close ties with two of the largest oil producers in the region, 
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Saudi Arabia and Iran, during the 1960s. Iran in particular became a close American ally 
and received significant American military aid in return for looking after American 
interests in the area. As historian Roham Alvandi points out, Iran’s leader, Shah 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, whom the United States had helped install as part of a 1953 
coup that toppled the democratically-elected government of Mohammed Mossadegh, was 
much more than a bystander in this relationship. On the contrary, he was an active player 
in shaping Iranian-American relations and not an American surrogate. The Shah was also 
more comfortable with close American ties with Israel, much more than Iran’s neighbor 
across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia.172 
 The Nixon administration’s efforts to dramatically alter U.S.-Soviet relations 
through détente were complicated by an issue of mutual interest to American Jews and 
the Israeli government, the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union. Like many other religious 
and ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, Jews faced many restrictions on their freedom 
to practice their religion or change their economic and political circumstances. Soviet 
leaders also imposed strict limitations on Soviet citizens’ freedom of movement, 
including their ability to emigrate to another country. Soviet Jews began to push back 
against these restrictions in the 1960s, especially following Israel’s victory in the Six-Day 
War, and these political protests caught the attention of Jewish communities around the 
world. Starting in the 1960s, Jews in the United States began calling for Jews living in the 
Soviet Union to be allowed to leave and pressed their elected representatives to do 
something about this issue. Through their organizations and protests, American Jews 
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became some of the most important activists in the broader global effort to aid Soviet 
Jews.173   
 As Nixon and Kissinger worked to improve U.S.-Soviet relations by negotiating a 
trade deal between the two superpowers, activists seeking to open up Jewish emigration 
from the Soviet Union pressured the Nixon administration to demand that the Soviet 
government relax its immigration quotas. Soviet Jewish activists found an important ally 
in Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington. Jackson was a vocal critic 
of the Nixon administration’s détente policy and one of the forerunners of the 
“neoconservatives,” a group of intellectuals and politicians that included many liberal 
Democrats who broke with their party over the Democrats’ perceived softness toward the 
Soviet Union. He sought to use the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration to undermine the 
Nixon administration’s policy of détente. Together with Ohio Representative and fellow 
Democrat Charles Vanik, Jackson succeeded in attracting significant bipartisan support 
for an amendment to the Trade Reform Act that linked trade concessions from the United 
States to relaxed Soviet immigration quotas. Nixon and Kissinger vehemently opposed 
this initiative, but they were ultimately unable to overcome Jackson and Vanik’s high 
level of bipartisan support in Congress. The Jackson-Vanik amendment became a serious 
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barrier to détente negotiations between the Nixon administration and the Soviet 
leadership of Leonid Brezhnev.174  
 The Nixon administration’s opposition to the Jackson-Vanik amendment damaged 
the administration’s relationship with leaders of the American Jewish community. While 
Nixon was elected in 1968 with only 17% of the Jewish vote, his administration did try to 
improve relations with the Jewish community.175 Mostly this was done through official 
intermediaries like Leonard Garment, a White House liaison to the Jewish community. 
The Nixon administration also reached out to American Jews through unofficial contacts 
such as Max Fisher, a wealthy Jewish businessman from Detroit. Fisher was unique in 
that, unlike many of his peers, he was a Republican and an important fundraiser whose 
ties to the GOP made him an important intermediary between Republican 
administrations, the American Jewish community, and the Israeli government.176  
Fearing that support for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would disrupt their plans 
for détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger tried to convince American Jews 
to dial back their criticisms. At a meeting with Jewish leaders in New York in late 
September 1972, Nixon argued that the best way to aid the Jews of the Soviet Union was 
to improve U.S.-Soviet relations with measures such as the Trade Reform Act. “If we 
make this an issue of prestige or a test of manhood between ourselves and the Soviets,” 
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Nixon warned, “the Soviets will only dig in their heels and the situation will become 
worse.”177 But despite the efforts of men like Garment and Fisher, American Jewish 
leaders remained steadfast in their support for the Jackson-Vanik amendment.  
 The Jackson-Vanik amendment also threatened to disrupt U.S.-Israeli relations. 
At this moment in Israeli history, the government of Golda Meir was trying to develop 
closer relations with the Nixon administration. Israeli officials were particularly eager for 
the United States to supply Israel with more sophisticated military equipment. In this 
area, however, the Israeli desire to cultivate closer ties with the United States conflicted 
with another Israeli priority, which was bringing Jews from around the world to Israel. 
Achieving this objective seemed to dictate that Israel should support the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, which was expressly intended to force the Soviet Union to allow Soviet Jews 
to emigrate to other countries, including Israel. However, coming out in support of this 
amendment threatened to undermine the Nixon administration’s larger goal of détente 
with the Soviets. While nominally remaining neutral on the Jackson-Vanik amendment, 
Israeli officials quietly supported it.178 
 In addition to the importance placed on aiding Soviet Jews within the American 
Jewish community, it was also one element of a broader trend in the United States and 
elsewhere which saw individuals, non-governmental organizations, and government 
officials called attention to the plight of religious and ethnic minorities around the world 
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to secure and protect their human rights. The cause of human rights presented a unique 
challenge to American policymakers. While it could be harnessed to criticize the Soviet 
Union for its poor human rights record, the critical eyes of human rights activists could 
just as easily be turned on the United States for anything from its treatment of African 
Americans in the United States to its support of dictatorships abroad that were guilty of 
their own human rights violations. As the case of the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
demonstrates, the cause of human rights could also undermine an administration’s foreign 
policy goals even when it nominally agreed with the human rights criticisms leveled at 
the Soviet Union. A growing number of historians of American foreign relations have 
highlighted this increased concern for human rights around the world, including inside 
the Soviet Union.179   
 Besides calling attention to the plight of Soviet Jews living under communist rule, 
advocating for Soviet Jews was also connected to the tense climate of racial and ethnic 
politics in the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s. For many American 
Jews, protests against the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union and calls for the U.S. 
government to act on their behalf became assertions of Jewish identity. The same was 
true of activism on behalf of Israel. A small number of American Jews took their efforts 
to aid Soviet Jews to extreme ends. Under the leadership of Meir Kahane, an ordained 
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rabbi from Brooklyn, New York, members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) held 
violent demonstrations and targeted Soviet diplomats’ homes and offices with pipe 
bombs in 1971 (remarkably, no one was killed in these attacks). Kahane later moved to 
Israel and established an ultra-right and racist political party, Kach, and was briefly 
elected to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, before being expelled for his racist 
positions and rhetoric.180  
 Another major Cold War issue that shaped U.S.-Israeli relations during these 
years was nuclear weapons. Nixon and Kissinger were much less concerned than their 
predecessors had been with nuclear non-proliferation, the effort to prevent more nations 
from developing nuclear weapons. This change in attitude had a direct bearing on 
American relations with Israel. Nixon’s predecessors John Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson, despite their sympathy for Israel, were still committed to non-proliferation, and 
Israel’s nuclear program had been a source of tension between the two countries. The 
Nixon administration’s solution to the problem of Israel’s nuclear program was 
essentially to ignore it. During Golda Meir’s visit to the United States in late September 
of 1969, the Israeli leader and the Nixon reached a private understanding that allowed 
both countries to strengthen their relationship without publicly acknowledging Israel as a 
nuclear power. According to historian Avner Cohen, Nixon told Meir that the United 
States would be satisfied with a “nonintroduction pledge,” under which Israel pledged not 
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to be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. U.S. officials 
knew, of course, that Israel had nuclear weapons, but Nixon and Meir agreed that Israel 
would be exempt from U.S. nonproliferation efforts if Israel never publicly 
acknowledged its nuclear arsenal. This ambiguous relationship has characterized the 
United States’ view of Israel’s nuclear program ever since, and it opened the door to 
closer U.S.-Israeli ties.181  
Early Efforts at Arab-Israeli Negotiations: The Rogers Plan 
 With Nixon and Kissinger focused on the Vietnam War and relations with the 
Soviet Union, the Arab-Israeli conflict was initially not a major priority for the Nixon 
administration. For the first few years of the Nixon presidency, the State Department 
under Secretary of State William Rogers was the most important force in shaping 
American foreign policy in that region. While Rogers, a former Attorney General during 
the Eisenhower administration without significant foreign policy experience, was an old 
friend of the President, Nixon held very strong views on foreign policy and preferred to 
manage major foreign policy issues out of the White House instead of through the State 
Department. Nixon and Henry Kissinger dealt with high-priority matters such as the war 
in Vietnam and relations with the Soviet Union directly and left lower-priority issues 
(such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East) to Rogers and the State Department 
during Nixon’s first term. Nixon also worried that, as a Jew, Kissinger could not be 
effective and objective when it came to matters related to Israel.182 As a result, Rogers 
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and career officials at the State Department were the main forces behind the Nixon 
administration’s first foray into Middle East politics.  
 In a speech before the Galaxy Conference on Adult Education on December 9, 
1969, Secretary Rogers outlined a series of steps that American officials hoped would 
lead to “a just and lasting peace” between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. Several 
important characteristics of the speech stand out. First, in principle, Rogers said that 
American policy would be a balanced one in which both Israelis and Arabs would make 
significant concessions on the road to peace. Rogers also saw a role for the Soviet Union, 
which was closely allied with Arab states such as Syria and Egypt, in any Middle East 
negotiations. The Secretary of State also committed the United States to supporting an 
Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied in June 1967 and for Israel to return to 
its pre-1967 borders. Finally, Rogers stated that there could be no lasting peace in the 
Middle East without addressing the plight of the Palestinian people who were expelled 
from their homes following the wars of 1948 and 1967.183 Taken together, the “Rogers 
Plan,” as it became known, was the State Department’s blueprint for a comprehensive 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The Rogers Plan was not well-received in Israel or among Israel’s American 
allies. On December 22, less than two weeks after Rogers made his announcement, the 
Israeli cabinet rejected the Rogers framework outright, calling it a threat to Israel’s 
security and an attempt to appease Israel’s Arab enemies. That same day, in an interview 
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with the New York Times, Golda Meir called the plan “treasonous.”184 Israeli leaders were 
especially upset at the prospect of being forced to withdraw from territories captured in 
1967 without full recognition of Israel’s right to exist by its Arab neighbors and official 
peace treaties. Israel’s allies among the American Jewish community were also upset 
with the Rogers plan. At a meeting between William Rogers and the Council of 
Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, Jewish leaders told the Secretary of State that 
his framework did not enhance American security, Israeli security, or the cause of peace 
in the Middle East.185 Seeing the Israelis were not going to accept the framework for 
negotiations outlined by Rogers, the Egyptians did not bother to respond to it.186  
 One of the major reasons behind the failure of the Rogers plan was a lack of 
support from the White House. Leonard Garment, a lawyer in the Nixon White House 
who acted as a liaison between the White House and the American Jewish community 
and sometimes as a private envoy to the Israeli government, played a role here. As he 
recounted in his memoirs, Henry Kissinger ordered Garment to tell Golda Meir, who was 
visiting the United States at the time, to “slam” the Rogers plan at every opportunity. 
Surprised and shocked to receive such an order, Garment asked where the order came 
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from, and Kissinger informed him that it came directly from Nixon.187 This amounted to 
one part of the U.S. government undermining another. Unsurprisingly, the Rogers Plan, 
the U.S. government’s first attempt to put forward a comprehensive solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, went nowhere.  
1970: The War of Attrition and Black September 
 Only a month after the start of the Nixon administration, a new round of 
hostilities between Egypt and Israel broke out in the Sinai Peninsula as Egypt took more 
aggressive steps to reclaim its territory from Israeli forces. This conflict, which became 
known as the War of Attrition and lasted from early 1969 to the summer of 1970, was 
both a significant moment in the conflict between Egypt and Israel and an instance where 
the Arab-Israeli conflict became a proxy conflict in the Cold War between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Though this conflict has not received the same level of 
scholarly attention as the wars of June 1967 or October 1973, it would have important 
consequences for the course of Arab-Israeli negotiations and U.S.-Israeli relations going 
forward.188   
 Fighting along the Egyptian-Israeli border escalated at the beginning of 1970 
when Israel, in response to heavy Egyptian artillery bombardment of IDF positions, 
launched deep-penetration air raids into Egyptian territory. Without effective air 
defenses, Egyptian cities and military installations were extremely vulnerable to Israeli 
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air attack. To remedy this situation, President Nasser traveled secretly to the Soviet 
Union at the beginning of 1970 to demand the resources to counter this new Israeli threat 
from Egypt’s Soviet allies. The Soviets responded by sending both surface-to-air missiles 
and Soviet crews to operate them to Egypt. Israeli raids deep into Egyptian territory 
stopped quickly after these new air defense forces became operational.189  
 Israel’s strikes into Egypt were carried out using sophisticated American aircraft, 
F-4 Phantoms, which the Johnson administration had dispatched to Israel at the end of 
1968. These were the same aircraft that American forces were using in the air war against 
North Vietnam in Southeast Asia and would use in a potential military conflict with the 
Soviet Union. In addition to the aircraft themselves, the U.S. also provided Israel with 
sophisticated electronic countermeasures that could protect an attacking aircraft from 
Soviet surface-to-air missiles. While the Nixon administration certainly did want to 
strengthen Israel’s military against its local adversaries, historian Guy Laron suggests 
another motive. By helping Israeli forces to use American aircraft and technology against 
the Egyptians, the Americans could observe their equipment’s performance in real time 
against an adversary using the same equipment that American pilots were facing over 
North Vietnam or could face in a future war with the Soviet Union.190 
The arrival of Soviet missiles and personnel in Egypt marked a dramatic 
escalation in the War of Attrition. On June 30, two Israeli aircraft were shot down by 
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Soviet missiles, signaling the end of Israel’s advantage in the air. A month later a group 
of Israeli aircraft encountered a flight of Egyptian MIG aircraft, and in the ensuing battle 
Israeli pilots shot down five Egyptian planes. It was later revealed that the pilots of the 
downed Migs had been Soviet servicemen, not Egyptians. This dangerous situation 
threatened to transform the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition into a much bigger conflict, 
but this did not happen. Following intense negotiations led by William Rogers, both the 
Egyptians and the Israelis agreed to a ceasefire in the first week of August 1970. In the 
end, the war ended in a stalemate, without either side gaining any significant advantage 
while simultaneously claiming victory.   
 Just as one crisis on Israel’s western front facing Egypt was cooling off, another 
one on its eastern border with Jordan was heating up. Tension had been brewing in 
Jordan ever since large numbers of Palestinian refugees settled there after fleeing their 
homes in Palestine during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Jordan’s King Hussein went further 
than most other Arab leaders to integrate Palestinians into Jordanian society, granting 
them Jordanian citizenship and significant autonomy within the country. Despite these 
measures, Palestinians living inside Jordan began to act more and more like a state within 
a state, establishing their own governmental, social, and security services.191  
By the summer of 1970, the foremost Palestinian political and military 
organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), had established a parallel 
government within the Jordanian refugee camps. It was also carrying out cross-border 
raids into neighboring Israel, which often prompted violent Israeli retaliatory attacks. 
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Israeli retaliatory attacks against Palestinian guerillas threatened to destabilize the regime 
of King Hussein, a moderate leader and rare American ally in the Arab world. All this put 
Hussein in a difficult position: he wanted to retain his standing among Palestinians, but 
inaction would undermine his position as leader of the Jordanian kingdom.192  
 In September, Palestinian militant activity touched off a crisis in Jordan that 
threatened to create a larger war in the region. On September 6, Palestinian guerillas from 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a radical militant group linked 
to the PLO, hijacked four airliners heading for New York City from several European 
airports and diverted them to Jordan. Both Americans and Israelis were among the 
passengers of these four flights. One of the aircraft landed in Cairo, where the hijackers 
were captured, and the passengers freed. The remaining three aircraft landed at Dawson 
Field in Jordan, which was quickly surrounded by soldiers from the Jordanian army. On 
September 7, the hijackers demanded the release of Palestinian militants being held in 
Israeli prisons, or the hostages would be killed. With no good military options, there was 
little the United States could do on its own to rescue the hostages.   
At the same time, relations between the PLO and the Jordanian government had 
descended into open warfare. On September 1, Palestinian guerillas unsuccessfully tried 
to assassinate King Hussein. By September 15, PLO forces were openly clashing with the 
Jordanian military in the streets of Amman, and King Hussein appointed a military 
government and declared martial law.  
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 In Washington and Jerusalem, American and Israeli leaders were increasingly 
concerned about the stability of Hussein’s regime in Amman. The Israeli government of 
Golda Meir feared that Hussein would be replaced by a radical regime that was much 
more hostile towards Israel. In the Nixon administration, American officials also feared 
this development, for they saw the Jordanian monarch as an important stabilizing force in 
the Middle East and a critical player in future negotiations between Israelis and Arabs. 
American officials were also concerned that neighboring Syria, an ally of the Soviet 
Union, would intervene in Jordan and bring down the regime of a moderate ally. Henry 
Kissinger captured the U.S. government’s fears in a September 16 memo to Nixon when 
he wrote that “it does not seem in the U.S. interest that a fedayeen movement urged on by 
radicals be permitted to impose its will on the government. It could not produce the 
stability that is necessary for peace.”193 
 Less than a week later, Hussein’s regime indeed appeared on the brink of 
collapse. The situation in the Jordanian kingdom appeared so dire that L. Dean Brown, 
the American ambassador in Amman, reported to his superiors at the State Department 
that Hussein was requesting direct military intervention to halt a “massive Syrian 
invasion.” According to Brown’s telegram, the King told him that “Immediate air strikes 
on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative.”194 Faced with the 
seemingly imminent collapse of the Hussein regime, a hostage crisis, and a possible 
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wider war in the Middle East, the United States had few military options. With most 
American military resources focused on the war in Vietnam, American officials looked to 
Israel to act as a potential military surrogate in the region. On September 20, Kissinger 
discussed the possibility of Israeli intervention in Jordan with Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s 
ambassador in Washington, telling him that the U.S. would fully support Israeli airstrikes 
in Jordan in support of the Hussein government.195 
 Fortunately for Hussein, the Israelis, and the Americans, such drastic measures 
proved unnecessary. By the next day, September 22, the situation began to stabilize as 
Jordanian forces gradually regained control of Amman and defeated the Syrian invasion 
force (which proved smaller and weaker than Hussein described in his meeting with 
Brown). Hussein’s relationship with the PLO was badly damaged, and the PLO withdrew 
most of its personnel from the country and moved its main base of operations to Lebanon. 
 In addition to their impact on U.S. Middle East policy, the events of September 
1970 also illuminated how the Arab-Israeli conflict could directly impact Americans 
overseas. Since the 1967 war, Palestinian militants turned to international terrorism, 
especially airplane hijackings, to draw attention to their cause by attacking prominent but 
poorly guarded targets. These attacks usually came against Israel’s airline, El Al, or 
against American aircraft carrying Israeli passengers. For PLO, these attacks were part of 
a larger campaign of violence to take matters into their own hands and rely less on Arab 
powers like Egypt. As Bruce Hoffman, a leading terrorism scholar, notes, Palestinian 
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terrorist groups were the most active in the world throughout the 1970s, and their success 
served as a model for other groups.196 
The September 1970 hijackings were the first time that Americans had been 
singled out their government’s support of Israel in the Middle East, and the U.S. 
government was simply not prepared to respond. In his history of American 
counterterrorism policy, historian Timothy Naftali notes that the Nixon administration 
was the first to take terrorism seriously as a national security issue and to try to formulate 
a strategy for responding to this problem. At first the U.S. strategy was to treat hijackings 
and other terrorist attacks as challenges best handled by the State Department, but after 
the September 1970 hijackings Nixon ordered U.S. officials to develop a more 
sophisticated and tougher response to what he called “air piracy.”197 
From the beginning, the Israelis developed a tougher policy to respond to terrorist 
attacks against Israeli targets than many other Western countries. After the first 
hijackings in the late 1960s, Israeli authorities adopted more strict security measures at 
airports and on board El Al aircraft, including placing armed sky marshals in civilian 
clothes among the passengers to disrupt potential hijackings. The Israeli government also 
responded to terrorist attacks with a broader policy of retaliatory raids on Palestinian 
military camps and targeted assassinations of Palestinian officials living abroad. Israel’s 
violent counterterror policy during this period is perhaps best exemplified by its response 
to the terrorist attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in September 
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1972. Carried out by Black September, a secretive group named for the events in Jordan 
less than two years before and had close ties to the PLO leadership, the Munich attacks 
led to the deaths of eleven Israeli athletes. Israel responded with a campaign of targeted 
assassination against those it held responsible for the attacks.198  
 With Hussein’s victory over the PLO and their Syrian allies, Jordan remained an 
important player in the region. Among other things, it convinced the Nixon 
administration that Jordan under Hussein could be a reliable ally going forward and an 
invaluable partner in future Arab-Israeli negotiations.  U.S. officials also concluded that 
relying on King Hussein as an intermediary was the best way to address the fate of the 
Palestinians going forward.199  
While outside military intervention in Jordan ultimately proved unnecessary, 
Nixon and Kissinger were impressed at Israel’s willingness to consider taking military 
action on behalf of the United States during a crisis. In their view, the United States and 
Israel had a shared interest in preserving the status quo in the Middle East, and Israel had 
shown that it was ready to aid its American ally. Recalling this moment in in his 
memoirs, Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin wrote that “We were considered a partner—not 
equal to the United States, but nevertheless a valuable ally in a vital region during times 
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of crisis.”200 As historian Paul Thomas Chamberlin put it more recently, “Israel was fast 
proving its value as a strategic asset in the Middle East and a model regional policeman 
in the Third World.”201  
Israel’s military usefulness to the United States in the Jordanian crisis raised anew 
the issue of American military aid to Tel Aviv. While Nixon and Kissinger were showing 
a greater willingness to supply Israel with more military equipment after the Jordanian 
crisis, not all U.S. officials were onboard with this new policy. Notably, Melvin Laird, 
Nixon’s first Secretary of Defense and a former Republican congressman from 
Wisconsin, repeatedly questioned whether backing Israel so strongly served American 
interests in the Middle East. In a memo to Richard Nixon from June of 1970, Laird 
warned the president against selling additional attack aircraft to Israel on the grounds that 
tilting so heavily in favor of Israel would hurt American efforts to achieve peace in the 
region. Reminding Nixon that it was imperative for the United States to avoid a war with 
the Soviet Union in the Middle East, Laird concluded his memorandum by stressing that 
“The critical consideration is one of our basic national security and in our considered 
judgment an expansion of US commitments to Israel…would constitute a significant and 
dangerous threat to our security interests.”202 Laird reiterated this view to the president in 
the aftermath of the Jordanian crisis, but was overruled.203 Melvin Laird was not the first 
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American defense official to raise questions about levels of U.S. military aid to Israel, 
and he would not be the last.  
Just as the Executive Branch was divided over how much support the United 
States should extend to Israel, similar divisions existed within the U.S. Congress. On one 
side was Senator J. William Fulbright, a Democrat from Arkansas and the powerful chair 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A vocal critic of the U.S. war in Vietnam, 
Fulbright also opposed increasing U.S. military aid to Israel in favor of a more balanced 
approach to the Middle East. He was opposed by a faction of legislators led by Henry 
Jackson, a vocal supporter of Israel and co-sponsor of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
that aimed to pressure Soviet leaders to allow more Soviet citizens (including Jews) to 
leave the Soviet Union. As Kenneth Kolander argues in his recent book America’s Israel, 
this latter group led by Senator Jackson was part of an important shift in U.S.-Israeli 
relations. While presidents and policymakers in the Executive Branch strove for a more 
even-handed approach to the Middle East, pro-Israel members of Congress 
enthusiastically and successfully pushed for a more explicitly pro-Israel policy, including 
significant military aid for Israel, from the 1970s onwards.204  
The Rise of Anwar Sadat 
 One of the most important developments for the U.S.-Israeli relationship during 
this period occurred in neither Israel nor the United States, but in Egypt. Since coming to 
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power in a coup in 1952, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser had been the dominant political 
figure in the Arab world. Nasser’s sudden death then, on September 28, 1970, was a 
major turning point in the modern history of the Middle East. Nasser’s successor Anwar 
Sadat, the Egyptian vice president and a relatively unknown figure outside of Egypt, 
would have an enormous impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict during his ten years as 
president. Unlike Nasser, Sadat proved more willing to sacrifice transnational Arab 
solidarity and the cause of the Palestinians in the service of Egyptian national interests. 
Sadat was willing to do what was unheard of for most leaders in the Arab world, 
negotiate directly with Israel. His efforts came to fruition at the end of the decade with 
the signing of a U.S.-mediated peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in March of 1979, 
the first such treaty between Israel and an Arab nation.205  
 After officially taking power in October of 1970, Anwar Sadat reached out to the 
Nixon administration in hopes of improving relations between Egypt and the United 
States. Despite several attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to improve relations with Nasser, 
American leaders had generally kept their distance from Egypt since the end of World 
War II. Much of this had to do with the fact that the Soviet Union had been supplying 
Egypt with significant military and economic aid since the 1950s. At the time of Nasser’s 
death, U.S.-Egyptian relations were, according to the Egyptian journalist Mohamed 
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Heikal, in the midst of an uneasy truce because leaders of both countries fundamentally 
distrusted each other.206  
 Sadat knew that to earn the Americans’ trust, he would have to distance himself 
and Egypt from the Soviet Union. This was easier for Sadat than it would have been for 
his predecessor Nasser. While Nasser had his quarrels with Soviet leaders, Sadat never 
warmed to the Soviet Union. He took a major step in that direction when, on July 18, 
1972, he ordered all Soviet military personnel and their dependents to leave Egypt. As 
Sadat described it in his autobiography, his move to expel Soviet personnel from Egypt 
was an assertion of Egyptian independence: “I wanted to tell the Russians that the will of 
Egypt was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to tell the whole world that we are always our own 
masters.”207 He hoped that if the Americans could see that he was not a Soviet puppet, 
they would be more willing to negotiate with him. Noting the close relationship between 
Israel and the U.S., Sadat also believed that the only way that he could hope to influence 
Israel diplomatically was through the United States.  
1973 
 1973 was a critical year for U.S.-Israeli relations. While talks to jumpstart the 
Middle East peace process and to repair U.S.-Egyptian relations were going nowhere, 
Egypt’s Sadat and Hafez Assad of Syria began planning an attack on Israel that would 
dramatically reshape diplomacy and politics in the region for decades to come. That war, 
referred to here as the October War (known in Egypt as the Ramadan War and in Israel as 
 
 206 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, 114.  
 207 Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1978), 231.  
135 
 
the Yom Kippur War), caught both Israeli and American leaders by surprise. It prompted 
the United States to intervene on Israel’s behalf to a degree unprecedented in the history 
of American foreign policy in the region. While Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
certainly wanted to ensure Israel’s survival, they were also eager to expand the American 
role in the Middle East and to undermine the Soviet Union’s influence there. A number of 
important developments in the nine months leading up to the outbreak of war shaped both 
the American response to the war and the war’s aftermath.  
 One key element in the leadup to the October War of 1973 was the deterioration 
of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. While the Soviets built a close 
relationship with Nasser, things were different with his successor. Despite signing a 15-
year treaty of friendship in May of 1971, the Soviets were concerned by Anwar Sadat’s 
efforts to reform Egypt’s economy and to purge Nasser’s allies from the Egyptian 
government. The Egyptians, for their part, were upset at the Soviet Union’s reluctance to 
resupply the country’s military with offensive weapons. Soviet leaders feared that 
providing such weapons would encourage the Egyptians to take aggressive military 
action against Israel and upset détente negotiations with the United States. The 
deterioration of Egyptian-Soviet relations in 1971-1972 created an opening for Anwar 
Sadat to reach out to the Americans in the hopes that the United States could deliver 
concessions from Israel.208  
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 At the beginning of 1973, Henry Kissinger had the first of several meetings with 
Egyptian envoys to discuss restoring U.S.-Egyptian relations. As Nixon’s first term in 
office ended and his second began, Kissinger was emerging as the most important official 
in shaping U.S. foreign policy after the President. This came at the expense of William 
Rogers, whom Nixon announced in late August would be replaced by Kissinger as 
Secretary of State. But despite deteriorating relations between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union and a more sympathetic Egyptian leader, these informal U.S.-Egyptian talks went 
nowhere. When Sadat reluctantly concluded that talks with the Americans were not going 
to produce the desired results, Sadat decided that he would have to take drastic action in 
the Middle East to achieve his objectives.209  
 Another one of these factors was the growth of Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories. In April 1973, two officials on the National Security Council, William Quandt 
and Harold Saunders, raised concerns about Israel’s policies in the Occupied Territories 
in a memo to Henry Kissinger. They reported that Israeli officials, including Defense 
Minister Moshe Dayan, were encouraging Israeli settlers to buy land in the West Bank, 
an indication that the Israeli government did not expect to withdraw from the West Bank 
any time soon. According to Quandt and Saunders, King Hussein of Jordan, who had a 
special interest in the fate of the West Bank, had already expressed his concern to 
American officials about the growing permanent presence of Israelis in the West Bank, 
territory that could be returned to Jordan as part of Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. Quandt 
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and Saunders warned Kissinger that “At present we have no framework for dealing with 
these changes other than to regret any actions that make a settlement more difficult.”210  
 On September 1, only a month before war broke out, Kissinger raised the issue of 
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories with the President. He warned Nixon that 
the principal consequences of increased Israeli settlement activity “will be to make Israeli 
relinquishment of the West Bank and Jerusalem even more unlikely than at present and to 
establish an enclave of Jewish settlements in northeastern Sinai, cutting off the Gaza Strip 
from the rest of the former Egyptian territory.”211 Nixon apparently agreed with 
Kissinger, for he replied in a handwritten note on the memo that Israel’s actions were “an 
enormous mistake” and ordered Kissinger to “tell the Israelis in unmistakable terms that I 
believe they hurt their cause and jeopardize our (my) support by such brutal tactics.”212  
 In addition to being an uneasy time for politics in the Middle East, 1973 was also 
a critical year for the world’s energy supply. As countries in Western Europe and Asia 
recovered from the destruction of World War II, they built thriving economies through 
manufacturing, shipping goods abroad, and importing them from overseas. The two 
decades after World War II also saw one of the largest periods of economic expansion in 
U.S. and world history. All this economic growth meant that there were more people who 
could afford homes that required heating oil and personal vehicles that required gasoline. 
As a result, global energy consumption, especially of petroleum, increased dramatically 
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from the 1940s onward. For many years the United States was one of the world’s largest 
oil producers, supplying most of its domestic energy needs and exporting oil around the 
world, but this could not go on forever. By the 1970s, the United States’ developed oil 
reserves were drying up and it had to import more oil from abroad to fulfill domestic 
demands.213  
 This trend, combined with the underdevelopment of oil resources elsewhere in the 
world and few efforts to develop alternative energy sources, meant that an increasing 
percentage of the world would be looking to Arab oil producers in the Middle East and 
North Africa to supply their energy needs in the coming decades. Though the United 
States itself did not import a significant amount of petroleum from the Middle East, its 
allies in Western Europe and Japan were heavily dependent upon oil from that energy-
rich region. Any disruption of this supply would have serious consequences for the global 
economy. To make the world energy situation even more volatile, many of the largest 
Arab oil-producing nations (especially Saudi Arabia) were very concerned with Israel’s 
continued occupation of Palestinian territory and disturbed by the United States’ ongoing 
support of Israel. Several analysts warned of this brewing crisis, but their warnings went 
largely ignored.214  
 A final critical factor that shaped the American response to the October 1973 war 
was the expanding Watergate investigation. The crisis began with little fanfare when, on 
June 17, 1972, police arrested several burglars breaking into the headquarters of the 
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Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate complex in 
Washington, D.C. As federal agents and journalists expanded their investigations in late 
1972 and into 1973, they uncovered more and more links between the burglars and the 
Nixon White House. By May of 1973, the Senate had begun holding hearings on the 
Nixon administration’s involvement in the scandal and subsequent coverup and appointed 
a special prosecutor to investigate the President and his aides. If this was not enough, 
Nixon’s vice president, Spiro Agnew, was also under investigation for corruption, a 
charge that eventually led to his resignation. Though Henry Kissinger and White House 
Chief of Staff Alexander Haig kept the President abreast of events in the Middle East 
throughout the crisis, Nixon’s attention was on his administration’s legal troubles. With 
the President heavily focused on defending his actions in the face of ongoing 
investigations, Kissinger emerged as the most important person in shaping American 
foreign relations at just the moment that a crisis was about to explode in the Middle East.  
The October War of 1973 
Like the Six-Day War of June 1967 less than a decade earlier, the October War of 
1973 transformed the Middle East for decades to come. Although Israel ultimately halted 
and pushed back surprise attacks by Egypt and Syria, Arab forces’ initial military 
successes against Israeli troops shattered the myth of the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) 
invincibility. The war also had enormous implications for the Cold War contest between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Though the two superpowers each had difficult 
relations with their Middle Eastern partners, both launched massive aerial resupply 
efforts to replenish their allies’ stores of arms and ammunition, turning the war into 
another proxy conflict in the global Cold War. This was a crucial turning point in the 
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history of U.S.-Israeli relations as U.S. aircraft flew more than five hundred missions to 
deliver over 22,000 tons of military supplies to Israeli forces as part of Operation Nickel 
Grass.215  
While there are numerous studies of the Six-Day War of June 1967, the secondary 
literature on the 1973 October War is much smaller. While there are abundant sources on 
the American role in the conflict at U.S. archives and in published collections like the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series, sources from Israel, Egypt, Syria, and the 
Soviet Union are much more difficult to access. This has forced historians and journalists 
to rely heavily on published sources such as media reports and memoirs to understand the 
conflict. Histories of the October War, especially those published in or translated into 
English, reflect these archival limitations in their focus on the Israeli and American 
perspectives and the fighting between Israeli and Arab forces rather than the conflict’s 
larger economic and political dimensions.216 
Anwar Sadat was perhaps the most influential figure in the history of the October 
War. As Egypt began distancing itself from the Soviet Union, Sadat tried to improve his 
country’s relationship with the United States. But when these discussions produced no 
significant changes to the political and military situation in the Middle East, the Egyptian 
president decided that it was time to take dramatic steps to transform the region without 
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superpower initiatives. Fearing that American and Soviet leaders were preparing to 
cooperate on a joint Middle Eastern peace initiative as part of détente, Sadat decided to 
take military action to transform the situation. By launching a surprise attack against 
Israel, Sadat aimed to create what historian Craig Daigle has called a “crisis of détente,” 
one that would disrupt U.S.-Soviet negotiations and involve the superpowers in a Middle 
Eastern war on his terms.217 
Seeking allies for this effort to use an attack on Israel to disrupt détente, Sadat 
enlisted Syrian leader Hafiz Al-Assad to join him in a surprise attack against Israel 
sometime in 1973. Assad came to power in Damascus in a military coup shortly after 
Sadat replaced Nasser as president of Egypt. Both leaders badly wanted to recover the 
Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, territories Israel seized during the Six-Day War, 
and restore Arab military pride following the humiliation of June 1967. But while Sadat 
had the larger goal of engineering an international diplomatic crisis, Assad’s more limited 
goal was solely to recapture the Golan Heights through a conventional military victory 
over Israeli forces. Sadat did not reveal to Assad that they had different objectives for the 
upcoming attack, and this discrepancy in Egyptian and Syrian endgames shaped the 
outcome of the October War.218 
 As Egyptian and Syrian leaders prepared for war with Israel, Egyptian president 
Anwar Sadat took steps to use the “oil weapon” in the upcoming war. In August 1973 he 
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traveled to Saudi Arabia to appeal to its leader, King Faisal, to support his efforts with an 
oil embargo if the United States came to Israel’s aid. Though Faisal was furious with 
Israel after it seized East Jerusalem in June 1967, Saudi authorities at the time refused to 
use oil as a weapon against Israel and its supporters in the West. But by 1973, things had 
changed. With no sign that the Nixon administration was putting any pressure on Israel to 
withdraw from the Occupied Territories and under increasing pressure from supporters of 
the Palestinian cause, the Saudis agreed to impose an embargo in case of an Egyptian 
attack on Israel. Faisal’s only condition for Sadat was that the war last long enough to 
attract significant international attention.219 
Following meetings between their respective military commanders, Sadat and 
Assad decided that their joint attack would begin on October 6. This day fell during both 
the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, when 
many Israeli military personnel were at home and away from their units. Despite Israel’s 
powerful military and extensive intelligence-gathering apparatus, Israeli leaders only 
realized that an attack was imminent approximately 24 hours before it began. This did not 
leave enough time for Israel to fully mobilize its military reserves, which were a vital part 
of its planning for war. Several factors explain how Israel was caught by surprise in the 
first week of October 1973, starting with hubris. Following its swift and overwhelming 
victory over three Arab militaries in June 1967, Israeli political and military leaders had 
become overconfident and complacent, believing that their military forces could deal 
with any threat from a neighboring Arab country.  Instead, Egyptian forces only 
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advanced as far as they could while remaining under the protection of their Soviet-
supplied surface-to-air missiles, which diminished Israel’s ability to launch attacks 
against Egyptian forces using its air force, undermining one of Israel’s most important 
military advantages.220 
Israel’s allies in the United States, who had come to rely on the Israelis for 
information about Arab states’ military capabilities, were also caught by surprise. This 
was the opposite of what happened in 1967, when U.S. intelligence agencies correctly 
predicted that Israel’s military would prevail handily in any conflict with its neighbors. 
This time on October 1, less than a week before the war began, Kenneth Keating, the 
U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv, reported in a telegram to his superiors at the State 
Department that the “Israelis do not perceive a threat at this time from either Syria or 
Egypt.”221 But while the Israelis were caught unprepared for the Syrian-Egyptian attack, 
this intelligence failure actually helped them in the eyes of the Americans. As Israel’s 
ally, the United States would have had a more difficult time coming to Israel’s aid if it 
appeared that Israel had been the one to initiate the conflict. On October 6, Prime 
Minister Golda Meir met with Ambassador Keating to assure the Americans that, even 
though the Israelis had intelligence that an Egyptian-Syrian attack was imminent, the 
Israelis were not planning a pre-emptive strike.222 
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With the President preoccupied with the Watergate investigation, Henry 
Kissinger, recently confirmed as Secretary of State, was the most important official 
shaping the U.S. response to the outbreak of war in the Middle East in October 1973. 
From the very beginning of the conflict, Kissinger saw the fighting between Israel and 
Egypt and Syria as not only a regional war that needed to be halted, but also as an 
opportunity to increase U.S. influence in the Middle East and to reduce Soviet influence 
in the region. On the morning of October 6, only hours after the fighting began in the 
Middle East, Kissinger told Nixon in a phone call that “My view is that the primary 
problem is to get the fighting stopped and then use the opportunity to see whether a 
settlement could be enforced.”223 Furthermore, as Kissinger said to Nixon’s chief of staff, 
Alexander Haig, the following day, it was important to support Israel in its time of need 
because the U.S. would need an Israel that was receptive to American advice to achieve 
American objectives. “My profound conviction,” Kissinger told Haig, “is that if we play 
this the hard way, it’s the last time they [the Israelis] are going to listen. If we kick them 
in the teeth, they have nothing to lose. Later if we support them they would be willing to 
help with Jewish emigration or MFN or other stuff.”224 It would not be long before the 
U.S. would get the opportunity to demonstrate its loyalty to Israel.  
 But even with the growing American commitment to supporting Israel with 
military equipment, the massive U.S. military airlift to resupply Israel did not begin until 
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the conflict was nearly a week old. There are a couple of reasons for this, starting with 
the fact that U.S. intelligence initially predicted that Israeli forces would recover quickly 
and that there was no need for U.S. intervention. But just as U.S. officials missed the 
approach of war, they were also ignorant of the heavy losses Israeli forces were suffering 
in the early days of the war. This changed on October 9, when Israel’s ambassador to the 
United States, Simcha Dinitz, told Henry Kissinger that the Israelis had lost dozens of 
aircraft and hundreds of tanks in just a few days of intense combat with Egyptian and 
Syrian forces.225  
Another factor that contributed to the American decision to resupply Israel with 
military equipment was the Soviet Union’s efforts to resupply its Syrian and Egyptian 
allies. According to Victor Israelyan, a Soviet diplomat and scholar who in October 1973 
was stationed in Moscow at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Soviet government knew 
about Sadat and Assad’s plans for war from Soviet military and diplomatic officials in 
their respective nations days before the attack and began evacuating its personnel from 
both countries. In his 1995 account of Soviet decision-making during the October War, 
Israelyan wrote that Soviet leaders knew about the Egyptian-Syrian plan to attack Israel 
but, because of strained relations with Assad and Sadat, neither encouraged or 
discouraged it. But if the Soviets were not behind the war, they nonetheless did not want 
to see their Arab allies crushed by U.S.-supported Israeli forces and quickly launched an 
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aerial resupply effort. Soviet leaders’ desire to aid Syria in particular was enhanced by 
the deaths of Soviet citizens in Israeli air attacks inside Syria.226  
The combination of Israel’s dire military situation and the Soviet move to aid its 
Arab allies against Israel convinced American officials to launch their own effort to 
resupply Israel with ammunition and military equipment. But there is debate over how 
Nixon, Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and other U.S. officials came 
to order a massive airlift directly from the United States to Israel using U.S. military 
aircraft and personnel. After meeting with Simcha Dinitz on October 9, Kissinger met 
with President Nixon that same day, where Nixon bluntly told his advisers that “The 
Israelis must not be allowed to lose.” Kissinger agreed, arguing that “We want to stick by 
Israel now so they won’t turn on you during the diplomatic phase.”227 But even after 
Nixon and Kissinger agreed that an American airlift was needed, it took several days for 
officials to work out the details. For one thing, U.S. officials first tried to avoid using 
American aircraft, but it quickly became clear that only a full-fledged American airlift, 
using U.S. aircraft and personnel, would be able to deliver the sheer volume of equipment 
needed to replenish Israeli stores. There was also the matter of arranging for a place for 
U.S. aircraft to refuel, a problem that U.S. officials eventually solved by working out an 
agreement with Portugal for U.S. aircraft to land and refuel at U.S. bases in the Azores.  
There is some disagreement over who was responsible for the delay between 
October 9, when Nixon authorized the airlift, and October 14, when the first U.S. aircraft 
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landed in Tel Aviv. In his conversations with Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Dinitz 
blamed military officials at the Defense Department.228 There are some indications that 
senior military officials were not enthusiastic about the United States taking an active 
role in Israel’s defense, though that seems to have disappeared once Nixon gave the order 
to begin the airlift.229 Other sources blamed Kissinger himself for the delay. Elmo 
Zumwalt, who served as Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Joint Chiefs 
during the October War, later wrote in his memoirs that Kissinger “simply wanted Israel 
to bleed just enough to soften it up for the post-war diplomacy he was planning.”230 
Regardless of these reports, it also took time for such a large and complex operation, 
officially labeled Operation Nickel Grass, to get off the ground, but eventually it did, and 
lasted for a month from October 13 to November 13.231 
Even as the Americans and the Soviets rushed to resupply their allies in the 
Middle East with ammunition and military equipment, both recognized that the best 
outcome (at least as far as the superpowers were concerned) was not a decisive victory by 
either side but a negotiated settlement. To that end, once the American resupply effort 
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was up and running, Kissinger made an important trip to the Soviet Union on October 20 
to negotiate a plan for a cease-fire between Israel and Egypt and Syria with Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev. But while both sides sought a ceasefire, each side pushed for one on its 
own terms, terms that would be more advantageous to their respective allies in the 
Middle East. For Kissinger, this meant pushing for a ceasefire agreement that did not 
require the Israelis to immediately withdraw from the territory they occupied when the 
shooting stopped.  
The U.S.-Soviet dimension of the October War produced one of the most 
frightening moments in the history of the Cold War when Henry Kissinger ordered that 
the U.S. military, including U.S. nuclear forces, be brought to DEFCON 3, an increased 
level of readiness for war. This dramatic escalation was a response to a message from 
Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev to Nixon which called for the United States and the 
Soviet Union to launch a joint peacekeeping mission to the Middle East to put a stop to 
the fighting between Israeli and Arab forces.232 Fearing that this suggestion of a joint 
mission was a thinly-disguised Soviet attempt to increase their influence in the Middle 
East, Kissinger and other senior American officials ordered the nuclear alert as a warning 
that the United States would not stand for such a move. The alert, which in the context of 
the Cold War nuclear confrontation was a dramatic and dangerous move, was ordered 
without consulting the President, who was preoccupied with the Watergate investigation. 
But while the Soviet message appeared to the Americans to be an aggressive move, 
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Victor Israelyan writes that it was instead a misguided attempt to force the Americans’ 
hand in pushing for negotiations, to which the Americans overreacted.233  
While Kissinger was trying to negotiate a suitable ceasefire with Soviet leaders, 
the battlefield situation in the Middle East was changing rapidly. After the initial shock of 
the Syrian and Egyptian attacks and heavy losses of men, equipment, and territory in the 
first days of the war, Israeli forces recovered and regained ground on both the Egyptian 
and Syrian fronts. Initially Israel faced a significant challenge in fighting a two-front war, 
but Israeli commanders’ efforts were aided by the divide between Egypt and Syria over 
military objectives. Unbeknownst to Syrian leader Assad, Sadat’s forces were only 
planning to advance as deep into the Sinai as they could while remaining under the 
protection of their Soviet-supplied anti-aircraft missiles, which limited Israel’s ability to 
attack Egyptian forces from the air. Instead of having to contend with a coordinated 
assault from two directions, Israel successfully defeated and pushed back Arab forces on 
both fronts, recovering all lost territory and pressing deeper into both countries before the 
war ended in a ceasefire on October 26.   
1973-1974: Turmoil in Israeli Politics, Oil Crisis, and the Beginning of Shuttle 
Diplomacy 
 While the October War had an enormous impact on Israel’s international position, 
it also shook Israeli politics and society to their core. On November 21, less than a month 
after the fighting ended, the Israeli government established a commission under Shimon 
Agranat, the chief justice of Israel’s supreme court, to investigate the IDF’s performance 
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during the recent war. Israel’s military losses were high, with more than 2,500 killed and 
thousands more wounded. In a country with mandatory male military conscription, the 
IDF and the Israeli public were, as the commission’s report would later put it, “linked by 
a thousand threads.”234  
Though IDF forces eventually defeated Egyptian and Syrian forces on the 
battlefield and inflicted heavy losses on both countries’ militaries, the combination of 
Egypt and Syria’s surprise attack and the high numbers of dead and wounded made the 
outcome seem more like a defeat than a victory. In the words of Bernard Avishai, an 
Israeli academic who in 1974 chronicled this fraught period in Israeli political history in a 
series of dispatches published in the New York Review of Books, “This is a society facing 
its short-comings; the achievements can wait.”235 In many respects it was the polar 
opposite of what followed the June War of 1967: instead of inspiring confidence in the 
government of Golda Meir, the October War shook Israelis’ faith in their political and 
military leadership.236 
 In postponed national elections on December 31, Israeli voters opted for 
continuity in a time of crisis and returned the government of Golda Meir to power, but it 
became clear that major changes to Israel’s political scene were on the horizon. This was 
made abundantly clear in the first week of April 1974 when the Agranat Commission 
released its interim report. Although the Commission praised the skills and bravery of 
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Israeli soldiers, it strongly criticized the military leadership of the IDF, including the 
chief of staff, General David Elazar, for serious disciplinary and intelligence failures.237 
Ten days after the interim report was released, Golda Meir resigned as prime minister, 
and Israel began the process of forming a new government.  
 Weeks later a new governing coalition emerged led by Yitzhak Rabin, the former 
IDF chief of staff and Israeli ambassador to the United States. Approved on June 3, 1974, 
this new government proved to be a deeply divided one. In addition to Rabin, the new 
government included another prominent Israeli politician and future Nobel Prize 
recipient, Shimon Peres, who became defense minister. Although there was significant 
continuity between the Meir and Rabin governments, Israel was on the cusp of a giant 
political upheaval. Only three years later, the long-dominant leftist, Mapai (Labor) 
coalition that had governed Israel since its founding in 1948 was defeated by a right-wing 
coalition in 1977. The shock and trauma of the October War and its aftermath played a 
significant role in producing this rupture in Israeli politics.238  
 Negotiations on the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict began even before the 
fighting of the October War ended on October 26. While some other parties involved in 
the negotiations wanted to pursue a comprehensive, long-term agreement that would 
address all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, from the beginning Henry Kissinger had a 
different plan. Instead of a comprehensive agreement, Kissinger favored more limited 
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disengagement agreements involving Israel and one Arab nation at a time. He would 
pursue these agreements using a step-by-step approach, with Kissinger personally acting 
as an intermediary between the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Syrians, and any other 
interested party to the negotiations. Over the course of the next few months, Kissinger 
traveled back and forth between Middle Eastern capitals as he and his negotiating party 
transmitted Israeli and Arab views on different elements of the proposed disengagement 
agreements. In order to be an effective intermediary between Israelis and Arabs, each 
side had to believe that Kissinger (and by extension the United States) was being fairly 
and accurately represented. In making himself integral to these negotiations, Kissinger 
secured a vital role for the United States in the Middle East and effectively excluded the 
Soviet Union from Arab-Israeli negotiations for the remainder of the Cold War.239  
 Negotiations throughout November and December of 1973 produced the 
disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. This first agreement between Israel 
and Egypt to withdraw their forces has since become known as Sinai I (to distinguish it 
from Sinai II, which was signed in September 1975). One key component of Sinai I was a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the United States and Israel. In 
addition to its other provisions, the MOU pledged that “the United States will make every 
effort to be fully responsive on a continuing and long-term basis to Israel’s military 
equipment requirements.”240  
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 After successfully negotiating Sinai I by shuttling back and forth between Cairo 
and Tel Aviv, Kissinger attempted to do the same between Israel and Syria. Negotiations 
with Syria’s President Assad proved more difficult than negotiations with Sadat. Between 
the beginning of March, when Kissinger flew to Damascus and met Assad for the first 
time, and the conclusion of these talks nearly three months later, he flew back and forth 
between Damascus and Tel Aviv numerous times to meet with Syrian and Israeli 
officials. After initial meetings with each side to get things started, Kissinger listened to 
one side’s position and take it to the other for review. As one side changed its position or 
made a concession, he took that new position to the other side for a reaction, and so on, 
until finally, on May 29, the two sides arrived at terms that were mutually acceptable.  
 The Syrian-Israeli negotiations hinged on the Golan Heights, territory that Israel 
had captured in June of 1967 and which Syrian forces had briefly retaken during the 
October War the previous year. From the beginning of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, it 
was clear that Israel was not going to withdraw from the Golan Heights completely. In 
addition to valuing their strategic importance in any future conflict with Syria, Israelis 
began settling in the Golan in small numbers back in July of 1967, just over a month after 
the Six-Day War ended. Although the settlers were evacuated before being overrun by 
Syrian forces, they were eager to return and had no intention of giving up on their 
settlements.241 In addition to disengaging their and Israel’s military forces in the Golan 
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Heights, Assad was also interested in addressing the issue of the Palestinians and 
reestablishing diplomatic relations between the United States and Syria.  
 At several points during the negotiations, Kissinger expressed his frustration with 
domestic politics in both Israel and Syria. In Israel, he found that the chaotic domestic 
political situation made Israeli officials quibble over a kilometer here or there, instead of 
moving decisively to reach a solution. This delay, he believed, damaged the American 
position (which depended upon his ability to act as a trustworthy representative of the 
Israelis) and threatened to open the door to a larger Soviet role in the negotiations. The 
situation was different for Assad: though he did not face losing a popular election, Assad 
needed to be able to explain to his supporters why he was negotiating (even indirectly) 
with Israel if he was not even going to be able to recover the Golan Heights.242 
 Finally, on May 29, the two sides agreed to terms for disengaging their forces on 
the Syrian-Israeli border. As with the first Egyptian disengagement agreement, the 
Americans and the Israelis signed a memorandum of understanding clarifying how this 
agreement would affect U.S.-Israeli relations. This MOU contained identical language 
about how the U.S. promised to remain “fully responsive” to Israel’s future military 
needs.243 But while the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement was a first step 
toward a full-scale diplomatic rapprochement between those two countries, Israeli-Syrian 
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negotiations stalled after this first disengagement agreement and tensions remained high 
between the two countries.  
 As American military aircraft were flying into Tel Aviv carrying tanks, aircraft, 
ammunition, and other military supplies to resupply Israeli forces, Arab oil producers 
retaliated against the United States for its support of Israel. While Saudi Arabian leader 
King Faisal, an American ally, had been reluctant to use the “oil weapon” in the past, in 
August of 1973 he agreed to Anwar Sadat’s request to use it against the United States in 
the event of a war. Two of the largest Arab oil producers, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
moved to reduce their oil production and imposed complete oil embargoes on the United 
States and several other countries that aided the American airlift, including the 
Netherlands and Portugal. While the United States was the primary target of this effort, it 
had an even greater effect on Western Europe and Japan, which were heavily dependent 
upon Middle Eastern oil to keep their economies going. Knowing that this would happen, 
leaders of Arab OPEC countries had hoped that European and Japanese leaders would 
pressure the United States to halt its support of Israel and force the Israeli government to 
negotiate directly with its Arab neighbors.244 
 At the same time that Kissinger and other American officials were getting 
negotiations in the Middle East off the ground, the Nixon administration was also 
working to end the oil embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia during the October War in 
retaliation for the American military airlift to Israel. Since the United States still imported 
very little Middle Eastern oil in 1973, it did not experience an oil shortage. But average 
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Americans were affected when a decrease in the total oil available globally drove up oil 
prices everywhere. Far from inactive bystanders, U.S. officials worked to mitigate the 
embargo’s impact at home, efforts that met with only limited success. Henry Kissinger 
and other American officials also moved to convince the Saudis and others to end the 
embargo by promising them American aid and progress in negotiations with Israel. These 
efforts were ultimately successful when, in response to the Syrian and Egyptian 
disengagement agreements, Arab officials agreed to lift the embargo in March of 1974.245 
The 1973-1974 oil embargo was an instance where American aid to Israel had 
serious consequences for other areas of American foreign relations. Western European 
nations like Great Britain and France, which were heavily dependent upon Middle 
Eastern oil and had been for decades, were hit much harder than the United States. As a 
result, Western Europe felt the brunt of the embargo, including both an oil shortage and a 
steep rise in oil prices. Unsurprisingly, only two countries in Western Europe, Portugal 
and the Netherlands, contributed to the American airlift to resupply Israel.246 An 
American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) from December 1973 warned that the 
embargo could have serious consequences for the United States’ European alliances. 
Intelligence analysts wrote that “The Middle East crisis has aggravated existing problems 
between the US and its allies across a broad spectrum. During negotiations, and so long 
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as the oil crunch is on, it will be difficult to enhance a sense of shared common interests 
among the US and its allies.”247 
Conclusion 
 The three-week war between Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian forces, and indirectly 
between their superpower backers, helped transform the Cold War in the Middle East. 
Despite Soviet efforts to reestablish their influence in the Middle East, the Americans 
successfully prevented this and largely kept them out of subsequent Arab-Israeli 
negotiations, a trend that continued for the remainder of the decade. The October War 
also transformed the U.S.-Israeli relationship in a profound way. For the first time, the 
U.S. had provided Israel with significant military aid in the midst of a conflict, the most 
dramatic and public U.S. commitment to Israel’s security in decades. Historians Arnon 
Gutfeld and Boaz Vanetik wrote in 2016 that Operation Nickel Grass, the American 
airlift to resupply Israel during the October War, had tremendous military and political 
significance, but its greatest impact was psychological. The airlift, they wrote, “restored 
Israeli morale and gave the leadership and the IDF the confidence they needed to 
overcome their precarious situation.”248  
In her memoirs, Golda Meir had this to say about Richard Nixon: “However 
history judges Richard Nixon—and it is probable that the verdict will be very harsh—it 
must be put on the record forever that he did not break a single promise he made to 
us.”249 Israeli leaders would not be so kind to Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford.  
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Chapter 4: Trouble with “Gallant Little Israel” 
In 1978, Fredrick Wiseman released Sinai Field Mission, a two-hour black-and-
white documentary chronicling daily life for nearly 200 American diplomats and private 
contractors in the Sinai Peninsula. These Americans were part of a small observer 
mission tasked with monitoring the movement of Egyptian and Israeli forces into and out 
of the area between the Mitla and Gidi passes, two strategically important points for 
anyone trying to control the entire peninsula. At one point in Wiseman’s film, an 
unnamed diplomat briefing a small group of visitors said that the best analogy for the 
American observer mission’s purpose in the Sinai was that of a referee in sports: “The 
referee has to make a call. There are rules, the two parties who are in conflict understand 
what the rules are, but somebody has to see that the rules are obeyed and that any 
infractions are called, and that the actions stops and starts over again.”250 The presence of 
these Americans in such a tense environment signaled the beginning of a new era of U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East.  
The American observer mission deployed to the Sinai Peninsula as a condition of 
the Sinai II Accords. Sinai II was the second of two disengagement agreements that 
Henry Kissinger facilitated between Israel and Egypt in the aftermath of the October War 
of 1973. Signed in September 1975, Sinai II followed months of intense negotiations 
during which Kissinger, acting as intermediary, shuttled back and forth between 
Jerusalem and Cairo. Although these step-by-step negotiations began under Richard 
Nixon, this second disengagement agreement was concluded under his successor, Gerald 
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Ford. The Sinai II Accords proved to be an important milestone in the history of U.S. 
involvement in Middle East diplomacy, but the process of getting there was long and 
difficult, and almost fell apart completely.    
 To understand how the United States arrived at this point, we must return to 
August 9, 1974, when for the first time in the history of the United States, an American 
president resigned from office. Following his surprise announcement on August 8, 
Richard Nixon’s vice president, Gerald R. Ford, became the thirty-eighth President of the 
United States. While much of the nation’s attention was focused on the Watergate crisis, 
Nixon’s resignation came at an important moment in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations. 
Though the Middle East was not one of Richard Nixon’s top international concerns 
during his first term, it gradually became one following his 1972 reelection, and 
especially following the October War of 1973. Throughout his political life Nixon had 
taken a close interest in foreign policy, but his replacement was much less experienced in 
international affairs. As this chapter demonstrates, the fact that Ford, not Nixon, was in 
the Oval Office mattered for the direction that U.S.-Israeli relations took during the years 
1974-1976.  
 In the Middle East, the United States was dealing with several complex problems 
at the same time in the aftermath of the October War of 1973. First and foremost, the 
United States faced an international energy crisis stemming from oil-producing Arab 
states’ decision to raise oil prices in retaliation for the Nixon administration’s decision to 
resupply Israel with vital military supplies in the middle of a war. The new Ford 
administration also had to contend with a dramatically altered U.S. relationship with 
Israel, which was rapidly becoming one of the largest recipients of American military aid 
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in the world.251 American military aid to Israel had risen throughout the 1960s but 
reached unprecedented levels after the October War of 1973 and remained high and never 
returned to pre-1973 levels. When the October War ended in a ceasefire, the United 
States became deeply involved in Arab-Israeli diplomacy as Henry Kissinger shuttled 
back and forth between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and other places in order to negotiate 
the disengagement of Israeli and Arab forces and prevent the resumption of hostilities.  
 To signal continuity in U.S. foreign relations at a time of domestic political 
turmoil, Ford quickly announced that Henry Kissinger would retain his twin roles of 
Secretary of State and National Security Adviser to the President. During his first 
national security briefing with the new president on August 12, only days after Ford took 
the oath of office, Kissinger called the Middle East “the worst problem we face.”252 
When Ford recalled this moment a few years later in his memoirs, he wrote that “We 
would have to watch the area carefully.”253 In this as in many other areas of foreign 
policy, Ford largely deferred to Kissinger’s judgment on what direction U.S. foreign 
policy should take. As historian Thomas Schwartz put it bluntly and succinctly in his 
2020 political biography of Kissinger, “Gerald Ford thought that Henry Kissinger was 
brilliant, and Henry Kissinger agreed.”254 
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 Though Ford’s successor Jimmy Carter is better known for his efforts to achieve 
Middle East peace, developments during the Ford administration were necessary and 
important precursors for the September 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and 
Israel and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that followed six months later. As this chapter 
demonstrates, by expanding negotiation efforts initiated under Richard Nixon and 
spearheaded by Henry Kissinger, the Ford administration oversaw and shaped trends in 
U.S.-Israeli relations that characterized the unique relationship between these two 
countries for decades to come. Specifically, from the 1970s onwards the United States 
supported Israel with unprecedented levels of economic and military aid and significant 
political and diplomatic support. As one scholar has described it, the Ford presidency was 
a critical phase in the development of the “special relationship” between Israel and the 
United States.255  
 This chapter also explores the intersection between the United States’ diplomatic 
relationship to Israel and American domestic politics during a particularly volatile period 
for both countries. As they had done for decades, American Jewish community and 
organizational leaders paid close attention to the U.S. administration’s relations with the 
Israeli government and met frequently with American officials to share their concerns 
about the status of U.S.-Israeli relations during this period. As Gerald Ford ran for 
reelection in 1976, American relations with Israel became part of his campaign’s efforts 
to convince Jewish voters to choose Ford over his Democratic challenger, former Georgia 
governor Jimmy Carter.  
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 Finally, this chapter also emphasizes the importance of the Ford administration’s 
contributions to American foreign policy in the 1970s. Gerald Ford is much better known 
for his impact on domestic policy in the 1970s, and the literature on the Ford presidency 
reflects this. The early scholarship on the Ford administration characterized Ford as little 
more than a caretaker president, but more recently scholars have moved away from this 
label and highlighted the thirty-eighth president’s limited but real accomplishments 
during his two-plus years in office.256 This chapter extends this discussion into the realm 
of American foreign policy in the Middle East to show that the Ford administration made 
significant changes to the American relationship with Israel that would have long-term 
consequences.  
“Gallant Little Israel” 
 Gerald Ford’s connection to Israel began long before he joined the Executive 
Branch in late 1973. During his more than two decades in the House of Representatives, 
the future Vice President and President was more focused on the U.S. economy than U.S. 
foreign policy. Ford’s vision for the United States’ role in the world was shaped by his 
service in the Pacific theater during World War II.  Before the United States entered the 
Second World War after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the 
Michigan Republican shared the view of many other Midwestern Republicans that the 
United States should focus on its own security and not the security of others. But his 
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experiences aboard the U.S.S. Monterey in the Pacific theater helped change his views. 
Rather than sticking to its own affairs, Ford’s military service convinced him and many 
other Americans that the United States had a unique responsibility to preserve global 
peace and order in the face of challenges from the Soviet Union.257  
 Ford brought these views with him to Washington when he was elected to the 
House of Representatives in 1948 as a Republican from Michigan’s Fifth Congressional 
District. From the beginning of his career in Congress, Ford espoused strong 
anticommunist views and supported some of the most significant foreign policy 
initiatives of the early Cold War, such as the Marshall Plan. Ford’s internationalist views 
resembled those of his fellow Michigan Republican, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a key 
supporter of Democratic President Harry Truman’s Cold War policies. In the Republican 
primary of 1952, Gerald Ford supported General Dwight Eisenhower, a fellow 
internationalist, over Senator Robert Taft, who opposed many of President Truman’s 
international initiatives. Ford remained a strong supporter of Eisenhower’s foreign policy 
throughout the 1950s.258   
 In Congress Ford did not make U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East one of his 
top priorities, but he did address events in the Middle East on several occasions. For 
instance, on June 13, 1967, two days after a United Nations cease-fire ended the Six-Day 
War, then-Republican Minority Leader Ford praised Israel for its recent military victory. 
Speaking before a gathering of fellow Republicans in Philadelphia, Ford chastised the 
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administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson for doing nothing to ensure a positive 
outcome during the recent Middle East crisis. Israel’s victory was more than a military 
victory for the Jewish state, Ford claimed, it was also a blow to the United States’ 
adversary in the Cold War, the Soviet Union. As Ford told his audience, “Gallant little 
Israel has handed the Soviet Union a severe setback because the Israelis displayed a 
courage which has been sadly lacking in the western democracies in recent years.”259 In 
Ford’s view, Israel had done what other Western countries, including the United States 
under Lyndon Johnson, had failed to do—dealt a blow to the Soviet Union by defeating 
Arab countries that were allied with the United States’ Cold War enemy. In his view, 
Israel was an ally of the West, doing what the United States and other democracies could 
be doing if they had better leadership.   
 Over a year later in September 1968, during an intense and divisive presidential 
campaign, Ford again took aim at the Johnson administration’s policy failures in the 
Middle East. This time, he weighed in on the debate over whether the United States 
should supply Israel with F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft, then some of the most 
sophisticated aircraft in the American military arsenal. The F-4s became an issue in that 
year’s presidential election between Republican candidate Richard Nixon and Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey. Ford criticized President Johnson, who had recently 
announced that he would not seek reelection, for failing to articulate a real Middle East 
policy. Although the Humphrey had been a strong supporter of Israel during his years in 
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the Senate, Ford portrayed the Vice President as indelibly linked to the Johnson 
administration’s “non-policy” in the Middle East. Ford charged that the administration of 
Johnson and Humphrey “has gone off and left the gallant defenders of Israel’s 
independence without adequate arms to match the massive Russian buildup in the Middle 
East.”260 As with his Philadelphia remarks the previous year, Ford’s admiration for Israel 
and respect for its accomplishments are evident here.   
 Though these references to Israel and the Middle East in the records from Gerald 
Ford’s time in Congress are infrequent, they do reveal several aspects of the future 
president’s views of the region. First, they demonstrate that Ford saw Israel and the 
Middle East primarily through the lens of the Cold War struggle to contain the global 
influence of the Soviet Union. Secondly, Ford’s reference to “gallant little Israel” reveals 
a sympathy and respect for Israel as a fellow Western power, an underdog nation fighting 
against overwhelming odds and without adequate assistance from its supposed allies. 
Finally, both statements show that Ford was perfectly willing to use Middle East policy 
to criticize his political opponents. When he was in the Oval Office, Ford discovered that 
crafting an effective policy for the Middle East was an extremely difficult endeavor, and 
that he was also vulnerable to those same criticisms from his domestic political 
opponents.   
Israel and the Middle East in the Early Days of the Ford Administration 
 The first days of the Ford administration were hectic ones. In addition to 
managing the transition from one president to another, Ford and his advisers also needed 
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to reassure the American people and the world that the U.S. government was in good 
hands and that President Nixon’s resignation would not disrupt the United States’ 
relations with other countries. On August 9, 1974, the same day Nixon officially resigned 
as president and Ford took the oath of office as his replacement, Ford and Henry 
Kissinger met with diplomats from fifteen Arab nations, including the ambassadors from 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian foreign minister. At this 
meeting, Kissinger and Ford assured the assembled Arab diplomats that the United States 
would continue its foreign policy in the region, including the initiative to negotiate peace 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors.261  
 The President and Secretary of State delivered that same message to Israel’s 
ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz, later that day. This meeting was more 
friendly than the previous one with Arab diplomats. Ford, who had known Israel’s new 
prime minister Yitzhak Rabin from his time as Israel’s ambassador in Washington, 
remarked that he probably knew the Israeli ambassador better than any other country’s 
ambassador. He told Dinitz that he looked forward to working with the Israelis to 
continue Nixon’s policies in the Middle East. Dinitz in turn assured the President that he 
had many friends in Israel, and that he looked forward to working with the new 
administration.262  
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 Three days later, on August 12 during a nationally televised address before a joint 
session of Congress, President Ford delivered the same message to the American people 
and the world. He again pledged to continue his predecessor’s foreign policy abroad, 
calling it “outstanding.” Turning to the Middle East, he pledged to continue American 
efforts to achieve peace in a volatile region that had seen multiple wars in the past three 
decades. Americans, he promised, “shall carry out our promise to promote continuing 
negotiations among all parties for a complete, just, and lasting settlement.”263 Fulfilling 
that promise would prove extremely difficult and frustrating for the new administration.  
 The Ford administration’s highest priority in the Middle East was to restart 
negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. Less than a week after Ford addressed the 
nation for the first time as President, he and Henry Kissinger met with King Hussein of 
Jordan, Jordan’s longtime monarch and one of the United States’ strongest allies in the 
Arab world. Hussein, who was one of the first heads-of-state to meet with the new 
president, told the Americans that his country wanted a just peace in the Middle East and 
expressed his hope that Jordan would play a major role in achieving that outcome. As 
Israel’s eastern neighbor and home to tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees, Jordan 
had a significant stake in the outcome of any Middle East peace process. Unlike the 
leaders of other Arab nations that took in Palestinian refugees, King Hussein made the 
Palestinians citizens of Jordan, but he had also endured the events of September 1970, 
when his regime nearly collapsed because of conflict with the Palestine Liberation 
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Organization (PLO). As a result, Hussein believed that he had a special responsibility to 
act on behalf of the Palestinians who remained in his country. “The end result for us,” 
Hussein told Ford and Kissinger, “is to get back to 1967 border and to achieve the return 
to Arab sovereignty of the Arab portions of Jerusalem.”264 From Hussein’s perspective, 
the best option for the Palestinians was not a fully sovereign state of their own, but a self-
governing territory with Jordanian sovereignty.  
 Hussein also mentioned his desire for additional American military aid, which the 
King claimed was integral to Jordan’s ability to play a constructive role in the peace 
process. “We need to be strong to negotiate withdrawal and to be moderate and 
reasonable. Otherwise, our options diminish and we lose the positions which present 
realities have opened for us.”265 One of these positions Jordan might have to give up on 
was its role as negotiator for the Palestinians. At this, Ford and Kissinger replied that they 
were firmly committed to supporting Jordan, but that Congress was dragging its feet on 
additional military aid for the Kingdom. The Americans promised to continue asking for 
additional aid, while urging Hussein not to give up his influence with the Palestinians. 
For the United States, which refused to negotiate openly with the PLO and its leader 
Yasser Arafat, it was critical to have a sovereign state like Jordan to address the 
Palestinian issue.   
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 In addition to meeting with Arab leaders, Ford and Kissinger were also preparing 
to host the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, at the White House in early September. 
The President and Rabin already knew each other, but this was the first time they had 
dealt with each other as national leaders. Ford respected Rabin as a dour and serious man, 
a tough negotiator who dressed conservatively and spoke softly. But toughness, Ford 
recalled years later, “was not the only ingredient needed to resolve the Middle East 
impasse. Flexibility—on both sides—was essential as well, and I wasn’t sure how 
flexible Rabin could be.”266 As the successor to a president who resigned in disgrace and 
the leader of a divided government that came together after the collapse of its 
predecessor, Ford and Rabin actually shared a similar political predicament. But a 
similarly precarious political position did not translate into a smooth working relationship 
between these two leaders.  
 Rabin’s September 1974 meeting with Ford, which came during his first trip to 
the United States as Prime Minister of Israel, occurred at a complex political moment in 
Israeli history. At home, Rabin presided over a fragile coalition government and a 
country still reeling from the trauma of the October 1973 war. After being caught by 
surprise on two fronts and suffering thousands of casualties in three weeks of intense 
fighting, Israel had emerged victorious with the help of a massive American airlift to 
resupply Israel with aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other vital pieces of military 
equipment. In addition to the dead and wounded, the October War had also badly 
damaged the Israeli economy. Rabin and other Israeli officials were determined to ensure 
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that Israel was prepared to meet the next major threat. To that end, Israeli leaders worked 
to strengthen old alliances and cultivate new ones to rebuild Israel’s military deterrent 
and revive its economy.  
 Seeking allies wherever they could be found, Israeli officials established closer 
ties with many right-wing military regimes such as those in Chile, Argentina, and 
especially South Africa. Governed by a white supremacist regime under the racist 
apartheid system, South Africa was also home to a large Jewish population and the 
birthplace of several prominent Israelis, including Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister 
from 1966 to 1974. While right-wing Israelis such as politician Menachem Begin had 
been calling for closer ties between Israel and South Africa for years, for decades Israel 
had tried to keep its distance from the apartheid regime (at least publicly) so as not to 
alienate decolonizing African nations elsewhere in Africa with which it was trying to 
build stronger relations.  
This began to change in the aftermath of the 1967 war as Israel’s occupation of 
the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan 
Heights turned it into a de facto colonial power. This turn of events badly damaged 
Israel’s reputation in Africa, a region where it worked hard to build relationships with 
decolonizing nations during the 1950s and 1960s. In the aftermath of the October War of 
1973, Israeli and South African leaders forged a covert and mutually beneficial alliance. 
For Israel, arms sales to South Africa were a boon to its sagging economy, especially the 
defense industry. The South African government, for its part, was happy to have the 
benefit of Israeli arms and military advisers in its fight against neighboring countries 
whose black African leaders were hostile toward the apartheid regime. While the Israeli-
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South African relationship would become even closer after Menachem Begin and his 
right-wing Likud party came to power in 1977, this development started under Israel’s 
long-dominant Labor party.267  
 But an alliance with South Africa could only produce so much return. What their 
country really needed, Israeli leaders had long believed, was a major ally and arms 
supplier in the West. As former allies like France distanced themselves from Israel after 
the 1967 war and its ongoing occupation of majority-Arab territories, the United States 
was the obvious nation for Israeli leaders to court. As a result, Yitzhak Rabin made 
securing more military equipment from the United States for the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) a high priority for his government. As he recorded in his 1979 memoir, military 
superiority was vital to Israel’s survival: “Only a very powerful IDF could convince the 
Arab leaders that the only course open to them was political negotiations.”268 The need to 
rebuild Israel’s armed forces following the October 1973 war added a new urgency to 
Israel’s dealings with the United States. Israeli prime ministers had long believed that 
close relations with the United States were a vital national interest, but Rabin had 
consistently favored closer ties with the U.S. throughout his military and diplomatic 
career. Though he valued Israeli self-reliance, Rabin believed that a close relationship 
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with the United States was the only way to guarantee Israel’s freedom of action in the 
Middle East.269  
 In preparing to meet with the Israeli prime minister, American officials were 
debating how much economic and military aid the United States should send to Israel in 
the coming years. The December 1973 foreign aid bill had allotted more than $2 billion 
in emergency military aid for Israel following the October War, but now U.S. officials 
had to determine aid levels for the future. On August 12, the same day of his first national 
security briefing as President, Ford signed a National Security Study Memorandum 
(NSSM) directing members of the National Security Council to study Israel’s future 
military requirements. In particular, the NSC was to study Matmon-B, an Israeli plan 
submitted to American officials that called for significant military aid from the United 
States to maintain Israel’s military superiority over its neighbors for the next decade.270   
 In their first meeting at the White House in the afternoon of September 10, 1974, 
Ford told his Israeli counterpart that he and the United States were committed to 
continuing to support Israel, but he also warned Rabin that such support was not 
unlimited. As he told Rabin, “We want Israel to be strong and capable of defending itself. 
Israel has the backing of the United States. It is a matter of how much you need and how 
much we can make available. We have constraints but we will keep the commitment that 
was made about your strength and your survival.” Rabin thanked the president for his 
comments, arguing that American support for Israel was integral to successful 
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peacemaking: “The stronger Israel is the better the chance for peace, and we are ready to 
move toward peace.”271  
 While U.S. officials were debating the appropriate level of military aid for Israel 
in late 1974, there were signs that some senior military officials were not happy that 
Israel was receiving so much American military equipment. On November 13, the 
Washington Post reported that George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the President’s senior military adviser, had complained about Israel’s level of 
influence in U.S. government circles to an audience at the Duke University Law School 
on October 10. Furthermore, as journalist Michael Getler reported, Brown had done so in 
blatantly antisemitic terms. In a long answer to a question about possible U.S. military 
intervention in the Middle East to secure oil reserves, Brown complained about Israeli 
officials who seemed to believe that Congress would approve any request they made for 
U.S. military hardware. “Now this is someone from another country,” Brown remarked, 
“but they can do it. They own, you know, the banks in this country, the newspapers, you 
just look at where the Jewish money is in this country.”272 Brown’s remarks prompted a 
series of condemnations from members of Congress and Jewish organizations and a 
rebuke from the White House press secretary, Ron Nessen, and Brown later apologized 
for his comments in a brief letter to the Jewish War Veterans organization.273 But Brown 
kept his post as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and faced no other disciplinary action. This 
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was not the last time that the General’s comments would cause problems for the Ford 
administration and Israel.  
 As 1974 drew to a close, Ford and Kissinger met with a variety of Israeli and 
American Jewish officials to listen to their views on U.S.-Israeli relations. In a meeting 
on December 18 with former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, Ford again stressed his 
commitment to supporting peace talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors but 
cautioned that there needed to be progress in these talks soon. Without movement, he 
warned, his administration could not guarantee that Congress would continue to approve 
such large amounts of military aid for Israel.274  
 Two days later, on December 20, Ford met with a group of American Jewish 
leaders organized by Max Fisher. A Michigan native like the President, Fisher was a 
business leader and philanthropist who emerged as an important fundraiser for the 
Republican Party in the 1960s. After Richard Nixon’s victory in 1968, Fisher became an 
unofficial adviser to the president on matters concerning American Jews and U.S.-Israeli 
relations and received significant access to the Oval Office. Under Ford, Fisher continued 
in this role, and he used the December 20 meeting to introduce his fellow Michigan 
Republican to Jewish leaders and demonstrate to the White House that U.S.-Israeli 
relations were an issue about which American Jews cared deeply. For Ford, it was an 
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opportunity “to confirm that we will not betray Israel and that we are entering the next 
phase of negotiation in the closest cooperation with Israel.”275 
 The Ford administration’s efforts to negotiate peace in the Middle East were a 
direct continuation of the initiative Henry Kissinger launched at the end of 1973. Instead 
of pushing for an ambitious and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Kissinger pursued smaller bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, 
focusing on one problem at a time. This step-by-step process would, in theory, build 
toward a broader solution to all conflict in the Middle East. But in practice, for the 
remainder of the Ford administration, Kissinger’s efforts to negotiate Arab-Israeli peace 
were directed toward securing another disengagement agreement between Israel and 
Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula. This came at the expense of other negotiation efforts, 
namely those involving Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians.   
 After concluding the first disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt 
(later referred to as Sinai I), Kissinger turned his attention to the Syrian-Israeli border 
region. After months of difficult negotiations, Israel and Syria agreed to a limited 
withdrawal of their forces. Both sides expected that negotiations would continue over 
Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, which Israeli forces had captured back in 1967 
and which Syria had briefly recaptured in the early days of the October War. This effort 
was significant not only because Syria had attacked Israel less than a year earlier, but also 
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because the United States and Syria restored diplomatic relations for the first time since 
1967, when Syria had cut ties with Washington following the Six-Day War.   
 Meeting with Ford and Kissinger at the White House on August 23, Syrian 
foreign minister Abdul Halim Khaddam spoke of his government’s desire to negotiate 
further and to continue to improve U.S.-Syrian relations. Upon hearing the President’s 
pledge that Kissinger’s efforts to negotiate peace in the Middle East would continue, 
Khaddam thanked the Americans and told them that “Syrians and Arabs are eager and 
dedicated to a just peace in the Middle East. We believe the U.S. as a great power should 
and can play a key role in this respect.”276 But despite this friendly meeting, negotiations 
with Syria over the Golan Heights ground to a halt as the Israelis proved unwilling to 
make further withdrawals from the Golan Heights. Facing a stalemate on the Syrian front, 
Kissinger and Ford concentrated their efforts on more promising initiatives, especially 
negotiations between Egypt and Israel.277  
 American efforts to negotiate peace between Israel and its neighbors suffered 
another setback in 1974 when talks between Israel and Jordan stalled over disagreements 
related to Palestinian refugees and territory. Ever since thousands of Palestinians 
displaced by the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 settled in Jordanian refugee camps, King 
Hussein presented himself as the Palestinians’ representative in negotiations with the 
United States and Israel. But since any negotiations between Israel and Jordan would 
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inevitably involve issues related to the Palestinians (including the status of the occupied 
West Bank and Jerusalem and the possibility of negotiating directly with the PLO), 
Israeli officials proved unwilling to make any significant concessions in this area.278   
 The fallout from the failure of these negotiations came a few months later at a 
large gathering of Arab nations in Rabat, Morocco. On October 28, representatives voted 
to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and 
called for the creation of a Palestinian state. This was bad news for American negotiators, 
who, following Israel’s lead, refused to negotiate with the PLO because of its 
involvement in cross-border raids into Israel, terrorist attacks abroad, and its refusal to 
recognize Israel’s right to exist. Not being able to negotiate with Arab countries over 
Palestinian concerns only made the Israelis more reluctant to take part in negotiations in 
the first place. American officials recognized this was a significant setback for American 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Kissinger, for one, was not pleased, and said so in a 
message to the President. He wrote that, “While all the returns on Rabat are not yet in, 
there is no question that the decisions reached there have greatly complicated the task of 
engaging Israel in negotiations.”279 
 American intelligence agencies echoed this grim prognosis. In a classified 
analysis produced a month after the Rabat Conference, analysts from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that the conference’s outcome was deeply concerning 
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to Israeli leaders, who felt that events were getting out of control. This was bad news for 
the Americans, whose credibility as an intermediary was critical to their success as arbiter 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “This sense of being swept along by the tides of 
history,” wrote the report’s authors, “by forces beyond Israeli control, is not really 
countered by US support, reassuring as this undoubtedly is for most Israelis.”280  
 The PLO was also making important inroads in the international community. On 
November 13, 1974, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly for the first time. In a wide-ranging speech, Arafat called Zionism a racist 
movement that was rooted in European imperialism and colonialism and denounced 
Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians, its attacks against Israel’s Arab neighbors, and 
for allying itself with racist settler-colonial regimes such as apartheid South Africa. He 
also connected the Palestinian struggle for statehood to the struggles of other decolonized 
nations and liberation movements around the world and touted the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian cause under the United Nations Charter. Arafat concluded his remarks by 
appealing to his audience to “aid our people’s return to its homeland from an involuntary 
exile imposed upon it by force of arms, by tyranny, by oppression, so that we may regain 
our property, our land, and thereafter live in our national homeland, free and sovereign, 
enjoying all the privileges of nationhood.”281 Shortly after Arafat’s speech, on November 
22, the UN voted to grant the PLO observer status.  
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Negotiations with Egypt and Israel, 1975 
 The stalled negotiations between Israel and Jordan ensured that, going forward, 
the Ford administration would focus entirely on bilateral negotiations between Israel and 
Egypt. These negotiations centered around Israel’s occupation of the Gidi and Mitla 
passes in the Sinai Peninsula, passes that were strategically vital for any power that hoped 
to control the Sinai, and the peninsula’s oil fields. From the Egyptian perspective, it was 
vital to obtain an Israeli withdrawal, even a limited one, as the first step toward a 
complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, which was sovereign Egyptian territory. 
For their part, the Israelis demanded that Egypt renounce violence as an option for 
regaining the Sinai.  
Recalling these negotiations, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and his foreign 
minister, Ismail Fahmy, both wrote in their memoirs that no country except the United 
States could successfully mediate negotiations between Egypt and Israel. However, they 
also recalled that this second round of negotiations was much more difficult than the first 
and complained about how closely the United States and Israel seemed to be cooperating 
throughout the process. In his 1978 autobiography, Sadat called Israel America’s 
stepchild and warned that Israel could not be trusted; he nevertheless continued to work 
with American leaders until his death in 1981. Fahmy, who later resigned from Sadat’s 
government because he disagreed with Sadat’s decision to pursue a peace deal with Israel 
at the expense of the Palestinians, wrote that Kissinger was nothing more than Israel’s 
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envoy and never brought the Egyptians a genuine American proposal.282 U.S. records of 
U.S.-Israeli negotiations during this period do show close cooperation between the two 
countries, but also deep frustration with Israeli leaders.   
Henry Kissinger began a new round of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East on 
March 9, 1975, intending to conclude a second disengagement agreement between Israel 
and Egypt as quickly as possible. For the next two weeks, Kissinger, his team, and a 
group of reporters were in constant motion across the region, traveling from Jerusalem to 
Damascus, Amman, and Cairo and back again. Their travels were interrupted by long 
meetings with leaders and senior advisers in each of these countries. Kissinger’s strategy 
was to personally convey one country’s terms to another world leader and take their 
responses back to the others, all the while building toward a formula that would be 
accepted by all. Throughout his travels in the Middle East, Kissinger kept President Ford 
informed of his progress in a series of reports to Brent Scowcroft, the deputy National 
Security Adviser.   
These reports demonstrate that Egyptian and Israeli leaders had serious concerns 
about the other’s willingness to meet their desired conditions for reaching a settlement. 
Early on it became clear to all parties that one of the largest hurdles to reaching an 
agreement between Israel and Egypt was the Israeli government’s call for Egypt to make 
a formal “non-belligerency” declaration towards Israel. In effect, this would mean that 
Anwar Sadat would agree that Egypt would agree not to use military force to recover the 
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Sinai Peninsula. Following a private meeting with Sadat on March 9, Kissinger reported 
to Ford that, while he expected the coming negotiations to be difficult, he was optimistic, 
because Sadat agreed to make significant concessions. “The most positive element we 
have received,” he reported, “is a willingness by Sadat to in effect agree to a no-war 
pledge. The form of words in which this is expressed is likely to be haggled over.”283 
Kissinger’s final point on the wording is an important one, for this issue proved to be a 
major sticking point for both Israelis and Egyptians in the coming weeks.  
Things came to a head a week later during one of Kissinger’s meetings with the 
Israeli negotiating team on March 16. After listening to Kissinger’s updates on his trips to 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Yitzhak Rabin leveled with the American Secretary of State. 
After expressing his appreciation for all of Kissinger’s efforts, Rabin said that “when I try 
to sum it up, I see on the three main points crucial to us--the question of non-use of force, 
the question of a real significant move toward peace, and the question of duration of the 
agreement--basically very little has been achieved.”284 If the Israelis did not accept 
Egypt’s terms, the negotiations would collapse and no progress would have been made.  
 For Kissinger, the prospect of these negotiations breaking down had enormous 
implications for American foreign policy beyond the Middle East. In March 1975, the 
United States had already withdrawn its troops from Vietnam, and North Vietnam was in 
the midst of its final campaign to defeat the American-backed regime in Saigon and 
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reunite Vietnam under communist rule. Around the world, Kissinger worried, American 
allies and adversaries alike would begin to ask why the United States could not bring 
Israel, a country of only a few million people, around in the face of Egyptian proposals 
that seemed generous. “It would be considered,” Kissinger wrote, “a sign of U.S. decline 
and impotence compounding events in Cambodia, South Vietnam, Turkey, and Portugal. 
Sooner or later a multiplier effect will set in.”285 Ford agreed with his secretary of state, 
telling him that he was “totally and completely behind your current efforts and the 
strategy which they represent.”286  
With President Ford’s blessing, Kissinger made one final attempt to salvage the 
negotiations. He dutifully conveyed Israel’s new demands to Anwar Sadat, but the 
Egyptian leader, believing that he had already made significant concessions to the 
Israelis, refused to bend anymore, and this impasse signaled the collapse of this round of 
talks. In a message to Ford, Kissinger expressed his deep frustration with the Israeli 
government. Blaming Israeli domestic politics for Israeli leaders’ refusal to give ground, 
he wrote that the Israelis “have nailed themselves to propositions they could not fulfill 
and are jeopardizing our entire position in the Middle East in the pursuit of entirely 
marginal points.”287  
 The collapse of talks in late March 1975 produced one of the most difficult 
periods in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations. In a letter to Yitzhak Rabin dated March 
21, 1975, President Ford expressed his “deep disappointment” with Israel’s conduct 
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during the recently-collapsed talks and informed the Israeli prime minister that he had 
ordered “an immediate reassessment of U.S. policy in the area, including our relations 
with Israel, with a view to assuring that the overall interests of America in the Middle 
East and globally will be protected.”288 To the dismay and annoyance of Ford and 
Kissinger, the letter was quickly leaked to the Israeli press.289  
 The next day, Kissinger met with the Israeli cabinet before flying back to the 
United States. After conveying a message from Sadat saying that he would make no 
further concessions, he told Rabin that the U.S. government agreed with the Egyptians, 
who believed that fault for the breakdown in negotiations lay with Israel alone. But 
despite these unfortunate circumstances, Kissinger insisted that the United States was not 
trying to force the Israelis to do something they did not want to do. On the contrary, he 
wanted to convince Israel’s leaders that making the concessions called for by the United 
States and Egypt was in fact in Israel’s best interest. Even at this low point in U.S.-
brokered talks, Kissinger expressed his hope that negotiations would soon resume and 
that he did not regret cooperating closely with Israel in recent months. But, he continued, 
circumstances might not be so favorable to Israel in the future. “There will,” he said, “be 
enormous pressure to separate us, instead of enabling us to stay together and enabling the 
U.S. to protect Israel’s position.”290  
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President Ford took the collapse of Kissinger’s negotiations with Israel 
personally, and comments he made to Henry Kissinger and Max Fisher at the end of 
March reveal where his views of Israel and Jewish people intersected. At the time Fisher 
was preparing to travel to Israel as an informal intermediary between the Ford 
administration and the Rabin government. Complaining that he and Kissinger had spent a 
great deal of time on the Middle East only to be disappointed by the Israeli government, 
Ford worried that American Jews might be souring on his presidency because of his 
stance toward Israel. The President ended the meeting by saying that “I supported Israel 
because I think it is right. Some of my best friends are Jews because I admire strength 
and brains. I feel awful to be put in this kind of position.”291 
 The Ford administration’s “reassessment” of U.S.-Israeli relations took the form 
of several high-level meetings between senior White House officials and several groups 
who were deeply concerned with and had extensive knowledge of and experience with 
U.S.-Israeli relations. First Kissinger invited a small group of Jewish intellectuals, 
including international relations expert Hans Morgenthau and author and Holocaust 
survivor Elie Wiesel, to the State Department, where he warned of serious and domestic 
consequences for the United States if the rift between the Israeli and U.S. governments 
was not repaired. After giving his guests an overview of the administration’s position on 
recent events, Kissinger told them that the President was outraged at Israel’s conduct and 
felt betrayed. Furthermore, he warned, “If the Jewish community attacks the President 
you will see for the first time an American President attacking Israel and this could 
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unleash the most profound consequences.”292 Though Kissinger claimed that he did not 
want anything from his guests, briefing them on the administration’s position was a way 
for him to put indirect pressure on the Israeli government. The next week, Kissinger met 
with a group of former senior foreign policy officials who had served in both Republican 
and Democratic administrations. Sometimes known as “wise men,” their number 
included former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance, and George Shultz, two 
future Secretaries of State, and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. This 
group, which included former officials with extensive experience with U.S. Middle East 
policy, included many who supported taking a tougher stance on Israel.293  
Kissinger also met with several senior State Department officials, including most 
of the department’s Middle East ambassadors, who were summoned to Washington to 
give their perspectives on how to move forward with Israel. During meetings in April 
1975, officials discussed several options, including convening a peace conference in 
Geneva, Switzerland, restarting bilateral negotiations, and shifting toward a 
comprehensive peace agreement between Israel, Egypt, and potentially Syria and 
Jordan.294 
 In the meantime, U.S. officials took steps to reduce U.S.-Israeli cooperation, 
including canceling a visit to the U.S. by Israeli Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, 
reducing intelligence cooperation, and delaying planned arms deliveries. When Kissinger 
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and Ford met with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was about to become U.S. ambassador 
to the United Nations, the Secretary stressed that, given the current state of U.S.-Israeli 
relations, Israel needed to be handled carefully at the UN. Kissinger told Moynihan that 
Israel needed to be treated as a normal country to avoid tying the United States too 
closely to Israel’s uncompromising position. But Kissinger also argued that doing so was 
in Israel’s best interest because it would help prevent Israel from becoming a Sparta-like 
state, one that used force to solve every single problem. He concluded by saying that 
“Israel must be treated like Great Britain, not the Department of the Treasury.”295  
While American officials were “reassessing” the state of U.S.-Israeli relations 
following the collapse of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, domestic forces intervened to 
make the situation even more complicated. On May 22, three-quarters of the U.S. Senate, 
including members of both parties, signed a letter to President Ford protesting his 
administration’s recent stance on military aid for Israel. The letter, which was introduced 
and read aloud in the U.S. Senate by George McGovern, a Democrat, stated that a strong 
Israel both ensured that an outside power like the Soviet Union would not dominate the 
Middle East and would deter Israel’s neighbors from renewing hostilities in the region. 
“Withholding military equipment from Israel,” the letter warned, “would be dangerous, 
discouraging accommodation by Israel’s neighbors and encouraging a resort to force.” 
The letter concluded by calling on President Ford to be responsive to Israel’s military and 
economic needs and to make it clear that the White House, like the Senators, stood firmly 
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with Israel in the search for Middle East peace.296 Moments like this one revealed just 
how deeply U.S.-Israeli relations were linked to American domestic politics.297   
According to contemporary press accounts, the letter had been circulating among 
senators for two weeks before its release. The New York Times reported that letter was 
originally drafted by Republican Jacob Javits and eighteen other senators and was 
enthusiastically supported by Israeli government officials and the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). As reporter Bernard Gwertzman wrote at the time, the letter 
was intended as a show of strength by pro-Israel forces on Capitol Hill, who were 
“determined to convince the Ford administration that they have the votes to insure that 
United States policy is not to Israel’s disadvantage.”298 More recently, historian Kenneth 
Kolander identified the Israeli embassy, especially Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, as the 
driving force behind the Senate letter.299 
 After months of discussions and meetings, including Ford’s meetings with both 
Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. officials decided to resume negotiations toward an 
agreement that closely resembled the one they had abandoned in March. Kissinger did 
not receive a warm welcome when he returned to Israel in August 1975 to resume his 
shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and Cairo. When the American Secretary of State 
and his delegation landed in Tel Aviv on August 21, they were met by thousands of 
protestors. These demonstrators objected to American efforts to get Israel to withdraw 
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from the Sinai and claimed that such a withdrawal would only harm Israel’s security and 
would not increase the chances for peace. Thomas Dunnigan, a career foreign service 
officer who was then the deputy chief of mission at the American embassy in Tel Aviv, 
recalled that their motorcade was pelted by rocks as they drove to the Israeli parliament 
from the airport in Tel Aviv. According to Bernard Gwertzman, the American delegation 
was trapped at the Knesset with the Israeli cabinet for an hour because demonstrators had 
blocked all exits.300   
 After negotiations throughout August, the parties eventually reached a new 
limited disengagement agreement. The major provisions of the new agreement were very 
similar to what had been discussed before negotiations collapsed in March. In return for a 
pledge that Egypt would look to diplomatic negotiations to recover the remainder of the 
Sinai Peninsula and not military force, the Israelis agreed to make a limited withdrawal 
from the Milta and Gidi passes. A key provision of the agreement was a U.S. 
commitment to overseeing the implementation of and compliance with its terms. To that 
end, the agreement called for the deployment of American civilian observers to the Sinai 
Peninsula to oversee the implementation of the agreement and to ensure Egyptian and 
Israeli compliance. Despite its limitations, the September 1 disengagement agreement 
was an important step toward peace between Egypt and Israel, but the agreement was 
especially beneficial to Israel.301 
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As with the Egyptian and Syrian agreements of 1974, this deal, which came to be 
known as Sinai II, was capped off with a new Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
between the United States and Israel, but this time the terms went even further than both 
these earlier agreements. In this newest memorandum, signed by Kissinger and Israeli 
foreign minister Yigal Allon, the United States pledged to coordinate its negotiating 
strategy with Israel during future negotiations in Geneva. Next, the U.S. pledged to 
conduct a joint study with Israel of its military needs and to be sympathetic to Israel’s 
requests for military aid to fulfill its defense requirements, including requests for 
“advanced and sophisticated weapons.” But the agreement went even further in several 
respects. The Sinai II MOA also committed the United States to ensuring that Israel’s 
energy needs were met for the next five years if Israel could not secure enough oil on its 
own. This would be achieved by making U.S. oil available to Israel for purchase and, if 
necessary, providing the Israelis with the means to transport that oil to Israel.302   
The MOA also had important ramifications for Israel’s relationship with the 
Palestinians. In addition to looking favorably upon Israel’s military requirements and 
ensuring Israel’s energy supply, the United States also agreed to continue its policy of 
refusing to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it recognized Israel’s right to exist 
and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.303 While the United States 
had publicly refused to negotiate with the PLO, American intelligence officials had met 
with PLO representatives multiple times during the 1970s. These contacts included an 
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ongoing liaison between CIA case officer Robert Ames and Ali Hassan Salameh, the 
chief of the PLO’s intelligence department and someone with close personal ties to 
Yasser Arafat. The MOA’s language surrounding the PLO, writes Kathleen Christison, 
amounted to a “diplomatic straightjacket” that actually hindered progress in Arab-Israeli 
negotiations for years to come.304 
 Following the conclusion of the Sinai II accords, American efforts to facilitate 
negotiations between Israel and its neighbors largely stalled for the remainder of the Ford 
presidency. But the cessation of shuttle diplomacy did not make all controversies in U.S.-
Israeli relations disappear. On the contrary, for the remainder of the Ford administration, 
American officials dealt with a series of other issues related to American military aid to 
Israel and Israel’s presence in the Occupied Territories.  
The Ford Administration and Israel, September 1975-November 1976 
 On January 31, 1976, President Ford approved $2 billion in new military aid for 
Israel. These funds were later included in a massive foreign aid bill totaling more than $9 
billion, a bill approved by the Senate the following June. In total, the bill included $4.6 
billion in economic and military aid for Israel and covered the period from July 1, 1975-
September 30, 1977.305 This massive figure made Israel the largest single recipient 
country (the next largest was Egypt) and represented the largest package of American aid 
for Israel since the United States recognized Israel in 1948. This continued a trend that 
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began in the early 1960s, but this measure was unique in both its size and the fact that it 
came when Israel was not at war. But while this was an important moment in the history 
of U.S.-Israeli relations, this massive increase in American aid to Israel did not go 
unchallenged. There were voices within the U.S. government who questioned whether 
such massive aid for Israel was in the national security interests of the United States.  
 Even in late 1975, before the massive aid package for Israel was approved, 
officials in the Department of Defense were warning the White House that not only did 
Israel not need large new amounts of American military aid but that such aid could be 
counterproductive and harm U.S. interests in the Middle East. In a Top-Secret 
memorandum for the President, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger gave the DOD’s 
perspective on future levels of military aid for Israel. He wrote that the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) “currently has sufficient military strength to defeat any combination of Arab 
forces in a renewed war and would require little or no emergency resupply in order to 
win.” He went on to point out that fully complying with MATMON B, Israel’s request 
for American military aid over the next decade, was based on worst-case scenario 
planning and would be difficult (if not impossible) for the DOD to fulfill. Schlesinger 
also warned that such an aid package could be damaging to American interests in the 
Middle East. It would likely, he wrote, “exacerbate Arab perceptions of Israel as a kind of 
Western spearhead and would be seen as giving Israel a kind of lien on our Middle 
Eastern policy.”306 
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 As they debated the proper level of American aid for Israel for 1977 and beyond, 
American officials predicted that Israel would need less military aid from the United 
States going forward. This was because Israel’s military was in good shape and should be 
able to hold its own against any possible combination of Arab countries until at least 
1981. But they also pointed out that the U.S. government had an ulterior motive for 
setting high aid levels for Israel. As NSC officials Robert Plowden and Robert Oakley 
wrote in a memo for Brent Scowcroft, “there continues to be a political requirement for 
substantial aid levels, which enable us, inter alia, to avoid substantial cuts in assistance 
for Arab countries.”307 In other words, American military aid to Israel made it easier for 
the United States to supply military aid to Arab countries, presumably by mollifying the 
Israeli government and pro-Israel forces in the United States.  
 As the largest recipient of American military aid, Israel was an important part of a 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) that reviewed U.S. policies on arms 
transfers to other nations. This study, NSSM 223, was initiated by Henry Kissinger in 
May 1975, during the Ford administration’s reassessment of U.S.-Israeli relations and 
was to be conducted by the National Security Council, with a final report to be delivered 
approximately a month later.308 In an Executive Summary of the final report produced in 
response to NSSM 223, the authors described arms transfers as important tool of foreign 
policy and national security. According to the review, U.S. arms deliveries for the year 
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1974 were worth $5.4 billion while other services and transactions (which included spare 
parts, support equipment, and support services) over several years added up to another 
$12.8 billion. As the report noted, these numbers far surpassed both other free-world 
arms suppliers and all communist countries. The report also pointed out that arms 
transfers were a means to an end, not an end in and of themselves, and to be effective, 
American officials had to carefully balance competing objectives. This was especially 
true with Israel and the Middle East.309 
  In their discussion of Israel, the review’s authors noted that since 1967, American 
arms transfers were a major contribution to Israel’s emergence as a formidable military 
power in the Middle East. But they also warned that American support could backfire if it 
went too far. Lending too much military support to Israel could in turn trigger an Arab 
military buildup, which might lead to a renewal of hostilities, the opposite of what the 
U.S. was trying to achieve in the Middle East. Arms transfers to the Middle East were 
also becoming even more complicated, because not only was the U.S. supplying military 
equipment to Israel, but it was also increasing its sales of military equipment to Arab 
countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. While acknowledging that some arms 
transfers were necessary to achieve short-term objectives, they cautioned that these 
benefits would be “purchased at the price of long-term injury if smoldering local conflicts 
later flare up anew and are fought out with more violence, destruction, and potential for 
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greater power involvement than would have been true in the absence of US defense 
transfers.”310  
 Barely two months after the Sinai II accords were signed, the Ford administration 
was confronted with a new Israel-related problem, this one originating much closer to 
Washington. On November 10, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 
3379 which determined that Zionism was “a form of racism and racial discrimination.”311 
The authors of the resolution based their conclusion on Israel’s ongoing occupation of 
Palestinian lands, which they likened to racist regimes in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and 
South Africa. The American ambassador to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, delivered 
a strong rebuke to the General Assembly. This incident brought together American 
foreign policy in the Middle East, the issue of human rights, the growing influence of the 
decolonized world, and American Jews’ attitudes toward Israel.  
 Daniel Patrick Moynihan became U.S. ambassador to the United Nations after 
serving as an aide in the Nixon White House and as the American ambassador to India. In 
his speech laying out the United States’ opposition to the General Assembly’s resolution, 
Moynihan called the notion that Zionism was a form of racism “a political lie of a variety 
well known to the twentieth century and scarcely exceeded in all that annual of untruth 
and outrage.”312 Moynihan’s attack on the resolution centered on his belief that Zionism, 
which he defined as the Jewish equivalent of a national liberation movement based on 
belief and not birth, was utterly incompatible with racism. On top of that, he charged that 
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the authors of the resolution and those who had voted for it failed to properly define 
Zionism. Finally, Moynihan denounced the resolution for the damage he predicted it 
would do to the cause of human rights.  
 According to one sympathetic scholar, Moynihan’s speech denouncing Resolution 
3379 was one of the highpoints in Moynihan’s long political career, a symbol of the 
organic, deep, and enduring relationship between the United States and Israel and an 
extension of Moynihan’s love for America and liberal democracy.313 But despite the 
passion of Moynihan’s response to Resolution 3379, it completely ignored the underlying 
issue at the heart of the General Assembly’s resolution, which was Israel’s undemocratic 
rule over millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.  
 Although the United States had pledged not to talk to the PLO in the September 1, 
1975, MOA, some American officials acknowledged that successful Arab-Israeli 
negotiations would, at some point, have to include the Palestinians in some capacity. One 
of those officials was Harold H. Saunders, director of the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research. Saunders had extensive experience with American foreign 
policy in the Middle East, having served on the National Security Council since the early 
1960s, where he was the White House’s Middle East expert during the Six-Day War in 
June 1967 and later a key member of Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy delegation. In 
testimony before the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, Saunders stated 
that the United States was not currently prepared to talk to the PLO (at least not publicly), 
which still refused to recognize Israel and was behind terrorist attacks that killed Israeli 
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civilians. But he did state that peace in the Middle East would be impossible without 
addressing the plight of the Palestinians. Resolving the many problems facing the Middle 
East following the 1947 partition of Palestine, the emergence of the State of Israel, and 
Arab opposition to the Jewish state, Saunders testified, “will not be possible until 
agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who 
consider themselves Palestinians.”314 
 One of the factors that complicated the Ford administration’s relationship with 
Israel was the expanding settler movement in the Occupied Territories, especially in the 
West Bank. As discussed in earlier chapters, previous U.S. administrations failed at 
critical moments to put pressure on the Israeli government to halt the settlers. Since the 
very first settlements were established in the late 1960s, the social and political 
background of the settlers themselves underwent a distinct shift. While the initial settlers 
came from both secular and religious backgrounds, by the early 1970s religiously 
motivated settlers came to dominate the movement, especially after Menachem Begin’s 
victory in 1977.  
 A vital moment in this transformation of the settler movement came in February 
of 1974 when an organization called Gush Emunim (translated as “Bloc of the Faithful”) 
was founded. Gush Emunim’s goal was to promote settlement in the Occupied Territories 
that Israel had controlled since June of 1967. According to the settlers’ beliefs, these 
territories were not captured lands but part of Eretz Israel (“the Land of Israel”), the land 
that God had designated as the homeland for the Jewish people. The West Bank, which 
 
 314 “Department Gives Position on Palestinian Issue,” The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 
LXXIII, No. 1901 (December 1, 1975), 797.  
197 
 
settlers referred to by its biblical names Judea and Samaria, was considered especially 
important because it included such religiously significant cities as Hebron and Jerusalem. 
The members of Gush Emunim believed that it was essential for Jews to occupy the 
entirety of Eretz Israel and made it their mission to encourage settlement in the Occupied 
Territories and to defend those settlements once established from outside interference, 
including from the Israeli government.315  
 From the very beginning, the religious settler movement was strongly influenced 
by several important rabbis. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, the son of a former Chief Rabbi of 
Palestine and a long-time head of a Jerusalem yeshiva (a Jewish religious school), was 
one of the most important ideological supporters of Gush Emunim and the settler 
movement. According to Motti Inbari, a scholar of religion specializing in Jewish 
fundamentalism in modern Israel, it was not the excitement of June 1967 but the shock 
and outrage of October 1973 that gave rise to Gush Emunim. Faced with the prospect of 
an Arab army overrunning part of Eretz Israel or an Israeli government potentially 
returning that same territory as part of peace negotiations, religious settlers were 
determined to do everything they could to ensure that a Jewish government retained 
control of the Occupied Territories.316 Israel was not the only place which saw the rise of 
religious fundamentalist movements in the 1970s. As scholars such as Gilles Kepel have 
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shown, the decade saw the emergence of religious movements around the world as Jews, 
Christians, Muslims, and others sought to counter the perceived failures of the modern, 
secular world by trying to recover the sacred foundations of organized society.317 
 The Israeli government’s conflict with the settler movement came to a head in 
December 1975. Following a confrontation between the IDF and a group of settlers at 
Sebastia in the West Bank, Yitzhak Rabin compromised with Gush Emunim activists. He 
also authorized four new settlements in the Golan Heights.318 Though Rabin gave in to 
pressure from the settler movement in this instance, this would not be his last clash with 
Israeli settlers. They would clash again during Rabin’s second premiership in the 1990s, 
with tragic consequences.  
 American officials in the Ford administration were very sensitive to the 
controversy surrounding Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and tried to make sure that 
neither the President nor any other American official took any action that seemed to 
endorse the Israeli presence in the West Bank. For instance, NSC officials recommended 
that the White House reject an invitation from the Jewish National Fund (JNF) to 
celebrate the bicentennial anniversary of the United States on the grounds that the JNF 
was involved in land reclamation projects such as tree planting in the Occupied 
Territories. According to a White House memorandum attached to the invitation, it was 
U.S. policy to avoid any official or unofficial appearance that would acknowledge or 
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encourage the permanency of Israel’s occupation. Instead, the memo read, “Our policy 
remains that the status of the Occupied Territories is a matter for negotiation among the 
parties and we do not recognize unilateral efforts by one side or the other to claim these 
territories.” At the same time, not wanting to damage relations with the American Jewish 
community, the NSC officials urged that the invitation be declined on the grounds that 
the President was too busy, and that some other, less controversial event be found for the 
President to address the American Jewish community.319 The same thing happened a few 
months later when the President was invited to address a convention of the Zionist 
Organization of America (ZOA). NSC officials objected to the ZOA’s “militant support 
of Israeli expansionism,” which stood in the way of the U.S. objective of securing a 
Middle East settlement based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.320 
 As these events transpired, American diplomats in Israel observed Gush 
Emunim’s activities and reported on them to their superiors at the State Department. 
According to Thomas Dunnigan, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tel 
Aviv, leaders of Gush Emunim pledged at a February 11, 1976, press conference that 
they planned to settle a million Jews and establish a hundred new settlements in the West 
Bank over the next decade. While acknowledging that these specific claims were little 
more than hyperbole, Dunnigan stressed that such statements had to be taken seriously. 
As he wrote to his superiors in Washington, “Gush Emunim intends to continue to press 
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its case for additional Israeli settlements particularly in Samaria, and that tough 
showdown awaits the [Israeli] cabinet.”321 
 While in these instances American concerns about Israel’s occupation and the 
growing settler movement were raised in private, the Ford administration also objected to 
Israeli settlements in public. On March 23, 1976, the new American ambassador to the 
United Nations, William Scranton, stated that the American position on the Occupied 
Territories had been clear since 1967. Calling the settlements in the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem, illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace between Israel 
and its neighbors, he stated that an occupier must “maintain the occupied area as intact 
and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any 
changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation and be consistent 
with international law.”322  
While the Americans did not see this statement as a departure from their 
established position, the reaction in Jerusalem was very different. Two days after 
Scranton’s speech at the UN, Malcolm Toon, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, was 
summoned to a meeting with the Israeli foreign minister, Yigal Allon, on March 25. As 
Toon recounted in a telegram to the State Department, the Israeli government interpreted 
Scranton’s remarks as a departure from existing U.S. policy and a violation of the 
agreement reached between the U.S. and Israel in September 1975 following the 
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conclusion of the Sinai II Accords. Allon defended Israeli settlements in the Occupied 
Territories as militarily necessary for Israel’s security and defended Israel’s occupation of 
the full city of Jerusalem. While leaving open the possibility of international management 
of Jerusalem’s holy sites, Allon pledged that Israel would never agree to a divided 
Jerusalem.323 This was one of many instances where Israeli leaders reacted strongly at 
even the hint of the U.S. taking a position that was different from its own.   
 Violence in Lebanon was another area of the Middle East that was causing 
concern for U.S.-Israeli relations. In addition to Lebanon’s own internal divisions 
between ethnic and religious groups, Lebanon was also home to a large population of 
Palestinian refugees, some of whom had lived in refugee camps for decades. After the 
Palestine Liberation Organization was expelled from Jordan in 1970, its leaders had 
moved their operations to Lebanon, especially the capital city of Beirut. PLO militants 
were launching attacks into Israel from Lebanon, which prompted the Israelis to retaliate 
with shelling and raids into Lebanese territory. To make this volatile situation even more 
dangerous, neighboring Syria was also becoming more deeply involved in Lebanese 
internal politics.324 
 As the security situation in Lebanon deteriorated, the U.S. embassy in Beirut 
came to rely heavily on its informal, covert relationship with the PLO. On June 16, 1976, 
two American diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Francis Meloy, were 
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killed along with their driver by a Palestinian faction that opposed the PLO. Four days 
later, President Ford ordered the evacuation of all U.S. embassy personnel from Lebanon. 
The evacuation was a success, in part thanks to assistance from the PLO, which provided 
security for the American withdrawal. But while these events showed how U.S. 
cooperation with the PLO could serve American interests, it was overshadowed by 
American officials’ focus on Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and their commitments to 
Israel.325 
Israel and the U.S. Election of 1976 
 When Gerald Ford announced that he would run for President in 1976, he began 
his campaign in what one journalist at the time called a “climate of apathy at best and 
public disillusionment at worst.”326 Facing a popular Southern governor in Jimmy Carter, 
a tough economy, growing dissatisfaction with détente and its chief architect Henry 
Kissinger, the shadow of Watergate, and the fallout from Ford’s decision to pardon 
Richard Nixon, the Ford campaign looked for potential supporters wherever they could 
find them. To this end, the President Ford Committee made a concerted effort to appeal 
to Jewish voters in critical swing states, including New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Illinois, Maryland, and Ohio. Though American Jews had largely voted for the 
Democratic Party since the beginning of the twentieth century, Republican strategists had 
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some cause for optimism. After winning only 17 percent of the Jewish vote in 1968, 
Richard Nixon received more than twice that number in his 1972 reelection campaign. If 
Ford could do the same, his aides reasoned, he stood a chance in the election.327 
 The Ford campaign made the American relationship with Israel the centerpiece of 
its effort to convince American Jews to vote Republican in the 1976 presidential election. 
Through meetings with leaders of American Jewish organizations and members of the 
Jewish press and targeted campaign advertisements in Jewish newspapers and periodicals 
in critical states, the Ford campaign hoped to win the Jewish vote, or at least a significant 
percentage of it, in states with large Jewish populations to offset the Democrats’ electoral 
advantage in the South.  
 Max Fisher, the wealthy Detroit businessman and Republican donor who often 
acted as an unofficial liaison between the White House and the Israeli government, was 
the leading figure in the Ford campaign’s efforts to court the American Jewish vote in 
1976. In a memo dated August 2, to presidential chief of staff Richard Cheney, Fisher 
argued that the Ford campaign had an opportunity to win substantial support from 
American Jewish voters in vital states. Fisher specifically pointed out that American Jews 
held the President in high regard for both his personal integrity and his strong support of 
Israel. He wrote that “If there is one thing the Jewish community is united on it is the 
preservation and security and viability of Israel. We will emphasize the President’s long 
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record of specific action, his deep personal commitment[,] and the fact that in the two 
budgets he has submitted, he has requested 40% of all the aid Israel has received from the 
United States since 1948.”328 Those exact arguments soon found their way into campaign 
advertisements and brochures funded and produced by the Ford campaign.  
 At a gathering of more than a hundred Jewish leaders on September 20, 1976, 
Ford emphasized his own, and his administration’s, deep commitment to supporting 
Israel. He pointed to his “excellent personal rapport” with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin, who “knows that the decisions we make or that I make are indicative of our close 
allegiance and alliance with Israel, he knows I mean what I say, and I do.” Ford promised 
that under his watch, the United States would not impose a solution to the Middle East 
peace process on the Israelis and would not accept a peace plan that asked for one-sided 
concessions from Israel. He told his audience that “This administration is totally 
committed to the security and safety of Israel.”329 
 Jimmy Carter’s presidential campaign also recognized the importance of the 
Jewish vote in 1976. On September 30, in a speech to the Conference of Presidents of 
Major Jewish Organizations, Carter argued that he was the better candidate for the 
American Jewish community. He criticized the Ford administration for inaction on the 
issue of Jews seeking to leave the Soviet Union, for failing to counter the Arab boycott of 
American companies that did business with Israel, and the growing American 
 
 328 Memo from Max M. Fisher to Richard B. Cheney, August 2, 1976, “Jewish Desk – Campaign 
Strategy,” Box F36, President Ford Campaign Committee Records, GFPL. 
 329 “Reparks of the President and Question and Answer Session to the Jewish Leaders,” p. 2-3, 




relationship with Saudi Arabia. On relations with Israel, Carter was clear on his position: 
“We must stand staunchly with Israel. We must let the world know that there will never 
be any deviation in our commitment to the right of Israel to exist -- to exist in peace -- to 
exist as a Jewish state. This is a commitment of the American people and our 
government. And we must provide whatever aid -- economic or military aid -- that’s 
necessary to permit Israel to live and to live strongly and to live in peace.”330 Carter also 
tried to counter the perception that his Baptist faith was a liability for American Jews by 
pointing to the Bible as a common text that Christians and Jews share.  
 Despite the Ford campaign’s appeals to Jewish voters, more comments from Air 
Force General George Brown came to light as Election Day approached that undermined 
the campaign’s message to American Jews. In a wide-ranging interview with the Israeli 
journalist and political cartoonist Ranan Lurie in October, Brown said that Israel and its 
armed forces were more of a burden than a blessing for the United States because 
supplying Israel with American military equipment took that equipment out of the hands 
of U.S. troops. Brown also made incendiary comments about the armed forces of U.S. 
ally Great Britain and the leadership of the Shah of Iran.331 At a Pentagon briefing 
alongside Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Brown defended himself by saying that 
he meant his comments in a strictly military sense. He did not, Brown emphasized, 
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disagree with the U.S. commitment to Israel and touted his own actions in support of 
Israel.332  
 In the end, despite the Ford campaign’s best efforts, the Democrat Jimmy Carter 
prevailed in 1976 in what proved to be a surprisingly close contest. Ford received 34% of 
the Jewish vote, the same percentage Nixon won in 1972, but not enough to make a 
difference in the overall results.333 It would be up to Carter and his team to take the next 
step toward revitalizing peace negotiations in the Middle East.   
Conclusion 
 The years 1974-1976 saw a deepening of the U.S.-Israeli alliance without a 
resolution of the tensions inherent in the complex relationship between these two 
countries. On the one hand, the United States dramatically increased its military aid to 
Israel, and, as part of its post-Sinai II agreement with Israel, committed itself to 
guaranteeing Israel’s military and energy needs in the coming years. But at the same 
time, there were those within the Ford administration and the U.S. government who 
questioned both the level of American aid to Israel and the long-term value of U.S. 
military aid to Israel in the first place.  
Henry Kissinger had a deep personal stake in the final evaluation of the Ford 
administration’s foreign policy. After writing two massive memoirs within six years of 
leaving government service, the former secretary of state waited seventeen years to 
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publish his third memoir, Years of Renewal, which covered the years 1974-1976. 
Published in 1999, Kissinger argued in this volume that the Ford administration made a 
vital contribution to the United States’ ultimate victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold 
War. Historian Robert Kagan challenged in his review of Years of Renewal, calling it a 
poor attempt to defend Kissinger’s (and by extension, Richard Nixon’s and Gerald 
Ford’s) policy of détente and link their efforts to those of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.334   
In his final evaluation of the Ford administration’s actions in the Middle East, 
Kissinger did something similar in order to defend his and Gerald Ford’s record in that 
region. Near the end of Years of Renewal, he wrote that “in the Arab-Israeli conflict, [the 
Ford administration] had maintained America’s central diplomatic role, and advanced 
from removing the residue of war to initiating firsts steps toward peace.”335 This narrative 
established Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and the Sinai II accords as important precursors 
for the Carter administration’s successful conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel in 1979.  
 Journalist Edward Sheehan looked ahead to the future of American foreign policy 
in the Middle East in his 1976 account of Kissinger’s Middle East diplomacy, the year of 
a presidential election and the last full year of the Ford administration. While recognizing 
the achievements of Kissinger and Ford, Sheehan concluded that shuttle diplomacy 
would not be enough to secure peace in the Middle East going forward. Going forward, 
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Sheehan wrote, “the task of American diplomacy is to pursue a general settlement with 
stamina and speed.”336 Ford’s successor in the White House would try to just that, and 
quickly discovered how difficult such an ambitious goal would be to achieve.  
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Chapter 5: Beyond Camp David: The United States and Israel during the Carter 
Administration 
In March 1979, nearly six months removed from his triumph at Camp David, 
President Jimmy Carter traveled to the Middle East in hopes of finally securing a peace 
treaty between Israel and Egypt. When Carter had addressed a joint session of Congress 
nearly six months earlier on September 18, 1978, he spoke triumphantly of the 
breakthrough Egyptian and Israeli negotiations had achieved after nearly two weeks of 
intense negotiations. But the subsequent talks, which were supposed to take three months 
to reach a final peace treaty between the two former enemies, dragged on for more than 
twice that long. Hoping to wrap up the negotiations personally, Carter first traveled to 
Egypt, where he met with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. As had been the case 
throughout the administration’s Middle East negotiation efforts, Carter found a much 
more sympathetic reception in Cairo than he did in Jerusalem. As Carter confided to his 
diary on March 8, 1979, “As I’ve said many times, I have never been pleasantly surprised 
by the Israelis.”337  
When Jimmy Carter replaced Gerald Ford in the White House in January 1977, he 
inherited a slate of pressing international and domestic challenges, including a stalled 
peace process in the Middle East. Since the end of the 1973 October War, Henry 
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy had produced a limited disengagement agreement between 
Israel and Syria and two more between Israel and Egypt. But negotiators had made little 
to no progress since the Sinai II Accords were signed on September 1, 1975. That 
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agreement was an important intermediary step toward peace between Israel and Egypt, 
the leading power in the Arab world, and deepened the U.S.-Israeli alliance by 
committing the United States to ensuring Israel’s military edge.   
At the beginning of 1977, the Arab-Israeli conflict was entering a new phase. 
After decades as the Soviet Union’s most important ally in the Middle East, Egypt was 
moving steadily into the Western camp under President Anwar Sadat. Instead of looking 
to Moscow for foreign aid, Sadat increasingly turned to Washington for assistance in 
building up his military and addressing Egypt’s increasingly dire economic situation. In 
Israel, the fallout of the 1973 October War was still being felt in the country’s domestic 
politics. After replacing Golda Meir in 1974, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had tried to 
rebuild Israeli security, but his government was unstable and deeply divided. Israeli 
forces still occupied the majority-Arab territories of the West Bank and Gaza. On the 
political front, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was achieving new 
prominence and acceptance in the international community and continued to carry out 
terrorist attacks against Israel from bases inside Lebanon.   
This stalemate led many American experts to reexamine some of their core 
assumptions about the Arab-Israeli peace process and look for alternatives to Kissinger’s 
step-by-step “shuttle diplomacy.” Perhaps the most prominent example of this was a 
report by a group of scholars from the Brookings Institution, a major Washington, D.C. 
think tank. Originally published in 1975, the “Brookings Report on the Middle East” 
concluded that not only was a new approach to Arab-Israeli negotiations badly needed, 
but also that the United States had strong political, economic, and moral interests in 
securing a stable peace in the Middle East. The report also laid out a detailed list of the 
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elements that a comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East should include.338 
Other experts were similarly calling for the U.S. to revise its relationship with Israel in 
order to secure a peace agreement in the Middle East. Writing in the journal Foreign 
Affairs in early 1977, George Ball, a former senior official in the State Department whom 
President Carter considered for the post of Secretary of State, argued that the United 
States should do more to pressure Israel to accept Arab leaders’ demands for 
concessions.339  
At the beginning of 1977, Jimmy Carter was moving into the White House at a 
tenuous moment in American political history. Carter, the former governor of Georgia, 
ran for President in the 1976 election as an outsider from Washington. Touting himself as 
a moral and honest candidate untouched by the Watergate controversy, Carter pledged to 
restore Americans’ faith in their government and to tackle persistent domestic and 
international challenges. But despite the optimistic note on which it began, Carter’s 
presidency proved to be a difficult and frustrating one. In addition to serious economic 
problems from persistent unemployment and inflation to rising energy prices, a series of 
international crises in the Carter administration’s final years soured many Americans on 
the reformer from Georgia. By the time it ended with Ronald Reagan’s victory over 
Carter in the 1980 presidential election, the Carter administration was largely seen as a 
failure. This view has changed in recent decades as historians, journalists, and former 
aides to President Carter have reassessed his presidency with the benefit of time and more 
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primary sources. Two of the most recent efforts to revive President Carter’s reputation 
come from Stuart Eizenstat, a former adviser to the president on domestic politics, and 
journalist Jonathan Alter, author of a most recent comprehensive biography of the thirty-
ninth president. Both Alter and Eizenstat agree that, despite his failures, Jimmy Carter 
was one of the most consequential and accomplished presidents in recent American 
history.340 
Along with his record on domestic policy and the economy, Jimmy Carter’s 
foreign policy record was strongly criticized both during his term and in the years 
immediately afterward. This largely negative view has changed over the years as more 
and more documents become available at archives such as the Carter Presidential Library 
in Atlanta, Georgia. Writing less than twenty years after Carter left office, historian 
Douglas Brinkley concluded that, despite its poor reputation, the Carter administration 
achieved many notable successes. Beginning with Gaddis Smith’s 1986 study, several 
scholars have reached the same conclusion about President Carter’s foreign policy. 
Though most of his advisers lacked the public profile of Henry Kissinger, scholars are 
also demonstrating how officials such as the political scientist and National Security 
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Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski played important roles in shaping U.S. foreign policy 
during the late 1970s.341  
The Carter administration took office at a pivotal moment in the history of the 
Cold War. Under Presidents Nixon and Ford, the United States had pursued a strategy of 
détente with the Soviet Union in hopes of reducing tensions with the communist 
superpower while retaining U.S. power in the world. This strategy had produced some 
notable successes, including successful agreements with the Soviets over grain exports 
and limitations on nuclear weapons. But détente also inspired fierce criticism from both 
hawkish Republicans and Democrats, who believed that the U.S. was losing its edge to 
the Soviet Union. Others complained that détente’s acceptance of the status quo 
abandoned American ideals of democracy promotion and human rights.342 These 
criticisms also arose in the context of the Middle East peace process when critics charged 
that Carter’s tense relationship with Israel was alienating an ally and fellow democracy in 
a volatile region.  
During the 1960s and 1970s the struggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union for influence in the Middle East had played an important role in the conflict 
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between Israel and its Arab neighbors. U.S. officials supported Israel as an anti-
communist bastion amongst a sea of Soviet-backed Arab countries, and in 1970 and 1973 
Arab-Israeli wars became proxy conflicts between the superpowers. But by the end of the 
1970s this dynamic was changing. After Anwar Sadat replaced Gamal Abdel Nasser at 
the end of 1970, Egypt, the most powerful Arab state in the Middle East, distanced itself 
from the Soviet Union and drifted further and further into the American camp. As Lorenz 
Luthi observes in his recent global history of the Cold War, by 1979 the U.S.-Soviet 
rivalry was no longer a major factor in shaping the Arab-Israeli conflict.343 This was a 
significant development because it undermined the Cold War rationale for a close U.S.-
Israeli alliance and shifted the focus away from outside superpowers and back to local 
actors. Nonetheless, American officials continued to view the Middle East through a Cold 
War lens.  
One of the most significant features of the incoming Carter administration’s 
approach to the world was an emphasis on human rights. International organizations like 
the United Nations and non-governmental organizations were already calling for 
governments to take protecting human rights around the world seriously, especially since 
World War II and the Holocaust. In a significant break with his predecessors, Jimmy 
Carter made the promotion of human rights around the world a key objective of U.S. 
foreign policy. It was, according to historians David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, an 
attempt to create a “post-Cold War foreign policy.”344 Carter also signaled his 
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commitment to promoting human rights abroad by tapping Andrew Young to be his 
ambassador to the United Nations, a cabinet-level position. Young, who as a young 
minister had been a close associate of Dr. Martin Luther King and an active participant in 
1960s civil rights campaigns, later served in the House of Representatives as a Democrat 
from Georgia, Carter’s home state. As UN ambassador, Young would make many key 
contributions to the Carter administration’s foreign policy in Africa but was forced to 
resign after failing to report a meeting with a representative of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) to the State Department.345 
The 1970s had already seen the United States become involved in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to an unprecedented degree. As Secretary of State under Presidents Richard 
Nixon and Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger had traveled back and forth across the Middle 
East to negotiate limited disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel 
and Syria. These efforts were aimed at both increasing stability in the region and further 
reducing the Soviet Union’s influence there. Under Jimmy Carter these efforts expanded 
further for, unlike his two Republican predecessors, this president took a deep personal 
interest in the Middle East and made the region a cornerstone of his foreign policy. The 
administration demonstrated the importance of the Middle East to its foreign policy from 
the outset when on January 21, exactly one day after taking office, Carter signed a memo 
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directing his senior advisers to produce a report on the short-term issues facing the 
Middle East and the long-term prospects for Arab-Israeli peace.346 
Historians who analyze the Carter administration’s record on the world stage 
usually cite American efforts to facilitate peace talks between Israel and Egypt as one of 
Carter’s most important foreign policy achievements. Betty Glad, for instance, wrote that 
the negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 saw Jimmy Carter at his peak as 
president, “tenacious, well-informed, and flexible.”347 But in the past decade scholars 
have become more critical of Carter’s actions in the Middle East. As more and more 
classified documents become available to researchers and as historians broaden their lens 
to include more discussions of domestic politics and international actors such as the 
Palestinians, a more complicated picture emerges. Instead of an unparalleled triumph, 
today historians are more likely to see the Camp David talks as a limited success and a 
missed opportunity. Seth Anziska went even further by calling the Camp David talks a 
conscious case of “state prevention,” in which the Palestinians were denied the right to 
participate in the very talks that would shape their future.348  
Jimmy Carter’s interest in the Middle East was based on both his own personal 
experiences and a deep religious faith. In his book The Blood of Abraham, Carter 
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recounted a trip to Israel that he made in May 1973 while still governor of Georgia. 
Arriving in Israel months before the trauma of the October War, Carter describes how he 
and his wife Rosalyn visited several kibbutzim and met with Israeli leaders, archeologists, 
Jewish and Muslim politicians, and recent Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. 
Reflecting his deep Southern Baptist faith, Carter wrote that, for him, “there is no way to 
approach or enter Israel without thinking first about the Bible and the history of the land 
and its people.”349 As several authors have shown, Carter’s deep religious faith was an 
important factor behind his efforts to promote peace in the Middle East.350 
President Carter’s desire to address the Palestinian issue further distinguished his 
Middle East policy from that of his predecessors. In his memoirs, Carter explicitly tied 
the plight of the Palestinian people to his administration’s emphasis on human rights, 
writing that “The continued deprivation of Palestinian rights was not only used as the 
primary lever against Israel, but was contrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of 
both our countries.”351 But despite the president’s interest in the Palestinian issue, his 
administration was hamstrung by several factors, including intense opposition from 
Israeli leaders. Carter’s desire to make progress on the Palestinian issue was also 
hindered by the Ford administration’s commitments to Israel under the September 1975 
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Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Under this agreement, Henry Kissinger pledged 
that the United States would not negotiate with the PLO unless it met several very 
specific conditions, including renouncing violence and recognizing Israel’s right to exist 
within its established borders. The Carter administration’s policies toward the 
Palestinians have been a subject of intense discussion by historians in recent years. This 
literature acknowledges how President Carter’s rhetoric and policies toward the 
Palestinians were a departure from his predecessors, but it also emphasizes the limitations 
on U.S. outreach to the PLO during the late 1970s. No matter how strongly the President 
or others felt about the plight of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, their cause was 
always secondary to the U.S. relationship with Israel and broader regional concerns.352  
Throughout his presidency Jimmy Carter had a difficult relationship with the 
American Jewish community, especially its leadership. While most American Jews voted 
for Carter in 1976, many were wary of the new president for several reasons. One factor 
was Carter’s religious faith. During a period when Protestant evangelicals were emerging 
as an important force in American domestic politics, especially on the right, some 
American Jews were concerned about what Carter’s devout Southern Baptist faith would 
mean for the American tradition of religious freedom and evangelicals’ views of the 
Jewish people. Ironically, the same deep theological convictions that made the president 
care so deeply about the Middle East also made American Jews nervous. American 
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Jewish leaders were also disturbed by what they saw as Carter’s even-handed approach to 
the Middle East, an approach in which Israeli concerns were weighed alongside those of 
other Arab nations and, to some extent, the Palestinians.  
All of this made for a tense relationship between Carter and the Jewish 
community, one of the Democratic Party’s core constituencies. In addition to his 
domestic policy responsibilities, Stuart Eizenstat was also deeply involved in discussions 
of the administration’s policies in the Middle East. As an American Jew who was deeply 
concerned about Israel, Eizenstat emerged as an important adviser to the President on 
Israeli matters and often served as a liaison between the White House and American 
Jewish leaders. Reflecting on this relationship in 2018, Eizenstat argued that the Carter 
administration had many successes, but its poor relations with the American Jewish 
community was one of its most important failures.353  
From Comprehensive Hopes to Bilateral Realities, 1977-1978 
 Early on in its tenure, the Carter administration made the Arab-Israeli conflict a 
centerpiece of its foreign policy. The “Brookings Report on the Middle East” had a 
significant impact on the administration’s early approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Instead of continuing Henry Kissinger’s strategy of pursuing piecemeal agreements that 
might someday lead to a more comprehensive solution, the authors of the Brookings 
Report called for the United States to take a comprehensive approach to the peace 
process, one that included Israelis, Arabs from multiple countries, the Palestinians, and 
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the Soviet Union. This approach mirrored the one outlined by Secretary of State William 
Rogers in December 1969 but never implemented by the Nixon administration (see 
Chapter 3). Among the report’s authors were political scientists Malcom Kerr, Nadav 
Safran, and Steven Spiegel, each of whom had written extensively about the Arab world 
and/or U.S.-Israeli relations. More significantly, two more of the report’s co-authors 
would go on to hold senior foreign policy posts in the Carter administration: Zbigniew 
Brzezinski as National Security Adviser, and William Quandt as the National Security 
Council’s point man for the Middle East.354  
Shortly after taking office in January, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance traveled to 
the Middle East, stopping first in Israel before moving on to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria. Reporting on his visit with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Vance wrote in a 
telegram to President Carter that he had been warmly received by the Israelis, who were 
eager to continue the close American-Israeli relationship and appeared open to restarting 
stalled peace negotiations.355  
Several weeks later Yitzhak Rabin himself visited the United States and met with 
Carter at the White House. At their first meeting on March 7, Carter told the Israeli prime 
minister that he was firmly committed to the U.S.-Israeli partnership, calling it a 
“commitment of the Executive branch, the Legislative branch, and the American people, 
based on long-standing policy.”356 Recalling this meeting in his memoirs, Rabin wrote 
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that Carter’s words were “music to my ears.”357 Over the course of this meeting and 
another the following day, the American and Israeli leaders and their aides discussed a 
range of issues from resuming peace talks in Geneva to Israel’s borders, Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank, settlement activity, and levels of American aid to Israel. 
While there remained major differences between the United States and Israel on many 
issues, Carter went out of his way to assure the Israeli prime minister that he was fully 
committed to Israel’s security. He emphasized that the American commitment to Israel 
went beyond politics. Noting that many Americans of his faith background regarded the 
founding of Israel as the fulfillment of a religious prophecy, Carter said that this deep 
commitment “offers a permanence in our relationship that will guarantee the future 
against change.”358 
Less than two months into his presidency, Carter’s remarks at a town hall meeting 
in Clinton, Massachusetts, generated a stir among both American Jews and Israeli 
leaders. When asked by a Reverend Richard Harding about what needed to be done to 
establish a “meaningful and lasting” peace in the Middle East, Carter answered that the 
three most important prerequisites were for Arab countries to recognize Israel’s right to 
exist, for Israel to return to its pre-June 1967 borders, and for the Palestinian issue to be 
addressed in a meaningful way. On the third issue, the Palestinians, Carter told the town 
hall crowd that “There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who 
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have suffered for many, many years.”359 Israeli leaders and their allies in the United 
States seized on this remark, accusing the president of endorsing a separate and 
independent Palestinian state. 
While U.S. officials were laying the groundwork for a new peace initiative in the 
Middle East, national elections in Israel introduced a new element into the region’s 
politics. Ever since the founding of the State of Israel, the country’s politics had been 
dominated by the Labor party and other left-wing parties. But this changed on May 17 
when, to the surprise of political observes in both Israel and the United States, right-wing 
and religious parties led by Likud and its leader Menachem Begin received the most 
votes. Facing a difficult economy, the lingering effects of the 1973 October War, a 
growing movement to settle Israelis in the Occupied Territories, and widespread 
disillusionment with Yitzhak Rabin’s government, Israeli voters rejected the country’s 
longstanding status quo.360  
In the spring of 1977, Samuel Lewis was getting ready to take up his post as the 
new U.S. ambassador to Israel. An experienced diplomat who had worked under both 
Henry Kissinger in Washington and Daniel Patrick Moynihan at the UN in New York, 
Lewis was careful not arrive in Israel while the 1977 elections were still underway. 
Recalling this time in an oral history interview for the Association for Diplomatic Studies 
and Training, Lewis said that no one at the State Department or the Central Intelligence 
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Agency (CIA) predicted that Begin and his Likud party would come out on top.361 During 
his nearly eight years as the U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv, Lewis emerged as an astute 
observer of Israeli politics and U.S.-Israeli relations in his dispatches to Washington.  
While the Americans failed to predict Begin’s victory, they immediately 
recognized the historic importance of this election for the Middle East. According to a 
telegram addressed to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, American diplomats in Israel 
believed that recent tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship and particularly 
disagreements over U.S. military aid to Israel had contributed to Labor’s poor 
performance in Israeli national elections. Instead of trusting the Israeli political 
establishment yet again, Israeli voters had apparently opted for something new. As 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote to Cyrus Vance, “the Israeli 
electorate foresees hard times ahead and has prepared to batten down the hatches by 
taking a strong swing to the right.”362 
Likud’s unexpected victory was driven in part by Israeli voters who were born in 
Arab countries, many of whom did not feel fully accepted in an Israel long dominated by 
leaders with European heritage. Rooted in disillusionment with the Labor government of 
Yitzhak Rabin, allegations of government corruption, and lingering trauma of the 1973 
October War, the elections of May 1977 brought about a sea-change in Israeli politics. As 
Bernard Avishai observed in an essay for the New York Review of Books, “In voting for 
the Likud, Israelis have changed their political direction on many fundamental issues of 
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Israeli life: a quite different Israel has pushed through the accumulated layers of the old 
Labor Zionist establishment, and neither Israel nor ‘Zionism’ can be the same.”363  
Menachem Begin was not a new figure in Israeli politics. Born in 1913 in what is 
today Poland, Begin joined the Revisionist Zionist movement as a teenager. Founded by 
Vladimir Jabotinsky, the Revisionists were a small right-wing group within the broader 
Zionist movement who rejected the left-wing ideology of other Zionists and called for 
creating a Jewish state in Palestine by force if necessary. After escaping to Palestine 
during World War II, Begin joined the Irgun underground movement, which launched 
attacks against British authorities and installations, including the infamous bombing of 
the King David Hotel on June 22, 1946, in which nearly 100 people were killed. During 
the Israeli War of Independence, the Irgun was responsible for the attack on the Arab 
village of Der Yassin on April 9, 1948, where around 200 Arab civilians were killed by 
Irgun fighters. Begin and the Irgun were also involved in a confrontation with Jewish 
forces loyal to the new Israeli government of David Ben Gurion over the Altalena, a ship 
carrying arms for the Irgun. After a tense confrontation between the Irgun and the newly 
created Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on June 19-20, 1948, Begin and the Irgun accepted 
the Ben Gurion government’s authority and joined the new country’s democratic political 
process. Begin soon emerged as the leader of the right-wing Herut party which, apart 
from one brief period in the late 1960s, was always in opposition to the ruling Labor-
dominated Israeli governments.364 
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The May 1977 elections in Israel had enormous implications for Israeli foreign 
policy. Begin’s view of Israeli foreign policy and security was deeply influenced by the 
Holocaust, which he narrowly escaped. The Nazis’ attempt to exterminate the Jewish 
people had convinced Begin that Israel (and by extension Jews everywhere) were in 
constant danger of attack and discrimination. Consequently, Israel needed to be strong 
militarily and prepared to defend itself at all times. In order to reassure domestic and 
international audiences that he was not trying to bring about a radical departure in Israel’s 
relationship with the world, Begin asked two experienced officials, Moshe Dayan and 
Ezer Weizman, to serve in his cabinet as his ministers for foreign affairs and defense 
respectively. But despite these gestures toward continuity, most scholars agree that Israeli 
foreign policy under Menachem Begin was much more ideologically driven than it was in 
previous governments.365   
Begin’s ideology would prove influential in shaping U.S.-brokered peace 
negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. While he showed a strong 
commitment to negotiations with Egypt, Begin approached the Palestinian question very 
differently. A firm believer in Eretz Israel, Menachem Begin was a strong supporter of 
the settler movement that emerged in the Occupied Territories, especially in the West 
Bank. Determined to hold onto the territory that he and others referred to by the biblical 
names Judea and Samaria, Begin tapped Ariel Sharon to be his Minister for Agriculture, 
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the ministry that oversaw settlement building activities. Sharon, an experienced military 
commander and politician who later became defense minister and prime minister, was 
equally committed to expanding Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories and 
helped make Begin’s plan for settlement expansion a reality. As David Landau, Israeli 
journalist and biographer of Ariel Sharon, described it, “Begin was the architect; Sharon 
was the master builder.”366 
Menachem Begin made his first visit to the United States as Prime Minister of 
Israel in July 1977. Over the course of two days of high-level meetings between Carter, 
Begin, and their senior advisers, the Americans and Israelis held extensive discussions 
about their respective priorities and hopes for the future of the Middle East. Recalling 
that first meeting in his diary, President Carter wrote that he was surprised at how much 
he and the new Israeli leader got along. Unlike Begin’s predecessor Yitzhak Rabin, 
Carter found Begin to be a strong leader who would “be eager to work with me, 
compatible with what he considers to be the best interest of Israel.”367 This was not to say 
that the Americans and Israelis agreed how to proceed with peace negotiations in the 
Middle East. On the contrary, American and Israeli negotiators had serious differences 
over many issues, especially the continued presence of Israeli military forces and settlers 
in occupied Arab lands and the political status of the Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Despite these 
differences, both sides vowed to continue negotiations.368  
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In keeping with his hopes for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, President Carter hoped to involve the Soviet Union in those negotiations. This 
was a distinct departure from the strategy of Henry Kissinger, who had sought to keep the 
Soviet Union at arm’s length in the Middle East to reduce its influence in that vital 
region. Instead, the Carter administration released a joint U.S.-Soviet statement at the 
beginning of October 1977 calling for all parties to convene in Geneva, Switzerland, for 
direct negotiations involving all parties. Signed by Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko, the statement asserted that both superpowers agreed that 
peace in the Middle East was vital for international peace and security, and that Arab and 
Israeli leaders should convene in Geneva as soon as possible to achieve “a just and 
lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”369 
In addition to the difficulties Carter faced in negotiating with Israeli leaders, his 
administration was also dealing with criticism of its Middle East policy from much closer 
to home. In a memo to White House chief of staff Hamilton Jordan and presidential 
counsel Robert Lipshutz, Edward Sanders and Roger Lewis warned that the President and 
his administration faced a serious public relations problem with the American Jewish 
community. Writing that the President was seen as too friendly toward the Palestinians 
and too critical of Israel, Sanders and Lewis bluntly warned that the Carter administration 
“is seen as less friendly to the Israeli democracy than its predecessors.”370 
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While U.S. negotiations with Israel seemed to be making little progress, Egyptian 
leader Anwar Sadat decided to take matters into his own hands. After promising in a 
November 9, 1977, speech to the Egyptian parliament that he would go to Jerusalem and 
the Knesset itself in pursuit of peace, the Egyptian president did just that ten days later. 
Sadat’s visit to Israel on November 19 caught many people by surprise, including the 
Americans. While he was welcomed by cheering crowds in Israel, some members of 
Sadat’s own government vehemently opposed the trip. Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian 
foreign minister, went so far as to resign his post because of his opposition to Sadat’s trip. 
Recalling this moment in his 1983 memoirs, Fahmy wrote that Sadat had been “wooed 
and manipulated” into believing that he could work with the Israelis, only to be forced 
into a position where he had no choice but to agree to a separate peace with Israel, one 
that abandoned the Palestinians.371  
But Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, which included meetings with Israeli 
officials, a speech before the Knesset, and a visit to Yad Vashem, was an important 
symbolic moment, it did not immediately produce a breakthrough in the peace process. 
While Egyptian officials were beginning to develop a rapport with Israeli officials, 
especially Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, Sadat’s Knesset speech was not well-
received by his Israeli audience, and Begin’s response was equally partisan. Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian academic and diplomat who later became Secretary General 
of the United Nations, was a member of the Egyptian delegation that traveled with Sadat 
to Jerusalem. Recalling the atmosphere as Sadat’s visit was coming to an end, he wrote in 
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his memoirs that “It was now evident how wide a gap separated the Egyptian and Israeli 
positions. The hope of bringing down psychological and political barriers through this 
visit was fading.”372 A subsequent summit between Sadat and Begin in Ismailia, Egypt, 
was similarly inconclusive, and both leaders increasingly turned to the United States as 
an intermediary.  
As 1977 gave way to 1978, officials of the Carter administration continued their 
efforts to broker a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. As American officials met 
with representatives from Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to discuss terms for a future peace 
conference, they were also dealing with the issue of American military aid to U.S. allies 
in the Middle East. As previous chapters have emphasized, the United States had 
dramatically increased its military aid to Israel in recent years, but the United States was 
also increasing its levels of military aid to Arab allies in the Middle East, especially 
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials believed that military aid would 
incentivize these countries to participate in peace negotiations, but they proved highly 
controversial for Israelis and their allies in the United States.  
On February 14, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced that the Carter 
administration would proceed with a package of aircraft sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia. The sales, which would take place over the next few years, designated fifty F-5 
aircraft were for Egypt, and sixty newer and more sophisticated F-15s were designated 
for Saudi Arabia; Israel was to receive fifteen F-15s and seventy-five F-16s. In his 
statement, Vance argued that these sales would fulfill the three countries’ legitimate 
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security requirements, would not alter the military balance in the Middle East, and were 
“consistent with the overriding objective of a just and lasting peace.”373 Israeli leaders 
saw the sales differently, and so did their American allies. Pro-Israel politicians and 
Jewish groups strenuously objected to the sale, arguing that providing Arab nations with 
such sophisticated weaponry endangered Israel. The Carter administration stubbornly 
refused to back down, and the sales were eventually approved by Congress.374  
The controversy over the 1978 Middle East arms package caused a serious rupture 
in the Carter administration’s relationship with leaders of the American Jewish 
community. One member of the White House staff, Mark Siegel, even resigned in protest 
over the arms sale after he was booed while giving a speech to the United Jewish Appeal 
group defending the Carter administration’s policy.375 Before leaving, Siegel had worked 
on domestic policy issues and acted as a liaison between the White House and the 
American Jewish community. In a meeting with Carter and White House chief of staff 
Hamilton Jordan on March 9, the President reluctantly accepted Siegel’s letter of 
resignation, and Siegel bluntly told his former superiors his reasons for leaving. He 
argued that Carter’s advisers were giving him bad advice, that the aircraft sales to Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia would endanger Israel, and that arming Israel’s enemies would only 
divide Israeli leaders and the American Jewish community from the administration. 
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Emphasizing that Jewish people like himself felt insecure for “very good and substantial 
reasons,” Siegel told Carter and Jordan that “If we are to make leaps of faith toward 
peace, if we are to be fully able to take quantum leaps of faith that may be necessary, we 
must proceed from a position of security. And in this regard, that is the fundamental 
problem with your arms sales decision.”376 
At the same time that the Middle East aircraft package was being debated, U.S. 
officials were also reviewing a massive new Israeli request for American military aid. 
Matmon C, as it was known, was intended to modernize Israel’s armed forces over the 
next decade at the cost of $1.5 billion per year in foreign military spending (FMS). At a 
meeting of the Principals Review Committee (PRC), U.S. officials decided that, since 
Israel’s request was based on a maximum evaluation of the Arab military threat, there 
was no need to give Israel everything that it was asking for. Instead, the U.S. would make 
no multi-year commitment and would insist that Israel use some of its own money to pay 
for American equipment instead of relying entirely on American grants (which Israel 
would not have had to pay back). U.S. officials felt comfortable with this decision 
because, as was the case during the Ford administration, the U.S. intelligence community 
continued to believe that “Israel has a significant margin of military superiority over the 
Arabs and that this will continue through the early 1980’s regardless of how we respond 
to Matmon C.”377   
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Another factor complicating U.S. negotiations with Israel in the first half of 1978 
was violence along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. As historian Javier Gil 
Guerrero points out in a recent article, scholars of the Carter administration’s Middle East 
policy tend to forget about Lebanon and instead focus on Egyptian-Israeli negotiations 
and events in Iran. During the late 1970s a civil war was raging in Lebanon between its 
Muslim and Christian communities, a conflict that was made more complicated by the 
presence of large numbers of Palestinian refugees. After fleeing Jordan following the 
events of September 1970, leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had 
moved their headquarters to Beirut and, as had happened in Amman, established what 
amounted to a state-within-a-state. From Lebanon, Palestinian militants launched ground, 
rocket, and artillery attacks on northern Israeli towns, attacks which prompted retaliatory 
attacks by Israeli forces. In a preview of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 
1982, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched a major ground incursion into Lebanon in 
March 1978, withdrawing after several weeks of heavy fighting. With its attention 
focused elsewhere, the Carter administration never developed a coherent and effective 
Lebanon policy, and instead saw Lebanon as an annoyance that had to be dealt with 
whenever it threatened to upend Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations.378 
In the midst of tense negotiations over war and peace between Arabs and Israelis 
and the Palestinian situation, Menachem Begin came to Washington at the beginning of 
May to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Israel’s independence. At a White House 
ceremony where both the President and the Israeli prime minister spoke, Carter told his 
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audience that it was a point of pride for the United States to have been the very first 
nation to recognize Israeli independence in 1948. Celebrating both the “indomitable will 
and character” of the Israeli people and the United States’ “unshakable” commitment to 
the Jewish state, Carter asserted that the “the existence of the State of Israel will ensure 
for all times that the Jewish people will not be condemned to repeat the Holocaust.”379 
In connecting American support for Israel to the trauma of the Holocaust, Carter 
recalled his own 1973 trip to Israel. During that trip, the future president read journalist 
Arthur Morse’s 1968 book While Six Million Died, a highly critical account of the U.S. 
response to the Holocaust. Morse was particularly critical of the administration of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt for failing to aid European Jews fleeing Adolf Hitler’s 
Nazi regime in Germany during the 1930s and remaining bystanders for far too long 
while the Nazis were slaughtering Jews during World War II.380 Besides celebrating 
Israel’s independence and strong U.S.-Israeli ties, Carter used this occasion to announce 
the creation of a presidential commission to make recommendations for establishing a 
Holocaust memorial in the United States, “To ensure that we in the United States never 
forget.”381 This was a unique moment in the history of Holocaust commemoration 
because, apart from Israel’s Yad Vashem, no country in the world (certainly, no country 
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in Europe, where Jews were actually murdered during World War II) had such a 
memorial.  
The Carter administration’s announcement of its desire to build a Holocaust 
memorial in the United States marked the continued growth of Holocaust consciousness 
in the United States. Following the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East, American 
Jews’ concern for Israel’s security grew steadily, as did their interest in the Holocaust. As 
historian Michael Barnett put it in 2016, “American Jews relived the Holocaust as they 
watched events unfold in the Middle East.”382 This interest and concern was not confined 
to Jews alone but rather occurred among the larger American population as the number of 
accounts of the Holocaust on the page and on the screen increased.  
In his analysis of the effort to establish the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
Washington, D.C., historian Edward Linenthal writes that Carter’s announcement of a 
Holocaust Memorial Commission was a signal “that the Holocaust had moved not only 
from the periphery to the center of American Jewish consciousness, but to the center of 
national consciousness as well.”383 Linenthal also explicitly connected Carter’s 
commission to his administration’s efforts to repair relations with the American Jewish 
community and the Israeli government. Facing skepticism about his personal faith and his 
administration’s perceived tough treatment of Israel and his sympathy for the 
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Palestinians, Carter needed to shore up his support with these groups if he wanted to 
continue pursuing negotiations in the Middle East.384   
Just two weeks before Begin’s visit, the American television network NBC 
broadcast a miniseries entitled Holocaust on four straight nights from April 16-19. 
Starring a largely American and British cast, including a young and relatively unknown 
Meryl Streep, the series was directed by Marvin Chomsky and written by Gerald Green, 
both of whom were Jewish. It told the story of the Holocaust through the experiences of a 
single family, the Weiss family, of German and Polish Jews during the 1930s and 1940s. 
Holocaust was one of many long-form programs from the 1970s that told epic historical 
tales over the course of multiple episodes. One of the most prominent was ABC’s Roots, 
which chronicled the history of slavery in the United States from the enslavement of 
native Africans by slave traders in the 18th century to the liberation of African Americans 
following the Civil War.385 
From Kristallnacht in November 1938 to the killing fields on the Eastern Front to 
the death camps, the fictional Weiss family witnessed all the horrors of the Holocaust. 
The series, which stretched to over nine hours and five episodes, received mostly positive 
reviews. It won multiple awards, including two Golden Globes, eight Primetime Emmys, 
and a Peabody Award. Tom Shales, a long-time television critic at the Washington Post, 
called Holocaust “the most powerful film made for television.”386 The reaction from the 
 
384 See Linenthal, Chapter One and Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), especially Chapter 10.  
385 Roots aired on ABC at the end of January 1977. Martin Chomsky, who directed all four 
episodes of Holocaust, also directed two episodes of Roots.   
386 Tom Shales, “NBC’s Powerful ‘Holocaust,’” Washington Post, April 12, 1978.  
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New York Times were more critical, however. TV critic John O’Connor wrote that, 
despite the series’ good intentions, it amounted to “a sterile collection of wooden 
characters and ridiculous coincidences.”387 The writer and Holocaust survivor Elie 
Wiesel was even harsher, calling the whole series “an insult to those who perished and to 
those who survived.”388 But while much of the commentary surrounding Holocaust 
focused on its depictions of history, fewer observers took notice of the miniseries’ 
references to the present-day Middle East.   
In subtle and overt ways, Holocaust celebrated Zionist voices among European 
Jews, denounced national governments for not doing enough to help European Jews 
during the Holocaust, and positioned the creation of Israel in Palestine as the proper and 
logical response to the Holocaust. A moment early in Holocaust was particularly fitting 
for the state of U.S.-Israeli relations in the spring of 1978. One of the series’ major 
characters was Eric Dorf, a fictional lawyer who reluctantly joined the Nazi Party and the 
SS. In Episode 1, Dorf met with his boss Reinhard Heydrich to discuss the fallout from 
two days of attacks against Jewish buildings, synagogues, and businesses, during which 
an unknown number of Jews were killed and thousands more arrested in Germany and 
Austria. These events, which took place from November 9-10, 1938, are commonly 
known as Kristallnacht for the shattered glass from Jewish storefronts that littered the 
streets. Commenting on how the world would respond to these events, Dorf, played by 
Michael Moriarty, says calmly, “Few governments will stick their neck out for Jews.”389 
 
387 John J. O’Connor, “TV Weekend,” New York Times, April 14, 1978.  
388 Elie Wiesel, “Trivializing the Holocaust: Semi-Fact and Semi-Fiction,” New York Times, April 
16, 1978.  
389 Episode 1, Marvin Chomsky (dir.), Holocaust (1978).  
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David Warner’s Heydrich made a similar remark two episodes later at a meeting of senior 
SS officials to discuss planning for the “final solution,” the effort to systematically 
eliminate all European Jews in Nazi-occupied territories. Dismissing suggestions that 
people will object to the wholesale slaughter of Jews, he confidently states that “No one 
will lift a finger to help Jews.”390 Intentionally or not, Carter’s words at the White House 
on May 1 were a direct response to these feelings of guilt and a clear indication that at 
least one country, the United States, would stand up for the Jewish State.  
Even as NBC’s Holocaust program was helping educate American and European 
audiences about the genocide of European Jews during World War II, the miniseries 
simultaneously told a more subtle story about the importance of Israel to the survival of 
the Jewish people. Throughout the series Zionists, who wanted to establish a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine, are consistently portrayed positively and sympathetically, 
especially through the character of Helena, an Austrian Jew who fell in love with and 
married Rudi Weiss. Helena is a committed Zionist who imagines a future for herself and 
Rudi in Palestine and dies heroically in battle while fighting as a partisan on the Eastern 
Front. Elsewhere, scenes in the Warsaw Ghetto portray Zionists as the first to recognize 
that the German authorities are planning to exterminate Jews on a massive scale. Instead 
of cooperating with the German authorities, the Zionists of the Ghetto call for armed 
resistance and help lead the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.391 
Holocaust’s portrayal of Zionists was in keeping with a broader trend in 
American films and television of the late 1970s. Time and again, Israel and Israelis, 
 
390 Episode 3, Marvin Chomsky (dir.), Holocaust (1978).  
391 See Episodes 3-4 in Chomsky, Holocaust (1978).  
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especially soldiers and intelligence operatives, were portrayed heroically and 
sympathetically, while Arabs and Palestinians appear as bloodthirsty radicals and 
terrorists. Playing upon American government and popular concerns about declining 
American military power in the wake of the Vietnam War and international terrorism, 
especially terrorism rooted in the turmoil of the Middle East, multiple films from this era 
portrayed Israelis as much more competent and successful at stopping terrorism than their 
American counterparts. One of the most prominent examples was the 1977 film Black 
Sunday, an action thriller in which an Israeli agent rushes to stop a fanatical Palestinian 
terrorist from setting off a bomb during the Super Bowl. Other films were based on real 
historical events. Soon after Israeli special forces successfully rescued over a hundred 
hostages from Palestinian terrorists at the Entebbe airport in Uganda in July 1976, 
American filmmakers acted quickly to produce and release not one but two films based 
on this Israeli accomplishment.392 Recognizing the power of the American film industry, 
Israeli officials used Hollywood’s interest in the Entebbe story as a chance to put a 
positive vision of Israel and U.S.-Israeli relations, before the American public.393 
Holocaust also had a significant impact outside the United States. According to 
the historian Tony Judt, when NBC’s The Holocaust series was broadcast in West 
Germany over four consecutive nights in January of 1979, it was seen by more than 
 
392 The films were Victory at Entebbe (1976) and Raid on Entebbe (1977). The former was 
directed by the same Marvin Chomsky who directed episodes of Roots and Holocaust. Israeli filmmakers 
also produced their own version of the Entebbe operation, Operation Thunderbolt, in 1977, which was 
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so compelling to filmmakers that another film, 7 Days in Entebbe, was released in 2018.  
393 On the Israeli government’s efforts to shape views of Israel through these two Entebbe films, 
see Tony Shaw and Giora Goodman, “Hollywood’s Raid on Entebbe: Behind the Scenes of the United 
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twenty million viewers or at least half the country’s adult population. Though panned by 
many intellectuals as “the purest product of American commercial television—its story 
simple, its characters mostly two-dimensional, its narrative structured for maximum 
emotional impact,” the series had a significant impact on German viewers because of the 
moment in which it appeared on their screens.394 In fact, the series seemed to have a 
greater impact in Germany than it did in the United States, the country where it 
originated.395 Besides their depictions of European Jews, the creators of Holocaust also 
presented a disturbing view of the German people’s complicity in the murder of Jews and 
other minorities, and it helped inspire the West German government to abolish the statute 
of limitations on murder to allow for new prosecutions of German perpetrators. 
By the summer of 1978, it was clear to American officials that a comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East was nowhere in sight. Instead of continuing down that road, 
President Carter and his advisers pivoted to the one avenue of Arab-Israeli negotiations 
that showed signs of progress, bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Following 
a preliminary conference of the American, Egyptian, and Israeli foreign ministers in 
Leeds, England, Carter took the dramatic step of inviting both Begin and Sadat to Camp 
David, the American presidential retreat in Maryland, for direct talks that Carter himself 
would manage personally. Both men accepted, and the Camp David talks began on 
September 5.  
 
394 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 811.  
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The Camp David talks between the Israeli and Egyptian delegations led by 
Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, with President Carter acting as intermediary and 
host, are usually remembered as the high point of the Carter administration, especially its 
foreign policy. These negotiations, which lasted for a remarkable thirteen days, paved the 
way for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that was signed the following year at the White 
House on March 26. They provided a dramatic (but ultimately temporary) boost to 
Carter’s approval ratings, which, according to the Washington Post, brought his 
favorability rating up by eleven points to 56% in just two weeks.396 Writing in The 
Atlantic magazine in 1979, journalist and former White House staffer James Fallows said 
that the Camp David talks were the best demonstration of Jimmy Carter’s optimistic 
belief that he could resolve complex foreign policy issues if he could only get the major 
players in the same room with each other.397  
The story of the Camp David negotiations has been told frequently by participants 
who recount the talks in their memoirs. The first comprehensive account of the Camp 
David talks was written by William Quandt, a political scientist who worked on Middle 
East issues for the National Security Council during the Nixon and Carter 
administrations. Quandt, who was actively involved in the Camp David talks, wrote his 
account based on his personal observations and his scholarly training but without the 
benefit of archival sources. In his 1999 study of Arab-Israeli negotiations during the 
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1970s, historian Kenneth Stein credits Jimmy Carter, along with Henry Kissinger, Anwar 
Sadat, and Menachem Begin, with engaging in “heroic diplomacy.” More recently, the 
journalist Lawrence Wright published a new account of the talks in 2014, drawing on 
some recently declassified sources from the Carter Library. Though all these sources 
acknowledge the limitations and failings of the Camp David talks, they generally agree 
that the U.S.-brokered negotiations in September of 1978 were a major success for U.S. 
diplomacy and the cause of peace in the Middle East.398 The Camp David talks have also 
been extensively chronicled in memoirs written by participants on all sides.399  
For thirteen days from September 5-17, the participants held intense negotiations. 
Discussions were closed to the press and conducted entirely in English, with American 
officials acting as intermediaries shuttling back and forth between the buildings where the 
Egyptian and Israeli delegations were staying. The American objective at Camp David 
was to arrive at two broad sets of principles that would form the basis of a future 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the future of the Occupied Territories of Gaza and the 
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West Bank, and that were acceptable to both the Israelis and Egyptians.400 Apart from a 
visit to the nearby Civil War battlefield of Gettysburg on September 10, the talks 
continued without interruption. At several points during those thirteen days, the talks 
nearly collapsed as one delegation or the other threatened to give up and go home, but 
each time the Americans were able to convince them to return to the negotiating table. 
There were intense disagreements within both the Egyptian and Israeli delegations, but 
divisions were especially deep among the Egyptian delegations, several of whom 
believed that the “American” proposals were in fact Israeli proposals with an American 
gloss, and that Anwar Sadat was willing to accept anything the Americans put forward.401  
The fate of Israeli settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and in the West Bank proved 
to be a major stumbling block as Begin, Carter, and Sadat worked to find mutually 
acceptable terms for a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This was an instance where 
Israeli domestic politics played a significant role in shaping the discussions at Camp 
David. As a committed supporter of the settler movement, Begin strongly resisted calls 
that Israel remove its settlers from any territory captured in June 1967 because of his own 
personal beliefs and ideology. But Begin was also the leader of a coalition government 
that included many right-wing and pro-settler parties. If Begin were to agree to remove 
settlements, he would put his domestic political position at risk.402   
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In this moment, input from a member of Begin’s own cabinet proved crucial. 
During a call with Begin on September 14, Ariel Sharon, himself a major supporter of the 
settler movement, argued that the Sinai Peninsula was neither Eretz Israel nor part of the 
original British Mandate, and thus less important than territories such as the West Bank. 
As Sharon’s biographer put it, Sharon was able to convince his prime minister that he 
was “breaking a promise, not betraying an article of faith.”403 This gave Begin the 
political cover he needed to resolve this critical impasse. In what was for him a major 
concession, Begin agreed to ask the Knesset to vote on whether or not to remove Israel’s 
settlements in the Sinai.404   
An underappreciated element of the Camp David negotiations was the role that 
U.S. military assistance to Israel played in making the talks a success. In addition to the 
Israeli settlements there, another reason that Israeli leaders were reluctant to give up the 
Sinai Peninsula was that they would have to give up several oil fields and two 
strategically important airfields. As the talks neared an end, Israeli defense minister Ezer 
Weizman asked U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown if the U.S. could build Israel new 
airfields in the Negev Desert of southern Israel to compensate for giving up these 
valuable bases. Weizman, who was one of the strongest advocates for peace with Egypt 
within the Israeli government, remembered this as a pivotal moment in the talks.405 
According to a memo from Secretary Brown to President Carter, for the U.S. to build two 
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new Israeli air bases in the Negev would cost more than $1.5 billion, a figure that was 
separate from existing U.S. military aid to Israel.406 Most accounts of Camp David focus 
on the negotiations over Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai, its occupation of Gaza and 
the West Bank, and other issues, but promises of U.S. military aid to both Egypt and 
Israel played an important role in incentivizing Israeli and Egyptian leaders to come to an 
agreement as the talks came to an end.407 
In recent years, scholars have turned a more critical eye toward the Camp David 
talks. For one thing, the fact that only two parties, Israel and Egypt, took part was a 
significant step back from comprehensive negotiations in Geneva. President Carter, who 
set out to conduct comprehensive negotiations to resolve the entire Arab-Israeli conflict 
at once, was forced to accept bilateral talks, and was fortunate that both parties agreed to 
come to the U.S. at all. Given the important role that Jordan was expected to play as a 
representative of the Palestinians, the absence of King Hussein was very significant.408 
Historians also point to the Camp David talks’ failure to make progress on the issue of 
Palestinian statehood as a significant failure. In addition to the bilateral negotiations over 
peace between Egypt and Israel, negotiators at Camp David were also trying to reach an 
agreement on the future of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) 
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and the Gaza Strip. These talks proved no less difficult and frustrating than they were 
before Camp David, when Menachem Begin had stubbornly defended Israel’s right to 
settle in the West Bank for both historical and security reasons. The most significant 
work to make this argument is Preventing Palestine by Seth Anziska. Anziska argues that 
by agreeing to facilitate bilateral talks between Israel and Egypt, the U.S. allowed Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin to solidify Israeli control over the Occupied 
Territories.409  
Negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
After all the drama and promise of the Camp David talks in September 1978, the 
next phase of negotiations toward a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt proved 
difficult and frustrating for the Carter administration. Negotiations toward a mutually-
acceptable peace treaty that were supposed to take just three months were still going on 
when 1978 gave way to 1979 and stretched into March of that year.  
The delay in reaching an Egyptian-Israeli treaty after Camp David also worried 
American Jews, who were already uneasy with the Carter administration’s Israel policy. 
In a memo to President Carter at the beginning of 1979, Edward Sanders wrote that the 
administration’s relationships with Israel and the American Jewish community were in 
serious trouble. Noting that both Israelis and American Jews distrusted the Carter 
administration, Sanders warned that “The position we find ourselves in with respect to 
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the Jewish community (and the Israeli public) is potentially disastrous for the attainment 
of a comprehensive peace.”410 
The world of secret intelligence was another area where U.S.-Israeli relations 
seemed to be faltering at the beginning of 1979. On January 22, operatives from the 
Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, killed Ali Hassan Salameh with a car bomb 
in Beirut. Salameh had been a senior official in the PLO and, since the early 1970s, an 
intermediary between the PLO and the CIA, often communicating directly with CIA case 
officer Robert Ames. Israeli leaders had long objected to any contacts between the 
Americans and the PLO, and to any sign that the American government was considering 
recognizing the PLO as the legitimate government of the Palestinian people. Salameh had 
long been an Israeli target for assassination because of his involvement in terrorist 
activities, but his killing also shut down a U.S.-Palestinian channel that threatened to 
undermine Israel’s complete objection to any negotiations with the PLO. As journalist 
David Ignatius reported in 1983, Salameh’s death was a reminder that, despite their 
apparent closeness, U.S. and Israeli interests often differed sharply.411  
In March 1979 Carter once again plunged into the minutiae of Egyptian-Israeli 
negotiations, this time by traveling personally to the Middle East. Once again, Carter had 
a much easier time negotiating with Anwar Sadat than with Menachem Begin, but after 
days of negotiations the Israelis finally accepted the Americans’ version of an Egyptian-
 
410 Memo from Edward Sanders to the President, “Observations on Where We Stand,” January 3, 
1979, Container 36, National Security Affairs – Country File, JCPL.  
411 David Ignatius, “Mideast Intrigue: PLO Operative, Slain Reputedly by Israelis, Had Been 
Helping U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, February 10, 1983. See also Kai Bird, The Good Spy: The Life and 
Death of Robert Ames (New York: Broadway Books, 2014) and Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The 
Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. (New York: Random House, 2018), 214-219.  
247 
 
Israeli treaty. On March 26, just over six months after the Camp David talks were 
concluded with great fanfare, Begin and Sadat again joined Carter at in Washington for a 
signing ceremony on the White House lawn.    
The signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which ended the state of 
war that existed between the two countries for three decades and established full 
diplomatic relations between them, was a momentous occasion. But while the treaty was 
celebrated in Cairo, Jerusalem, and Washington, it was widely denounced in other places. 
It was harshly condemned by countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya, where Arab 
leaders saw Anwar Sadat as having abandoned his fellow Arabs, especially the 
Palestinians, by choosing Egyptian national interests over Arab solidarity. The reaction 
was more muted in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, countries which hoped to 
maintain good working relations with the U.S., but even there Egypt’s treaty with Israel 
was strongly criticized.412 Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whom the Americans had 
initially hoped would take part in comprehensive Middle East peace negotiations in 
Geneva, also condemned the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in a letter to President Carter, calling 
it “advantageous only to Israel.”413 
The new Egyptian-Israeli treaty was certainly a victory (albeit an incomplete and 
hard-fought one) for American diplomacy during the Carter administration. It also 
signaled the beginning of new American commitments to its allies in the Middle East. 
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Israel was already the largest individual recipient of American military aid in the world, 
and it would receive even more as compensation for signing the peace treaty with Egypt. 
Egypt would also receive increased levels of U.S. aid in return for both the treaty but also 
for moving into the American or Western camp and away from the Soviet Union. 
Altogether start in in 1979, the U.S. committed $13 billion worth of military assistance to 
Egypt and Israel over the next three years, nearly a third of which was funded by the U.S. 
taxpayer.414  
These new military aid levels were heavily weighted in favor of Israel, which U.S. 
intelligence officials had already concluded was in no danger of losing its military edge 
to its neighbors. Not only was Israel slated to receive more military aid than Egypt ($3 
billion, versus $1.5 billion for Egypt), but they were also receiving that aid on more 
favorable terms that the Egyptians. In a memo to President Carter, National Security 
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out this discrepancy, calling the proposal 
“extremely lopsided in Israel’s favor.”415 With those additional funds, the Israelis could 
purchase newer and more sophisticated tanks, aircraft, and other weapons systems from 
American defense contractors, while much of the American aid to Egypt was geared 
towards modernizing their Soviet-supplied military equipment.  
One final aspect of post-treaty U.S. military aid to the Middle East tipped the 
balance in Israel’s favor. Similarly to the Sinai II Accords negotiated by Henry Kissinger 
and Yigal Allon in the summer of 1975, the Carter administration agreed to a new 
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memorandum of agreement (MOA) with Israel. This MOA, which the Egyptians were 
unaware of until after it was signed, stipulated that the United States would come to 
Israel’s aid if any of the treaty provisions were violated and stated that it would 
“endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and 
economic assistance requirements of Israel.”416 In another similarity with the 1975 MOU, 
the Carter administration committed the U.S. to ensuring that Israel had adequate supplies 
of oil and to protecting Israel from the volatility of international oil prices.417 
 By agreeing to withdraw Israeli settlers from the Sinai Peninsula, Menachem 
Begin angered some of his strongest supporters in the settler community. While most 
other Israelis (and their representatives in the Knesset) saw giving up the Sinai 
settlements as an acceptable price to pay for peace with Egypt, hardliners in the settler 
community saw it as a betrayal of their core belief that no Jew should be forced to give 
up any territory or settlement. This was an important moment for the Israeli right because 
it split the movement into those moderates who would accept some territorial withdrawal, 
and those who would resist any withdrawal at all costs, including through violence. The 
most extreme of this latter group would go on to form the Jewish Underground, a Jewish 
terror group that launched attacks against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories during 
the 1980s.418  
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 As happened several years earlier after the Sinai II Accords were signed, 
American diplomacy in the Middle East stalled after a major milestone had been 
achieved. Though the Americans had agreed to facilitate talks between Israel and Egypt, 
U.S. officials had not given up on resolving the broader Arab-Israeli conflict for good. 
Ideally, the peace treaty that eventually emerged from the Camp David Accords would be 
only the first step toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. But, as 
historian Avi Shlaim wrote in 1988, while “Carter and Sadat saw the Camp David 
Accords as the first step in a process that would lead to a comprehensive peace between 
Israel and her neighbors, Begin saw the peace with Egypt as the end of the road.”419 By 
the time Egypt and Israel finally signed a peace treaty at the White House, President 
Carter and his advisers were increasingly drawn away from the peace process and toward 
other pressing international and domestic issues.  
Turning Away from Arab-Israeli Peace: The Crises of 1979-1980 
After American, Egyptian, and Israeli leaders signed the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty in late March, their attention then turned to the second element of the Camp David 
Accords, the effort to negotiate an autonomy agreement for the Occupied Territories of 
the West Bank and Gaza. As contentious as Egyptian-Israeli bilateral talks had been, 
negotiations over the fate of the majority-Palestinian territories that Israel had occupied 
since the June 1967 war were equally difficult, if not more so.  
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In May, Prime Minister Begin announced his support of a law in the Knesset that 
would establish the united city of Jerusalem, not Tel Aviv, where most countries had their 
embassies, as Israel’s official capital city. The bill, entitled “Basic Law: Jerusalem, 
Capital of Israel,” was introduced by Geula Cohen, a right-wing politician with a long 
record of opposing Israeli withdrawals from the Occupied Territories. Cohen had earlier 
condemned Begin’s decision to withdraw Israeli settlers from the Sinai Peninsula, but in 
this case she welcomed his support. With sites holy to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 
the fate of Jerusalem was a particularly contentious element of Arab-Israeli negotiations. 
By taking this step, Begin signaled that Israel had no intention of giving up the Holy City 
of Jerusalem in future negotiations.420  
After securing peace between Egypt and Israel, U.S. officials’ attention was 
increasingly drawn away from the Arab-Israeli peace process and toward other crises in 
the Middle East. With Egyptian-Israeli peace in hand and negotiations with the 
Palestinians showing no signs of progress, officials of the Carter administration 
increasingly turned their attention away from the Arab-Israeli conflict and toward other 
conflicts in the broader Middle East region, where a growing movement of Islamic 
fundamentalists threatened the stability of U.S.-allied regimes.  
The first of these came in Iran, where the U.S.-backed regime of Reza Shah 
Pahlavi was becoming increasingly unstable. After U.S. intelligence operatives had 
helped re-install the Shah in a 1954 coup, Iran had become an important American ally in 
the Persian Gulf and a significant purchaser of U.S. military equipment. Iran also became 
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an important base for American efforts to spy on the Soviet Union. But behind its public 
image as a powerful regional player in the Persian Gulf with massive oil resources and 
the backing of a superpower, the regime in Tehran was much more fragile than it 
appeared.421  
After fleeing Iran for Egypt in January 1979, the Shah of Iran appealed to the 
Carter administration for permission to come to the United States for cancer treatment. 
Despite his emphasis on human rights, President Carter was sympathetic to the Shah, and 
in October permitted the Shah to enter the U.S. This proved to be a serious mistake 
because it touched off protests in Iran and led directly to the seizure of the American 
embassy in Tehran. Protestors breached the embassy gates on November 4 and 
overwhelmed U.S. security forces, taking more than fifty Americans hostage. Though 
thirteen of the Americans (all women and African Americans) would be released on 
November 20, the others remained hostages in Iran until January 1981, when they were 
finally released at the exact moment when Ronald Reagan replaced Jimmy Carter in the 
White House. After failing to secure the hostages’ release through negotiations, Carter 
authorized an ambitious rescue operation by American military forces. That operation, 
Operation Eagle Claw, ended in disaster on April 24, 1980, and the Carter 
administration’s inability to deal with the crisis in Iran seriously undermined its 
credibility on foreign policy in the midst of a tough reelection campaign.422 
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 Ironically, the hostage crisis in Iran briefly created an opportunity for cooperation 
between the United States and the PLO. After the Mossad killed Ali Hassan Salameh, 
Yasir Arafat was looking for other opportunities to rebuild the PLO’s relationship with 
the United States. Arafat and other PLO tried to position their organization as an 
intermediary between the U.S. government and the revolutionary regime in Tehran. 
Despite the provision of Sinai II that prevented the U.S. from negotiating with the PLO 
on political matters, U.S. officials in Lebanon routinely cooperated with Palestinian 
authorities on security matters. According to Jorgen Jensehaugen, the PLO intercession 
likely contributed to the release of the thirteen American hostages from Iranian captivity 
on November 20, 1979, and the return of bodies of the eight American servicemen killed 
during the disastrous rescue operation on April 24, 1980. Unfortunately for the PLO 
leadership, these releases did not produce the desired rapprochement with the U.S. 
government.423    
 As U.S. officials struggled to manage the situation in Iran, events elsewhere in the 
world further heightened the global atmosphere of crisis and seemed to further 
underscore the Carter administration’s foreign policy shortcomings. On November 20, 
the same day that the American hostages were released, militants seized the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca, one of the two Islamic holy cities in Saudi Arabia. The next day, 
protestors attacked the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, and nearly breached the 
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compound’s walls. On top of all this, tensions in the Middle East were further heightened 
by Soviet leaders’ decision one month later to send military forces into Afghanistan to 
prop up a pro-Soviet regime that was on the verge of collapse.424 
President Carter addressed the growing climate of crisis in the Persian Gulf during 
his 1980 State of the Union address before Congress on January 23. Denouncing the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an attempt to restrict the flow of Middle Eastern oil, 
Carter warned that any effort by the Soviets to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be 
seen as a threat to U.S. national interests, and would be “repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.” 425  The speech signaled a new American emphasis 
on security in the Persian Gulf, and Carter pledged to work with American allies in the 
region to meet the Soviet threat.426  
These crises in the Persian Gulf had significant implications for the U.S. 
relationship with Israel, especially when it came to oil. Under the September 1, 1975, 
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U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement signed by then-Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, the United States was committed to making sure that Israel had adequate oil 
supplies. Israel had traditionally bought much of its oil from Iran, which under the Shah 
had developed a close (if discrete) relationship with Israel. But when the Shah’s 
government collapsed in early 1979 and the Shah himself fled, turmoil in Iran sent 
shockwaves through the global energy market. A decline in Iranian oil production 
reduced the amount of oil available for purchase on the international market and caused 
global oil prices to skyrocket.427  
In early 1979, U.S. officials were trying to figure out how the United States could 
fulfill its commitment to ensuring Israel’s oil supplies. In a January 8 memo to the 
President, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger wrote that the U.S. should first try to help 
Israel find alternative sources of oil, specifically countries such as Norway, the United 
Kingdom, or Mexico. He noted, however, that since European countries have recently 
rejected Israeli requests for oil because of their own domestic and foreign policy 
considerations, using U.S. influence with Mexico was the administration’s best option. 
Schlesinger went on to argue that, for a variety of reasons, direct U.S. oil sales to Israel 
should be seen as a last resort.428  
 Close U.S.-Israeli relations increasingly set the United States apart from its 
closest allies in Western Europe. Largely left out of U.S.-mediated Arab-Israeli talks, 
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members of the European Economic Community (EEC) developed closer relations with 
the PLO. On June 13, 1980, during a meeting in Venice, Italy, leaders of the EEC 
released a document known as the Venice Declaration, in which they emphasized 
Europe’s close ties with the Middle East and called for a comprehensive approach to 
peace in the region. This stood in contrast to the American-brokered Israeli-Egyptian 
negotiations in 1978-1979, which focused on bilateral talks and produced an Egyptian-
Israeli treaty. The European leaders called for a just solution to the Palestinian problem, 
one that acknowledged the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, and called for 
an end to Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.429 The growing rupture between the 
United States and Europe over Arab-Israeli negotiations was the result of both European 
and Palestinian diplomacy.430 
 Closer to home, the issue of U.S.-Palestinian relations led to a personnel crisis 
within the highest levels of the Carter administration. On July 26, 1979, Andrew Young, 
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, held a discrete meeting with Zehdi Terzi, a 
professor at Columbia University and the PLO’s representative at the UN. The meeting 
took place because Young was hoping to delay the release of a UN report that called for 
the establishment of a Palestinian state, but the controversy that emerged focused less on 
the purpose of the meeting and more on the fact that the meeting took place at all. When 
news of Young’s meeting with Terzi appeared in the press, Young initially downplayed 
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its importance to his superiors at the State Department, but eventually told the full story, 
which was that the meeting was a deliberate, scheduled meeting between a senior U.S. 
government official and a member of the PLO leadership. When the full truth eventually 
came out, the Israeli government and American Jewish organizations protested loudly. 
When Secretary of State Cyrus Vance learned the full truth, he was furious, and bluntly 
told President Carter that Young had to resign. Young did so, and Carter reluctantly 
accepted his resignation.431 Given the Carter administration’s hopes to eventually bring 
the PLO into the fold as a full partner in Middle East peace negotiations, several 
commentators pointed to the disconnect between Young’s fate and official U.S. 
government policy.432 
Domestic Backlash 
Running for reelection in 1980, the Carter campaign again made a concerted 
effort to appeal to Jewish voters. But as Election Day approached, members of the 
campaign became concerned that Carter was not doing as well with Jewish voters as he 
had in 1976. In a September 30, 1980, memo to the President, aides Al Moses and Stuart 
Eizenstat wrote that “we have still not seen a strong turnaround in your standing in the 
Jewish community. While many Jews are increasingly skeptical of Reagan … they have 
still not returned in historic numbers to the Democratic fold.”433 Moses and Eizenstat 
argued that this was due in part to the perception among American Jews that during a 
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second term, when he did not need to run for reelection, Carter would increase pressure 
on Israel and that this would jeopardize Israeli security. To counter this misconception, 
they suggested that Carter give a public demonstration of his belief that Israel was a 
strategic ally of the United States, specifically by announcing the creation of a joint U.S.-
Israeli military facility in Israel.  
 Another campaign memo from October 9 put things more succinctly. President 
Carter’s problem, it stated, was “simple distrust. The American Jewish voters,” its author 
concluded, “believe that President Carter, if reelected, will recognize the PLO or put an 
untenable amount of pressure on the State of Israel to make concessions to the Arabs that 
would run counter to their national interests and security.”434 To combat this distrust, the 
memo suggested that Carter needed to do several things, including demonstrating all the 
things that he had done for Israel while in office and to connect his opponent Ronald 
Reagan to the Moral Majority, the evangelical political organizing group, and charges of 
antisemitism by some evangelical preachers.   
 The Carter campaign tried to do just that. In a briefing book comparing Carter’s 
record on issues important to the American Jewish community to the records of his 
opponents Republican Ronald Reagan and independent John Anderson, campaign 
officials argued that “The single most significant achievement of the Carter 
Administration has been its contribution to peace between Israel and Egypt.” In an echo 
of the argument made by the President Ford Committee in 1976, the document went on to 
state that “During President Carter’s Administration, the U.S. has approved some $10.4 
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billion in military and economic assistance to Israel -- about half of the aid Israel has 
received from America since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948. During Jimmy 
Carter’s Presidency, Israel has received more U.S. aid than in all the previous 29 years of 
its existence.”435 
When it came to international affairs, some of President Carter’s strongest critics 
were members of his own party who had become increasingly concerned about the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy during the 1970s. As the détente policy of the Nixon and 
Ford administrations moved forward, this loose group of public intellectuals, politicians, 
and policymakers became worried that the United States was giving up too much ground 
to the Soviet Union and was forfeiting its military and ideological position in the world. 
While the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet relations were their greatest concern, these 
“neoconservatives” were also very concerned with the security of Israel. This was in no 
small part due to the large number of Jews among the ranks of neoconservative 
intellectuals and to the rightward shift in Israeli politics. Jewish neoconservatives often 
published their criticisms of American foreign policy and calls for stronger support of 
Israel in the pages of Commentary magazine. First published in 1945 by the American 
Jewish Committee, Commentary began as a bastion of the Jewish left, but by the 1970s it 
moved steadily to the right under the editorship of Norman Podhoretz.436   
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President Carter was also facing growing criticism from another group, Christian 
evangelicals. Carter was a self-described born-again Christian and talked openly about 
his deep Baptist faith, something that had concerned some American Jews during the 
1976 election. His candidacy came as white evangelical Christians were taking a much 
greater and more prominent role in national politics, especially within the Republican 
Party. Newsweek magazine took note of evangelicals’ growing political prominence, 
declaring 1976 the “year of the evangelical” in its October 25, 1976, issue, but this 
phenomenon did not spring out of nowhere. On the contrary, the modern emergence of 
evangelical Christianity in the United States had its roots in the changes that reshaped 
American society after the Second World War. To achieve their political goals, 
conservative activists established organizations like the Moral Majority to elect political 
candidates who could turn conservative beliefs into laws and government policies.437 
Carter’s popularity declined among conservative evangelicals when he failed to act on 
major domestic issues that religious conservatives cared deeply about, including abortion 
and homosexuality. Many of these voters would abandon Carter and the Democratic 
Party for Ronald Reagan and the Republicans in 1980, and this trend would continue as 
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conservative evangelicals became a vital constituency of the GOP in subsequent years.438 
In addition to these domestic concerns, evangelicals also took issue with American 
foreign policy during the Carter administration, including its policies in the Middle East.  
In a sign of both American evangelicals’ deepening interest in Israel and their 
growing visibility in American society and politics during the 1970s, a group of fifteen 
prominent evangelical pastors and theologians paid for a full-page ad in the New York 
Times near the end of Carter’s first year in office. Under a headline that read, in large 
bold print, “Evangelicals’ Concern for Israel,” the signatories affirmed their belief in 
Israel’s right to exist as a free and independent nation and voiced their “grave 
apprehension” at the direction of American policy in the Middle East. Using justifications 
grounded in the Old Testament, these evangelicals argued that Israel’s “rebirth” as a 
nation was foretold in the Bible, as were Israel’s modern borders. While acknowledging 
that the exact borders were open to discussion, they wrote that “we, along with most 
evangelicals, understand the Jewish homeland generally to include the territory west of 
the Jordan River.”439  
The years that Carter was in the White House saw the beginning of a “symbiotic 
relationship” between conservative evangelicals in the United States and the Israeli Right 
of Menachem Begin’s Likud party. According to historian Colin Shindler, these two 
political movements paralleled each other during the 1970s, rising to prominence and 
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political power around the same time and sharing similar beliefs about the importance of 
religion in public life. Rather than a break with the past, right-wing Israeli politicians saw 
the support of American evangelicals as a continuation of Christian support for an 
independent Jewish state from 1948 onwards.440 
Two months before the 1980 election, Republican presidential candidate Ronald 
Reagan gave a speech to a convention of the B’nai B’rith organization in Washington, 
D.C., sharply denouncing the Carter administration for its policies in the Middle East and 
for its treatment of Israel. Charging that the President’s “weak and confused” leadership 
was both empowering the Soviet Union and putting both the United States and Israel in 
danger, Reagan called Israel “a strategic asset to America.” Asserting that U.S. relations 
with Israel under Carter were marked by “doubt and distrust,” Reagan warned his 
audience that “Israel today is in grave danger, and so is freedom itself.” According to the 
Washington Post’s Lou Cannon, who covered Reagan throughout his political career, 
Reagan’s speech was received enthusiastically by his audience, who interrupted the 
Republican candidate thirty times with loud applause.441  
Jimmy Carter’s defeat in the 1980 presidential election was the result of many 
factors, including his administration’s inability to show significant economic 
improvement and its foreign policy failings. Republican Ronald Reagan won a slight 
majority of the popular vote, but an overwhelming share of the electoral college vote. 
Although their vote was not the only vote cause of Carter’s loss, it was one of many 
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factors that shaped the outcome of the 1980 election, American Jews’ vote tallies in that 
year’s election were notable because, for the first time in decades, the Democratic 
candidate won less than a majority of the Jewish vote (only 45%). Independent candidate 
John Anderson took another 15%, but the remaining 40% went to Reagan. This was the 
largest percentage of the Jewish vote won by a Republican in American political 
history.442 
Reagan’s victory was also due in part to evangelical Christians shifting their votes 
from Carter to Reagan. While there were undoubtedly many reasons for this, one of them 
had to do with Carter’s Middle East policy. In particular, Carter’s support for a 
Palestinian state on land claimed by Israel compared to Reagan’s staunch support for 
Israel and rejection of a Palestinian state pushed many evangelicals to choose the latter 
over the former. Ironically, this shift came despite the fact that Carter was more overtly 
devout in his religious observance than Reagan was. Evangelicals were also concerned 
about the rise of fundamentalist Islam and faulted Carter for the rise of an Islamist regime 
in Iran. In the wake of Reagan’s victory over Carter, one author set out what he saw the 
new administration’s Middle East policy should be: “What then specifically should the 
Middle East policy of the Reagan administration be? It should be built on what little is 
left as the result of the disastrous policy that saw us abandon Iran to its present chaos. In 
the first case that means support for Israel.”443 
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Carter’s critics charged that his policies were anti-Israel, but the truth is more 
complicated. Firstly, U.S. aid to Israel to Israel actually increased following the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. But secondly and more significantly, if the Carter 
administration was indeed trying to pressure Israel to make dangerous concessions, those 
efforts were unsuccessful. Recognizing the limits of his presidential diplomacy after 
office in 1981, Jimmy Carter continued to work for peace in the Middle East as part of a 
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Chapter 6: The United States and Israel in the 1980s  
After his tense relationship with Jimmy Carter, Menachem Begin hoped that the 
new American president, Ronald Reagan, would be a more reliable partner. A 1981 
meeting between the Israeli prime minister and Max Fisher, a prominent Jewish 
Republican fundraiser and frequent unofficial intermediary between the American and 
Israeli governments, gave him reason for hope. According to Yehuda Avner, an 
experienced Israeli civil servant and diplomat who served under four Israeli prime 
ministers, Fisher predicted that Begin and Reagan would quickly develop a rapport. 
Noting Begin’s deep religious devotion, Fisher told the Israelis that “[Reagan] is also a 
devout man, and because of his innate commitment to Israel, I think you and he will 
eventually get along just fine once you get to know each other.”445 Reagan’s affection for 
Israel, Fisher continued, was based on its place in Biblical history, the horrors of the 
Holocaust, and Israel’s value as an ally in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.  
Ronald Reagan’s interest in Israel stretched back to Israel’s first days of 
independence and was deeply influenced by both ancient and recent history. In his 
memoir An American Life, Reagan identified land and religion as the two most important 
sources of unrest in the Middle East, and he traced those conflicts all the way back to 
Biblical times. Here Reagan clearly identified the Jewish descendants of Abraham and 
Moses as the first inhabitants of Palestine where, he wrote, they built a vibrant Hebrew 
civilization before it was overrun by successive pagan, Christian, and Islamic invaders 
and the Jews were forced into exile from their homeland. There followed centuries of 
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antisemitism and persecution, culminating in the Holocaust of the twentieth century. 
Similarly to his predecessor Jimmy Carter, Reagan saw the Nazi effort to exterminate 
European Jews as one of the key reasons that the United States should support Israel. For 
him, the Holocaust “left America with a moral responsibility to ensure that what had 
happened to the Jews under Hitler never happens again.”446 Reagan was also a devout 
anticommunist and Cold Warrior, and he saw the divisions and conflict in the Middle 
East as opportunities for the Soviets to exploit and challenge the United States and its 
allies. The fortieth president’s support for Israel was, in the words of historian Gary Scott 
Smith, “compensation for their long-standing persecution, as a fulfillment of biblical 
prophecy, and as a strategic bulwark to help stop Soviet intervention into the Middle 
East.”447 
As journalist Lou Cannon wrote in his detailed account of the Reagan presidency, 
Reagan’s support for Israel remained strong even as many of his other political views 
shifted dramatically.448 In August 1979, months before he announced his campaign for 
the Republican presidential nomination, Reagan published an op-ed in the Washington 
Post where he wrote that the United States’ chief objective in the Middle East was to 
prevent the region from falling under Soviet domination. The key to achieving that 
objective, the future president argued, was strong support for Israel, a country with a 
democratic system like the United States’ own, a powerful military, and highly competent 
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intelligence services. “Only by appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in 
our strategic calculus,” Reagan wrote, “can we build the foundation for thwarting 
Moscow’s designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our economic 
wellbeing.”449 A year later during a speech to the B’nai B’rith organization in 
Washington, D.C., the former governor of California criticized President Jimmy Carter 
for breaking the United States’ covenant with Israel, which had been established when 
Israel declared its independence in 1948.450 In describing the U.S. relationship with Israel 
as a “covenant” established in 1948, Reagan both underscored the religious roots of his 
enthusiasm for the Jewish state and skipped over the fact that the U.S.-Israeli alliance was 
younger than he implied.  
Reagan’s criticisms of the Carter administration’s tense relationship with Israel 
resonated with the American Jewish community. When the votes in the 1980 election 
were tallied, Reagan had not only won an overwhelming majority of the electoral vote 
and a plurality of the popular vote, but he also received 40% of the Jewish vote. This was 
the largest share of the Jewish vote that a Republican candidate had won since such 
statistics were first kept in the early 20th century.451 Certainly not all of this was because 
of Israel – American Jews were as likely to be disappointed by and disillusioned with 
Jimmy Carter as other groups of Americans – but the perception that Carter’s policies 
were harmful to Israel certainly hurt damaged his popularity with American Jews and 
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convinced many traditionally-Democratic Jewish voters to cast their votes for the 
Republican candidate in 1980.   
Ronald Reagan entered the White House after defeating Carter in the 1980 
election. Though he began his political career as a New Deal Democrat, Reagan moved to 
the right in the 1950s and 1960s, becoming a major supporter of ultra-conservative 
candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 before running for and winning the governorship of 
California in 1966. After unsuccessful campaigns for the presidency in 1968 and 1976, 
Reagan’s victory in 1980 was seen by many as a triumph for the post-World War II 
conservative movement. His presidency proved to be an extremely eventful one for both 
domestic and international affairs.452 
Reagan’s presidency came at a transformational moment in the history of 
international relations and U.S. foreign policy. After decades of tense and at times violent 
competition between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies, the Reagan 
administration came to Washington determined to carry on the struggle. To the surprise 
of many, by the end of the 1980s the two superpowers had taken significant steps to 
reduce the danger of nuclear war and finally bringing the Cold War to an end. Given this 
history, the literature on Reagan’s foreign policy has understandably focused heavily on 
U.S.-Soviet relations and the relationship Reagan developed with Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev.453 After more than three decades, more and more primary documents are 
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becoming available to researchers at the Reagan Presidential Library and through the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series.454  
The literature on the Reagan administration’s policies in the Middle East is much 
smaller than it is on other topics. As of today, there is only one book that directly focuses 
on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East during the Reagan presidency, and this book 
was published before many records became available at the Reagan Library.455 This is 
bound to change in the coming years as more records become available from American 
and Israeli archives. But while historians have justifiably focused on the Cold War 
dimensions of the Reagan presidency, Ronald Reagan’s eight years in the White House 
were also important ones for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.456  
As previous chapters demonstrate, American support for Israel had increased 
dramatically from the 1960s onwards and especially in the 1970s following the 1973 
October War. That support had remained strong during the Carter administration, even 
though many critics of President Carter criticized his “harsh” treatment of Israel. 
Amongst the many other ways that Ronald Reagan sought to break with his predecessor, 
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the new president made it clear that his administration would be a vocal supporter of the 
Jewish state. This vocal support was not mere rhetoric, instead it was accompanied by 
action. Besides continuing the policies of previous administrations that annually provided 
Israel with more than a billion dollars in military and economic aid, the Reagan 
administration also took steps to formalize the U.S.-Israeli alliance by establishing 
official working groups and holding regular meetings between American and Israeli 
officials to coordinate their countries’ response to shared military and strategic concerns.  
As a historian and diplomat with decades of experience working on Arab-Israeli 
negotiations, Aaron David Miller has a unique perspective on U.S.-Israeli relations. After 
leaving the State Department, Miller conducted hundreds of interviews with a wide range 
of American and Israeli participants in peace negotiations for his 2008 book The Much 
Too Promised Land. Drawing on these interviews and his own experience in government, 
Miller identifies the presidency of Ronald Reagan as a key moment in the development of 
modern U.S.-Israeli ties, writing that “the rise of Ronald Reagan and conservative 
Republican support for Israel laid the foundation for the current strategic relationship and 
created the beginnings of wall-to-wall political support.”457 Israeli officials observed 
something similar by the end of the 1980s. During his more than two decades in Israeli 
politics, Moshe Arens served as Israel’s ambassador in Washington and as defense and 
foreign minister in the Likud governments of Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. 
Recalling this decade of U.S.-Israeli relations in his 2018 memoir In Defense of Israel, 
Arens wrote that before the Reagan administration, Israel’s support had come mostly 
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from Democrats and that “It wasn’t until Reagan’s presidency that support for Israel 
became truly bipartisan.”458 
Yet while the United States and Israel did increase cooperation on a range of 
issues during the 1980s, the Reagan years were often difficult and frustrating ones for 
officials in Washington and Jerusalem. As was the case with other aspects of the Reagan 
presidency, the President’s personal statements and beliefs did not always match his 
administration’s official policies. Despite Reagan’s frequent and heart-felt expressions of 
support for Israel, his administration often butted heads with the Likud government of 
Menachem Begin during the early 1980s on a wide range of issues. As the journalist 
Wolf Blitzer observed in his 1985 book Between Washington and Jerusalem, “Ronald 
Reagan’s relationship with Israel was defined by its contradictions.”459 
Besides the President himself, there were several notable supporters of Israel in 
senior foreign policy posts of the incoming Reagan administration. One was the new 
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, a career Army officer who previously served as 
Richard Nixon’s chief of staff during the 1970s. In April 1981, while visiting Israel, Haig 
attended a dinner at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem hosted by Israel’s foreign minister 
(and future prime minister) Yitzhak Shamir. In a toast thanking his hosts for their 
hospitality and highlighting the close relationship between their two countries, Haig tried 
to describe what it was about Israelis that Americans admired so much. Telling his 
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audience that he was confiding a secret to them, the chief American diplomat had this to 
say:  
Americans admire Israelis. Lacking resources, surrounded by hostility, and seared 
by catastrophe, you have managed against all odds to fashion a society 
remarkable for its dedication to justice, to freedom, and to equality. We admire 
these qualities, we Americans. We admire them in others especially, because they 
inspire us--to seek them for ourselves.460  
 
During his brief tenure at the State Department, Haig was a key supporter of Israel and an 
important counterweight to another member of the Reagan administration, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger, who was much less sympathetic toward Israel than his 
colleague Haig or their boss, President Reagan.  
Another Israeli sympathizer in the new administration was Reagan’s new 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, a rare woman to serve in a senior 
foreign policy post during the Cold War. A trained political scientist, Kirkpatrick’s essay 
“Dictatorships and Double Standards” in Commentary magazine brought her the attention 
of Ronald Reagan and other conservatives. In that essay, she strongly criticized the Carter 
administration for its failure to support pro-American autocratic regimes in countries like 
Iran and warned of the dangers posed by extremists such as the Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Yasir Arafat.461 During her four years at the United Nations, Kirkpatrick was a staunch 
defender of Israel.462 
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A Succession of Crises, 1981-1982 
From the beginning, U.S.-Israeli relations during the Reagan administration were 
much more difficult than many expected given the new President’s comments about 
Israel and the pro-Israel members of his administration. The first year and a half of the 
Reagan administration faced a series of crises that tested the U.S.-Israeli relationship and 
challenged the new president to square his pro-Israel rhetoric with the realities of 
shepherding American foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War. After 
criticizing the Carter administration for its treatment of Israel, Reagan was determined 
that his administration would be vocally pro-Israel. But Reagan and his advisers also 
inherited a dangerous situation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Reeling from the rise 
of an Islamist regime in Iran and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter 
administration sought to build an anti-Soviet alliance with moderate Arab regimes, and to 
increase the American military presence in the Middle East. The Reagan administration 
continued this effort through Secretary of State’s efforts to build a “strategic consensus” 
between the U.S. and its allies, both Israeli and Arab, in this vitally important region. In 
addition to concerns about the Soviet Union, American officials also sought to counter 
the influence of another power in the region, Iran.463  
Besides Israel, one of the most important American allies in the Middle East was 
the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who shared U.S. concerns about the Soviet 
Union, were also concerned about the rising influence of Iran, a Shia Islamist regime that 
directly challenged the authority of Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Islamic theology. To shore up 
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the pro-American regime in Riyadh, U.S. officials decided to sell them sophisticated Air 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. The sale, which was initiated by the 
Carter administration, would, in the Americans’ view, strengthen an important ally in the 
Arab world against the threat of Soviet expansion into the oil-rich Middle East. In her 
survey of U.S.-Saudi relations, political scientist Rachel Bronson argues the AWACS 
sale was part of a deepening relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which has 
continued ever since.464 Alexander Haig in his second memoir wrote that that American 
arms sales to Arab states in the Persian Gulf were a key piece in his effort to establish 
closer ties between them and the U.S. He further argued that arming states like Saudi 
Arabia would simultaneously make Israel safer and advance the Middle East peace 
process.465 Israeli officials saw things very differently: fearing that American military 
equipment would inevitably be turned against Israel, they objected to all proposed 
American arms sales to the Saudi kingdom.   
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories were another issue that complicated 
U.S.-Israeli relations in early 1981. These settlements had long been a source of tension 
between the American and Israeli governments, but in early 1981 the Reagan 
administration took a different position from its predecessors. Officials in the Ford and 
Carter administrations had routinely argued that Israeli settlements were illegal under 
international law, but in a February interview with reporters, Reagan said that they were 
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not, and distanced himself from the previous administration’s position on settlements.466 
In a memo to Richard Allen, Reagan’s first National Security Adviser, National Security 
Council (NSC) staffer Douglas Feith laid out the administration’s position. Believing that 
the issue of sovereignty in the West Bank would not be solved until the parties involved 
reached a formal peace agreement and noting that the U.S. had not recognized anyone’s 
sovereignty over the area since the British Mandate of the early twentieth century, Feith 
concluded that, in the meantime, “there is now law that bars Jews from settling on the 
West Bank. No one should be excluded from an area simply on account of his nationality 
or religion.”467 Instead of a legal issue, Feith reasoned, the settlements were a political 
one that could only be resolved later through negotiations.   
Feith’s legalistic argument drew heavily on a 1980 journal article written by 
another member of the Reagan administration, Eugene Rostow, director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Rostow, whose brother Walt had been National 
Security Adviser to President Lyndon Johnson and was a key figure in the escalation of 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s, had been the dean of Yale’s law school 
before becoming Under Secretary of State during the Johnson administration. A life-long 
Democrat from a secular Jewish family, Rostow was one of many so-called 
neoconservatives, liberal Democrats with hardline foreign policy views, who supported 
Ronald Reagan on foreign policy grounds over Jimmy Carter in 1980.468 In an article in 
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the Yale Journal of International Law, Rostow argued that Jews had the right to settle in 
the West Bank under the British Mandate, and as a result, the U.S. government could not 
argue (as previous administrations had) that Israel’s settlements in the West Bank were 
illegal. In addition to claiming that early-twentieth century colonial arrangements still 
applied decades later, Rostow argued that establishing a new Arab state (a Palestinian 
state) in the region would empower the Soviet Union and endanger both the West and its 
most important ally in the region, Israel.469  
Soon U.S. officials would have bigger problems to worry about. On June 7, 1981, 
on Begin’s orders, the Israeli air force launched a large operation involving dozens of 
aircraft to destroy a nuclear reactor that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was building with 
the help of French technicians. During the Israeli operation, eight U.S.-built F-16 aircraft 
dropped sixteen thousand-pound bombs on the Osirak reactor, destroying it completely 
and killing ten Iraqi soldiers and a French technician on the ground.470 The Israeli aircraft 
had a long and difficult flight to and from their target, including passage through Saudi 
Arabian airspace. In addition to using American aircraft, journalist Rodger Claire also 
reveals that many of the Israeli pilots involved in the raid had received training in the 
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United States. One of the Israeli pilots on the Osirak raid, Iftach Spector, had also led the 
Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty on June 8 during the June War of 1967.471  
In a statement dated the same day as the attack, the Israeli government took 
responsibility for destroying Iraq’s nuclear reactor and defended its actions. The 
statement alleged that the reactor was being used to produce atomic weapons, not 
peaceful energy, and would soon become operational. Asserting that the reactor could 
produce enough plutonium to build a nuclear weapon the same size as the bomb dropped 
on Hiroshima in 1945, the Israeli government concluded that the Osirak reactor 
represented “a mortal danger to the people of Israel” and pledged that “We shall defend 
the citizens of Israel in time and with all the means at our disposal.”472 U.S. officials 
criticized the Israeli government for its raid on Iraq, and days after the attack, the 
President took the rare step of suspending the delivery of four F-16 aircraft to Israel, the 
same aircraft flown by Israeli pilots during the raid, though this step was only 
temporary.473 In his private diary, Reagan accepted the Israeli rationale for attacking Iraq, 
calling Saddam Hussein a “no good nut” who was trying to build a nuclear weapon and 
had called for the destruction of Israel.474  
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After the raid on Iraq and controversies over settlements, American and Israeli 
officials were eager to put U.S.-Israeli relations back on the right track. The first meeting 
between the Israeli prime minister and the new American president seemed to confirm 
Max Fisher’s prediction that Menachem Begin and Ronald Reagan would indeed get 
along very well. During Begin’s September 9-10, 1981, visit to the United States, he met 
with Reagan at the White House, and the two discussed their mutual desire to open a new 
era of U.S.-Israeli relations and develop closer security ties. Speaking to the New York 
Times after a meeting at the State Department, Begin remarked that he had received “the 
warmest atmosphere I ever enjoyed in Washington.” In a joint statement from the White 
House, Reagan only added to this impression. In his remarks, the President emphasized 
the similarities between Israel and the United States. Calling the two countries 
“philosophical neighbors,” he said that “The United States and Israel share similar 
beginnings as nations of immigrants, yearning to live in freedom and to fulfill the dreams 
of our forefathers.”475 
But these upbeat remarks concealed very real differences between the American 
and Israel governments on Middle East policy. Of these differences, perhaps the most 
significant, was the planned sale of aircraft carrying the sophisticated airborne warning 
and control system (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia. The sale was initiated before Reagan 
entered the White House as the Carter administration sought to support its allies in the 
Persian Gulf against Iranian and Soviet expansion. During Begin’s White House visit that 
September, the American and Israeli leaders had expressed their views about the 
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AWACS deal and essentially agreed to disagree. But as the Senate vote on the AWACS 
deal approached, it became increasingly controversial as Israel officials called for the sale 
to be cancelled and Israel’s American allies took up the cause. Writing just over a month 
after Menachem Begin visit the White House with such fanfare and friendly rhetoric, 
New York Times journalist Bernard Gwertzman observed that “a chill has settled over 
Israeli-American relations.”476  
For all his public commitment to Israel, Ronald Reagan was also committed to 
countering the Soviet Union and to living up to U.S. commitments to its allies. Despite 
Reagan’s image in some accounts as a passive leader who left many important decisions 
to his subordinates, Nicholas Laham argues that the AWACS debate was a case where 
Reagan took an active part in securing passage of his agenda.477 With the help of the 
President’s appeals to critical senators, the Reagan administration succeeded in 
preventing Congress from canceling the AWACS sale. White House chief of staff and 
future secretary of state James Baker was a key figure in this fight. 478   
As the AWACS debate continued to complicate U.S.-Israeli relations, tragic 
events in Cairo threatened to undermine the fragile diplomatic relationship between Israel 
and Egypt. On October 6, 1981, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by 
members of his own military during a parade ceremony. During his years as leader of 
Egypt, Sadat had distanced Egypt from the Soviet Union and moved it into the Western 
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camp. He also broke with most of his contemporary Arab leaders with his willingness to 
negotiate directly with Israel. A key player in U.S.-brokered Egyptian-Israeli negotiations 
during the 1970s, Sadat had done what no other Arab leader had done or would do for 
many years afterwards when he signed a peace treaty with Israel and opened diplomatic 
relations with the Jewish state. While Sadat claimed that he was not abandoning his 
fellow Arabs, especially the Palestinians, his actions were motivated by his view of 
Egyptian national interests and the need to shore up Egypt’s troubled economy with 
American economic and military aid. But while Sadat became very popular 
internationally, his actions angered many of his own countrymen, including several 
senior diplomats who resigned in protest of his agreements with Israel. He also alienated 
Islamists within his own country, and a group of them tried to overthrow the Sadat 
regime by assassinating its leader.479 
Throughout 1981, the ongoing debate over the AWACS sale continued to 
complicate relations between the Reagan administration and Israel. This was an instance 
where the United States’ close relationship with Israel created problems for its other 
priorities, including countering the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf and shoring up pro-
American regimes in that region. After receiving the largest share of the Jewish vote of 
any Republican candidate, events during Reagan’s first year in office threatened to erase 
those gains. The Senate’s October 29, 1981, vote to approve the sale of Air Warning and 
Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia and upgrade the F-15 fighter aircraft 
that the Saudis had already purchased from the United States soured many American 
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Jews on the Reagan administration. Privately, Reagan could not understand why Israeli 
leaders and their American allies did not trust his administration to simultaneously help 
maintain Israel’s military superiority in the Middle East while also sending military aid to 
Saudi Arabia. In an April 23 diary entry, Reagan expressed his frustration with the 
American Jewish community, which failed to appreciate that “they’ve never had a better 
friend of Israel in the W.H. than they have now.”480  
It did not take long for Reagan’s Jewish supporters to make their views known to 
the administration. In a memo to Elizabeth Dole, then the head of the White House’s 
Office of Public Liaison, a wealthy Republican Jewish donor named George Klein 
assessed the situation. Klein, who had previously worked with Max Fisher on the 
President Ford Committee’s efforts to attract Jewish voters to the Republican Party in 
1976, warned Dole that Reagan’s support among American Jews had seriously 
deteriorated due to the fierce fight to get the AWACS sale through the Senate. Klein 
recommended that the President do several things, including publicly emphasizing 
Israel’s strategic value to the United States, increasing the administration’s outreach to 
Jewish Republicans as well as Jewish politicians and leaders of Jewish organizations, 
appointing Jews to senior administration posts, and strengthening the post of liaison to 
the Jewish community. Klein concluded by saying that “The worst thing that could 
happen is that a feeling of finality settles upon this community--that this administration 
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and the Republican party has written off their votes, involvement--both politically and 
economically, and has shifted its previously stated policies.”481 
 In addition to their objections to the AWACS sale itself, American Jewish leaders 
objected to antisemitic insinuations that their opposition to the deal was part of an effort 
by a “Jewish lobby” to shape American foreign policy. In a letter to Jacob Stein, White 
House Special Adviser for Jewish Affairs, Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish 
Committee expressed his anger and frustration with recent events. Writing on October 31, 
two days after the Senate vote, Bookbinder wrote that “I hate to say the following, but my 
heart and my mind force me to do so: Once again, Jews (and Israel) are being prepared 
for our centuries-old curse, being scapegoated for problems not of our doing.”482 Officials 
in the Reagan administration tried to repair the damage, but the AWACS controversy 
dealt a serious blow to Reagan’s standing in the American Jewish community.  
After the Senate voted to permit the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, the Reagan 
administration sought to mollify its Israeli allies by negotiating a new memorandum of 
understanding between the two countries. In late November, just over a month after 
Congress’s vote on the AWACS sale, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and 
Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon gathered for a private, informal ceremony at the 
Pentagon to sign an agreement calling for greater strategic cooperation between the two 
countries. This was an important milestone in U.S.-Israeli relations. After all, though the 
United States supplied countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia with military 
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equipment, it had no such strategic agreement with any of those nations. The November 
1981 MOU also continued a long-standing practice in U.S.-Israeli relations by laying out 
the U.S. commitment to Israel in a document that did not have to be approved by 
Congress. However, the newly signed MOU was as notable for what it did not say as for 
what it did. Specifically, it did not commit the United States to coming to Israel’s 
protection, but instead laid out more limited forms of military and security cooperation. 
Israeli officials had hoped to secure a more expansive agreement with the Reagan 
administration, but officials at the Defense Department rejected more extensive 
cooperation with the Jewish State. Caspar Weinberger had even gone so far as to ensure 
that the signing ceremony took place privately in the Pentagon, without reporters and 
celebratory speeches.483 
Just weeks after Ariel Sharon and Caspar Weinberger had signed the joint U.S.-
Israeli MOU, the Begin government took actions that caused the Reagan administration 
to suspend it. On December 14, the Knesset voted to impose Israeli law over the Golan 
Heights, a section of strategically important territory Israel seized from Syria during the 
June 1967 war. The first Israeli settlement in the Golan was established on July 16, just 
over a month after Israel seized the Heights, and more Israelis had followed in 
subsequent years. Imposing Israeli law over the Golan Heights was widely interpreted as 
a prelude to annexation, which would pose a serious problem for future negotiations with 
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Syria to exchange land for peace as called for under UNSCR 242. As Ambassador 
Samuel Lewis reported to Washington in a telegram from Tel Aviv, Menachem Begin 
gave the United States no warning that he was about to present a Golan Heights bill to the 
Knesset. After talking with officials at the Israeli foreign ministry, Lewis wrote that at 
least part of Begin’s reasons for taking this step had to do with his vulnerable position in 
Israeli politics.484   
The Begin government’s actions were also having an impact on American Jews’ 
views of Israel in early 1982. Writing in the New York Review of Books, Rabbi Arthur 
Hertzberg observed that events such as the Israeli strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, 
disagreements over the Occupied Territories, and the disputed AWACS sale to Saudi 
Arabia had turned many American Jews against the Israeli government of Menachem 
Begin. While major Jewish organizations, oldline Jewish Republicans such as Max 
Fisher, and Jewish neoconservatives continued to support the Begin government, many 
others were increasingly uncomfortable with its policies. American Jews, who had 
embraced a version of Zionism that was compatible with their worldview back in the 
1940s, were also uncomfortable with Begin’s revisionist Zionism.485 Hertzberg’s essay 
appeared in February of 1982, just months before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon would 
exacerbate many of the same divisions he warned about.  
At the same time that American Jews were raising concerns about the Begin 
government and its policies, officials within the Reagan administration were worried 
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about what the tense U.S.-Israeli relationship would mean for the Republican Party’s 
prospects for winning over Jewish voters in future elections. After receiving more than 
40% of the Jewish vote in the 1980 presidential election, Elizabeth Dole warned that 
Reagan’s level of support among American Jews had fallen sharply to the point where it 
was amongst all other demographic groups except African Americans. Dole attributed 
this decline in support to several factors, but especially to the rocky relationship between 
the Reagan administration and the Israeli government. She warned that “Without a 
comprehensive and acceptable policy on Israel, it will be exceedingly difficult to regain 
much meaningful support within the Jewish community.”486  
Lebanon, 1982-1984 
Israel’s northern border with Lebanon had long been a tense region. In addition to 
Lebanon’s own internal divisions, the country was also home to thousands of Palestinian 
refugees, who lived in camps in the south of the country. After being forced out of Jordan 
in late 1970 following the events of Black September, the leadership of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated to Lebanon. The presence of large numbers of 
Palestinian refugees inside Lebanon added a new element to an already tense and divided 
society. The combination of a population divided along religious and sectarian lines and 
the interest of outside powers such as Israel, Syria, and the United States in Lebanese 
politics made Lebanon an extremely unstable place in the 1970s. By the end of the 
decade, Lebanon was already in the midst of a brutal civil war between its different 
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religious and political factions, which began in 1975 and had already killed or displaced 
tens of thousands of people.487  
 By the end of the 1970s, the PLO had established a formidable political and 
military infrastructure within Lebanon. While the PLO had some allies within Lebanese 
society, their increasing involvement in Lebanese national politics had also alienated 
many other Lebanese. The PLO became even more unpopular when the Israelis retaliated 
for Palestinian attacks inside Israel by attacking targets in Lebanon, attacks which killed 
Palestinian fighters but also many Lebanese civilians. Recognizing that the Israelis were 
likely to launch a new ground operation inside Lebanon in the near future, the PLO built 
up a formidable conventional arsenal in the years leading up to Israel’s 1982 invasion.488 
Palestinian guerillas frequently launched attacks inside Israel from bases in 
southern Lebanon, to which Israel had responded with frequent air and artillery fire and, 
in several instances, limited ground operations into Lebanese territory. This happened 
several times in 1978, but the Israeli-Lebanese border again erupted in violence again in 
the summer of 1981. Fearing that the border conflict would expand into a wider war, the 
State Department tapped Philip Habib, an experienced diplomat from a Lebanese-
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American background, to serve as the U.S. special envoy for the Middle East. After 
weeks of shuttling back and forth between Israel and Lebanon, Habib successfully 
negotiated a ceasefire starting on July 24, but this proved to be only a temporary 
reprieve.489  
If there was one key figure in Israel’s decision to invade Lebanon in June of 1982, 
it was Ariel Sharon. By the beginning of the 1980s, the future prime minister of Israel 
was already an experienced soldier and politician. He had served in each of Israel’s four 
major wars since 1948, and as minister of agriculture in the first Likud government of 
Menachem Begin, where he worked to expand Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories. After Likud’s narrow victory in Israel’s May 1981 parliamentary elections, 
Sharon pushed for and eventually received the defense portfolio. Looking at the tense and 
violent situation along Israel’s border with Lebanon, Sharon began planning for an 
ambitious military operation that would go beyond what Israeli forces had done in 
Lebanon before 1981. Instead of a limited operation that focused on PLO fighters and 
infrastructure in southern Lebanon, Sharon’s plan called for a full-scale invasion that 
would permanently expel the PLO from Lebanon and install a pro-Israel regime in Beirut 
that would sign a peace treaty with Israel.490  
In preparing for a broader military operation inside Lebanon, Israeli leaders 
sought out allies within Lebanon’s Maronite Christian community. According to Benny 
 
489 On Habib’s time as the Reagan administration’s special envoy to the Middle East, see John 
Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat Versus the Israeli General, Beirut 1982 
(Belmont, CA: Applegate Press, 2002).  
490 On Sharon’s ambitious plans for Lebanon, see Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon 
War (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984), Chapter 2, and David Landau, Arik: The Life of Ariel Sharon 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), Chapter 5.  
288 
 
Morris, the first Israeli overtures to Lebanese Christians took place during the years 
1948-1951, just as Israel emerged as an independent nation. Desperate for allies in a 
hostile region, the first Israeli government of David Ben Gurion authorized talks between 
Israeli diplomats and representatives from the Phalange, a Christian political party and 
militia in Lebanon. These early contacts laid the foundation for the covert alliance 
between Israel and the Phalange in the 1970s and 1980s.491 In the months before Israel’s 
invasion, Ariel Sharon traveled secretly to Lebanon to meet with Bashir Gemayel, the son 
of Phalange founder Pierre Gemayel and a leader of Christian militia forces in Lebanon. 
Both Sharon and Menachem Begin sympathized with Lebanon’s Maronite Christians, 
whom Sharon compared in his autobiography to the Jews of Israel, fellow minorities in a 
hostile region.492 
In planning for an extended military operation inside Lebanon, Israeli officials 
were extremely conscious of how the United States might react. In the early months of 
1982, several senior Israeli officials visited Washington to ascertain how the Americans 
would respond to a large-scale Israeli incursion into Lebanon. In May 1982, less than a 
month before the Israeli invasion began, defense minister Ariel Sharon met with 
Secretary of State Haig and other American officials. As Haig recalled in his memoirs, 
the Americans were shocked when Sharon presented his two options for a Lebanon 
operation, one a limited border operation and one that would take Israeli forces all the 
way to Beirut, where they would install a pro-Israel regime. Fearing that an Israeli 
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invasion of Lebanon would lead to a destructive war that could expand beyond the 
Israeli-Lebanese border region, Haig “strenuously” told Sharon in that very same meeting 
and then later in private that the United States could not support Israeli action inside 
Lebanon unless it was a proportionate response to an internationally-recognized 
provocation. The Israeli journalist Ze’ev Schiff, an experienced and respected observer of 
Israeli foreign policy, painted a slightly different picture a year after the meeting took 
place. In 1983, Schiff reported in the journal Foreign Policy that Israeli leaders believed, 
after their meeting with Haig, Israel had at least tacit permission from the Reagan 
administration, an unspoken “green light,” to launch a limited military operation inside 
Lebanon.493  
Israel’s preparations for war in Lebanon were well-known to the Americans 
months before the war began. Reporting from Tel Aviv in early April 1982, Ambassador 
Samuel Lewis warned his superiors in Washington that “Recent statements and troop 
movements indicate that the Israelis, angry and frustrated, are close to making a major 
strike on the PLO in Lebanon. We think they are only one provocation away from doing 
so.”494 The incident that touched off Israel’s invasion came less than two months later, 
but in Europe and not on the Israeli-Lebanese border. On June 4, Israel’s ambassador to 
the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, was shot and badly wounded by a Palestinian 
gunman in London. While it was quickly determined that the gunman was a member of 
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the Abu Nidal Organization, a Palestinian militant group that split from Yasser Arafat 
and the PLO, Israeli leaders responded by ordering air strikes against PLO bases in 
Lebanon. When the PLO responded to these attacks by firing on northern Israeli towns, 
the Israeli cabinet voted overwhelmingly in favor of a massive ground invasion of 
Lebanon. Israel’s leaders initially told the public that IDF troops would only advance 
forty kilometers into Lebanon to destroy the PLO’s ability to threaten Israelis in the north 
of the country.   
As Israeli forces advanced into Lebanon, they encountered surprisingly strong 
resistance from PLO conventional forces and suffered heavy casualties. They also 
engaged Syrian armored and air forces, destroying dozens of Syrian tanks and aircraft 
during the early weeks of fighting. After more than a week of fighting and advancing, 
Israeli forces reached the outskirts of Beirut and linked up with Christian militia forces of 
the Phalange, cutting the city off from the outside world. By this point it had become 
clear that the Israeli military leaders, especially Ariel Sharon, had larger goals in mind, 
beyond the forty-kilometer limit they cited when the invasion began. Throughout the 
remainder of June and through July and August, fighting continued between Israeli, 
Lebanese, PLO, and Syrian forces, causing major damage to the city of Beirut and heavy 
casualties on all sides but especially among the city’s civilian population. Israeli 
airstrikes were particularly destructive and were widely condemned by the press and in 
the international community. Throughout this period, the fighting was interrupted only by 
at least six ceasefire agreements, none of which lasted for more than a few days.495 While 
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fighting raged within Lebanon, the war had an enormous impact on Israeli society at 
home. For the first time in the country’s history, Israelis turned out in large numbers to 
protest their government’s foreign policy. Among the protestors were active-duty soldiers 
and officers, some of whom refused to serve in Lebanon. This activism did not arise out 
of nowhere but out of a nascent peace movement that had been growing throughout the 
1970s and received a significant boost when Israel made peace with Egypt in 1979.496  
In the weeks and months after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, American 
diplomats worked intensely to arrange a ceasefire. Special envoy Philip Habib shuttled 
back and forth between Israel and Lebanon, and after months of talks, a lasting ceasefire 
was finally reached on August 18. Under the deal reached with the Lebanese government, 
the PLO, and the Israelis, PLO forces would be evacuated on ships, and international 
forces would deploy to Beirut as peacekeepers. These peacekeeping forces included 
French and Italian troops and hundreds of U.S. Marines, the United States’ second 
military deployment to Lebanon after the events of July 1958. As PLO military forces 
were withdrawn, thousands of Palestinian civilians remained in refugee camps in western 
Beirut, including the Sabra and Shatila camps.  
Ronald Reagan’s decision to deploy U.S. forces to Beirut in late 1982 was one of 
the largest military deployments of his presidency. In ordering U.S. Marines ashore in 
Beirut, Reagan overruled his Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, who was 
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skeptical of both significant U.S. support for Israel and, more generally, using U.S. troops 
in a peacekeeping role.497 Instead, Reagan sided with his new Secretary of State, George 
Shultz. Like Haig, Shultz had served in the Nixon administration and was a strong 
supporter of Israel, the latter despite Shultz’s time as an executive in the Bechtel 
Corporation, which had significant contracts in Saudi Arabia.498 This Marine deployment 
was meant to be temporary, and after the last PLO fighters departed Beirut, the Marines 
returned to their ships offshore on September 10.  
As American diplomats were negotiating the evacuation of PLO forces from 
Beirut, officials in the Reagan administration were also exploring how they could use this 
moment to make real progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations. In a national address on 
September 1, 1982, President Reagan laid out a peace plan that would build on the 
accomplishments at Camp David by focusing on Jordan and the Palestinians, neither of 
whom were present at the September 1978 conference. Calling the U.S. initiative a 
“moral imperative” as well as a step toward securing American security interests, Reagan 
called for a “fresh start” in the effort to “reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns 
with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.”499  
The peace plan Reagan announced at the start of September was indeed an 
important step toward addressing the fate of the Palestinians. But in trying to address 
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both Palestinian and Israeli concerns, the Reagan peace plan contained the seeds of its 
own demise. Under the plan’s terms, there would be free elections in the Occupied 
Territories followed by a five-year period of autonomy during which the Palestinians 
would govern their own affairs. This process, which was already a part of the Autonomy 
Talks begun after Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty in 1979, but those talks 
quickly stalled and made little to no progress in the ensuing years. Notably, this entity 
was not a full Palestinian state, which Reagan rejected outright in his speech. Instead, this 
new Palestinian governing authority would govern in association with Jordan. There were 
even more limitations on the proposed Palestinian entity, starting with the fact that, while 
Reagan called for a halt to Israeli settlement building in the West Bank, he said nothing 
about withdrawing existing settlements and what would happen after the five-year period 
ended. Furthermore, Reagan rejected a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank to the 
country’s pre-1967 borders.500 Given these limitations, it was unsurprising when Arab 
countries did not rush to embrace the new American plan, though they were more 
enthusiastic than Israel was. The Israeli government rejected the plan outright, calling it a 
break from the Camp David framework and a precursor to a Palestinian state that “‘could 
create a serious danger’ to Israel's security.”501  
Despite the Israeli rejection, American officials still hoped to salvage some 
progress toward Arab-Israeli negotiations, but this effort was quickly overshadowed by 
renewed violence in Beirut, including some of the worst atrocities of the entire conflict. 
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After months of fighting between Israeli, Lebanese, PLO, and Syrian forces, the country 
was on the verge of seating a new government. On August 23, Christian Phalangist leader 
Bashir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon and set about putting together a 
government to rebuild the country in the aftermath of Israel’s invasion. But less than a 
month later, Gemayel was killed in a massive bombing at his party headquarters. The 
following day Israeli forces and Phalange militia troops entered West Beirut, the part of 
the city formerly occupied by PLO forces. Taking up positions in West Beirut, Israeli 
forces did not enter the Palestinian camps, but Christian militia forces did. In what former 
Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban called a “gruesome pogrom against undefended 
civilians,” Christian militias massacred hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the camps 
from the night of September 16 to the morning of September 18.502  
Though these atrocities were carried out by Israel’s allies and not by uniformed 
Israeli soldiers, from the beginning there were indications that Israeli military and civilian 
officials knew what was happening and did not stop the killings. Outraged at Israel’s 
complicity in the killings, thousands of Israelis demonstrated in the weeks following the 
massacres at Sabra and Shatila, and many called for Begin’s resignation. A commission 
appointed to investigate Israel’s role in the events of September 16-18, 1982, under 
Yitzhak Kahan, the President of Israel’s Supreme Court, and released its report in 
February of 1983. Though the Kahan Commission, as it became known, placed direct 
responsibility for the massacres on the Phalangists, the report did find Sharon, Begin, and 
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several senior IDF officers indirectly responsible for the massacres.503 Within days Ariel 
Sharon was forced to resign from his post as Minister of Defense, and months later 
Menachem Begin submitted his own resignation. In recent years, newly unearthed 
appendix material from the Kahan Commission report demonstrates, in the words of 
historian Seth Anziska, “a pattern of extensive cooperation and planning between Israeli 
and Maronite leaders” that went beyond “indirect responsibility.”504 
Shocked at the atrocities, President Reagan ordered U.S. Marines back to Beirut 
on September 29, thus beginning the second U.S. military deployment in Lebanon in 
under a year. Other U.S. personnel were tasked with training a new professional 
Lebanese army. For the next year, U.S. troops were in the uneasy position of being 
nominal peacekeepers in a city with multiple warring factions while at the same time 
operating with heavily restricted rules of engagement. Those factions including Syrian 
and Israeli forces, Lebanese Muslim and Christian militias, and Iranian-backed militant 
groups who increasingly targeted American and international forces in Beirut. One such 
attack came against the American embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983, which killed 
dozens of Lebanese and Americans, including most of the embassy’s CIA personnel. 
Though intermittent fighting raged on around the Marines, for the most part U.S. forces 
held their fire and did not try to impose order on the country.505  
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During this time, U.S. peacekeepers had repeated run-ins with the warring 
factions in the city of Beirut, including the Israeli Defense Forces. Despite the 
longstanding military relationship between the United States and Israel, tense encounters 
between U.S. Marines and IDF troops become commonplace. One such confrontation 
occurred on February 2, 1983, when two U.S. Marines approached an IDF patrol asking 
them to stop where they were going, whereupon the IDF forces allegedly pointed their 
guns at the Americans.506 A month later, American officials again complained that IDF 
troops were interfering with U.S. patrols in Beirut.507 American and Israeli diplomats 
agreed that such confrontations only damaged U.S.-Israeli relations, and tried their best to 
resolve them.  
The perception that U.S. forces were non-aligned peacekeepers ended when, on 
September 19, U.S. forces intervened directly in the civil war around them by firing 
shells from American naval ships offshore in support of the Lebanese army. According to 
the journalist Thomas Friedman, this American use of force “turned the Marines from 
neutral peacekeepers into just another Lebanese faction.”508 Just over a month later, on 
October 23, 1983, a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives into the 
American Marines’ barracks in Beirut, killing more than 240 American servicemen. A 
short while later, another suicide bomber attacked a French military barracks not far 
away, killing dozens of French soldiers. Subsequent investigations revealed that these 
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attacks were carried out by groups backed by Syria and Iran. Though the Reagan 
administration claimed that it was not withdrawing in the face of terrorist attack, it 
withdrew U.S. forces from Lebanon just a few months later.  
With the collapse of the Reagan peace plan and the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from Beirut, Ronald Reagan’s Lebanon policy must be considered one of the greatest 
failures of his presidency. In the words of journalist Lou Cannon, even with years of 
hindsight, if it were measured solely in terms of lives lost, the Marine barracks bombing 
was “the greatest disaster of the Reagan presidency.”509 Writing in the months after the 
Marines withdrew from Lebanon, William Quandt, who had extensive experience 
working on Middle East issues during the Nixon and Carter administrations, argued that 
it was not the Reagan administration’s end goals that were flawed, but the means it used 
to achieve them, which amounted to mistakes of “analysis, judgment, and execution.”510 
American officials’ inability to perceive the conflict in Lebanon as rooted in complex 
local issues instead of a proxy conflict between the pro-Western Israel and pro-Soviet 
PLO and Syria was a particular failure by the Reagan administration.511 
Rebuilding the Special Relationship 
In the aftermath of the attacks on American and French forces in Beirut, U.S. 
officials began reconsidering their level of cooperation with Israel. Less than a week after 
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the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks, President Reagan signed National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD) 111, which called for, among other things, “a stronger 
strategic relationship with Israel and those moderate Arab states willing to work with us 
militarily.”512 NSDD 111 argued that it was essential for the United States to work with 
its allies in the region to counter the influence of Soviet-backed Syria.  
A month later, the President signed another NSDD, this one coming just days 
before the new Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, visited the United States. 
According to the authors of NSDD 115, Sharmir’s forthcoming visit “affords us a unique 
opportunity to make progress on our Middle East agenda and to develop a more mature 
strategic relationship with the Government of Israel.” They went on to state that “Our 
objective is to undertake combined military planning to protect common interests and 
defend shared objectives focusing first on the Soviet-Syrian threats to our interests.”513 
Shamir’s trip to the United States was aimed at repairing the fissures in U.S.-Israeli 
relations that developed under Shamir’s predecessor during the war in Lebanon and 
restoring strategic cooperation, which was halted at the end of 1981 after the Golan 
annexation. At the White House, Shamir found a very different environment in 
Washington compared to his previous visit. Recalling the moment in his memoirs, 
Shamir wrote that “The contrast between this visit and my last one was so sharp I could 
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hardly believe that the cast of characters and scenery were the same.”514 At this meeting, 
American and Israeli officials agreed to set up joint committees to coordinate military 
and intelligence cooperation between the two countries. The Reagan administration also 
agreed to resume U.S. deliveries of cluster bombs to Israel, which had been halted during 
the Lebanon war, and to renegotiate aid levels for the coming year so that Israel would 
receive more than a billion dollars in grants instead of loans, which Israel was not 
required to pay back.515 
But despite these moves toward greater cooperation with Israel, there were still 
American officials who were warry of a closer alliance with Jerusalem. According to 
New York Times journalist Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. officials in the Defense Department 
repeated their long-standing concern that a closer alliance with Israel would only damage 
the United States’ standing in the Arab world and its ability to act as a neutral arbiter 
between Israelis and Arabs in peace negotiations.516   
One consequence of these efforts was closer cooperation between the Reagan 
administration and the Israeli government on terrorism. The attacks on the U.S. embassy 
and the Marine barracks had demonstrated how Islamist terrorists could pose a threat to 
American interests and personnel overseas, and in this the Americans had a logical ally in 
the Israelis.517  
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Another result of this meeting in late 1983 between Prime Minister Shamir and 
President Reagan was the approval of U.S. funding for an initiative known as the Lavi 
project. Lavi was an Israeli program to build an advanced fighter aircraft in Israel, which 
would replace the F-4 Phantoms that Israel had purchased from the United States starting 
in the late 1960s. Up until this point, American military aid to Israel took the form of 
grants or loans, which Israel would use to purchase American hardware. This ensured that 
American defense contractors and American workers were the ones who benefited from 
U.S. aid to Israel. Under the new deal, however, Israel would be allowed for the first time 
to use American funds to pay for research and development in Israel. Unsurprisingly, 
some of the strongest opponents of the Lavi project were in Caspar Weinberger’s 
Defense Department.518  
Israeli officials such as defense minister Moshe Arens welcomed this news from 
the Reagan administration. In addition to his government service as Israel’s ambassador 
in Washington and then as defense minister, Arens was also a former senior official of 
Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), the manufacturing company behind the Lavi project. 
Looking back on this moment in his 2018 memoir, Arens called it the start of an 
“unprecedented level of U.S.-Israeli cooperation.”519 Others were not so enthusiastic, 
including senior officials at the Defense Department such as Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger, who had long been a skeptic of the close U.S.-Israeli alliance. Weinberger 
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and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé assigned Dov Zakheim to investigate 
the Lavi program, with the objective of terminating the program. Unsurprisingly, given 
senior DOD officials’ initial skepticism, Zakheim’s report, which was completed at the 
beginning of 1986, concluded that the Israelis had dramatically underestimated the cost 
of manufacturing this new fighter aircraft and called for the Lavi project to be scrapped. 
In his 1996 memoir of the Lavi saga Zakheim, who was an observant Orthodox Jew, 
described painful moments in his work where he was called a traitor for undermining the 
Lavi project, and by implication Israel’s security.520 
 Some former U.S. government officials also warned that a closer alliance with 
Israel did not serve U.S. national interests and foreign policy priorities. One voice of 
dissent came from Henry J. Shaw, who had previously served as the chair of the military 
assistance branch of the Office of Management and Budget during the 1970s. Writing in 
the journal Foreign Policy, Shaw rejected the argument that Israel could be a useful 
strategic ally in the Cold War. Instead, he argued that, by supporting Israel with such 
large levels of economic and military aid, the United States alienated its allies in the Arab 
world and enabled Israel to continue its occupation of Palestinian territories. While 
acknowledging that some U.S.-Israeli cooperation was useful, especially in the realm of 
intelligence, Shaw claimed that both countries would benefit from “quietly discarding the 
strategic partnership myth and grounding their relationship in greater realism.”521 
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 Other criticisms of the Reagan administration’s special relationship with Israel 
came from long-standing American allies in Europe. One important feature of the Reagan 
presidency was the close relationship Reagan developed with British prime minister and 
fellow conservative champion Margaret Thatcher. But while that relationship proved 
mutually beneficial in other areas of international affairs, the Middle East was an area 
where real differences emerged between the Reagan administration and the Thatcher 
government. While the Reagan administration remained a steadfast ally of Israel despite 
all the instances where the two governments clashed, Margaret Thatcher’s view of Israel 
was more complex and less sympathetic. Thatcher visited Israel in 1976 as a leading 
conservative politician and had developed a reputation as a supporter of Israel and a critic 
of the British Foreign Office (FO), which had a pro-Arab reputation, not unlike the U.S. 
State Department had in some circles. But despite her frequent criticism of the British 
foreign policy establishment on other matters, the archival record reveals that Thatcher 
and leading FO policymakers shared similar views when it came to the Middle East. Both 
were critical of Likud governments and especially Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin. Thatcher appealed to President Reagan to put greater pressure on Israel to 
withdraw from the Occupied Territories and agree to peace talks with the Palestinians. 
This disagreement was a source of tension in a relationship that was otherwise very 
close.522 
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New Domestic Challenges 
 Even as the Reagan administration sought to improve ties with Israel from 1983 
onwards, international events that touched on the Middle East brought new domestic 
controversies for the Reagan administration to deal with in its second term. Tensions 
between the Reagan administration and American Jews again rose to the surface in the 
spring of 1985 when the President visited to the Bitburg military cemetery in West 
Germany. The Reagan administration portrayed the visit as an opportunity for 
reconciliation between the United States and Germany on the fortieth anniversary of the 
end of World War II. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl strongly encouraged 
Reagan to make the trip and likened it to a similar ceremony he took part in with French 
President Francois Mitterrand at the World War I battlefield of Verdun. In that ceremony, 
the West German and French leaders laid a wreath at a military cemetery where both 
German and French soldiers were buried.523  
Unlike the Verdun cemetery, however, there were only German soldiers buried at 
Bitburg, including several members of the SS. This outraged both veterans’ such as the 
American Legion and Jewish groups in the United States. In addition to the role of the SS 
in perpetrating the Holocaust against European Jews, several German soldiers buried at 
Bitburg were responsible for the deaths of American soldiers during the Battle of the 
Bulge in late 1944. Jewish groups were particularly upset with President Reagan when 
the found out he was going to visit Bitburg. At a White House ceremony where he 
received the Congressional Gold Medal of Achievement, Elie Wiesel, the noted writer 
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and Holocaust survivor, called on the President to cancel his trip. After receiving his 
medal from Reagan, Wiesel memorably told him that his place was not with the SS 
members buried at Bitburg, but rather with their victims.524 Criticism of this sort did not 
go over well with some members of Reagan’s staff. According to Headrick Smith, White 
House correspondent for the New York Times, White House communications director 
Patrick Buchanan expressed his frustration by repeatedly writing “succumbing to the 
power of the Jews” on a notepad during a meeting with Jewish leaders about the 
upcoming Bitburg visit.525  
Many Americans were also outraged at Reagan’s decision to visit the Bitburg 
cemetery with Chancellor Kohl. In typed letters on personal stationary and handwritten 
letters and notes, dozens of Americans wrote to the President and Marshall Breger, one of 
Reagan’s special assistants who often dealt with Jewish affairs for the White House. One 
such letter came from doctor in Boston named Richard Goldstein, a prominent internist at 
New England Deaconess Hospital. Goldstein’s letter is notable because he explicitly 
connected Reagan’s visit to Bitburg to the ongoing violence in the Middle East. 
Acknowledging at the outset that he had voted for Reagan twice and agreed with most of 
his policies, Goldstein called Reagan’s determination to visit the Bitburg cemetery 
“nauseating” and suggested that the President and his family visit Auschwitz instead. 
Goldstein concluded his letter by predicting that the visit would be used to undermine 
U.S.-sponsored peace talks with Jordan or Syria. “If you the American President cannot 
remember German history correctly for forty years,” he warned, “what good are 
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American guarantees of Israeli concessions in the Middle East.” Goldstein also charged 
that Reagan’s visit would help revive the far-right in Israel and would doom the 
Republican Party’s chances for the 1988 election.526 
Surprised at the intensity of the criticism from Jewish groups and individual 
Americans, Reagan stubbornly insisted on going to Bitburg during his visit to West 
Germany. At his staff’s urging, the President did agree to include a visit to the Bergen-
Belsen concentration camp on the same day as his visit to the military cemetery. Before 
the trip, Reagan’s speechwriters worked diligently to craft speeches for Reagan at both 
Bergen-Belsen and Bitburg that would allow him to both acknowledge the crimes of the 
Nazi regime while also calling for reconciliation between the United States and Germany 
in the face of a shared threat from the Soviet Union.527 
 American Jews were not the only ones upset at Reagan for his visit to Bitburg. In 
making the visit to a German military cemetery alongside Helmut Kohl, Reagan also 
angered Israeli leaders across Israel’s political spectrum. As New York Times journalist 
Thomas Friedman reported from Jerusalem, everyone from the current Labor prime 
minister Shimon Peres, the former Labor prime minister and current defense minister 
Yitzhak Rabin, and former Likud prime minister Menachem Begin denounced the visit. 
Shlomo Hillel, the speaker of the Knesset, called the visit to Bitburg “an attempt to blur 
history” and, as he told Friedman, such attempts “cannot fail to arouse in us a feeling of 
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deep pain and burning insult, and also an oppressive worry that they are intended to harm 
us, and possibly even to prepare the ground anew.”528 
Unbeknownst to the Reagan administration, that same year also saw the beginning 
of a new crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations, this time in the realm of secret intelligence. By 
the second half of the 1980s, U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation seemed stronger than it 
had ever been. Therefore, it came as a surprise to many when an American was arrested 
by federal agents outside the Israeli embassy in Washington on charges of stealing 
classified U.S. military documents for Israel. Jonathan Jay Pollard was arrested on 
November 21, 1985, and within six months pled guilty to espionage charges and was 
sentenced to life in prison. According to the indictment presented to a Washington, D.C. 
grand jury, Pollard worked with representatives of the Israeli government to knowingly 
and willfully transmit to the government of Israel and its representatives “information and 
documents related to the national defense of the United States, having and intent and 
reason to believe that the same would be used in advantage of Israel.”529 Pollard’s wife, 
Anne Henderson Pollard, was also indicted on lesser charges as a co-conspirator and 
accessory to Pollard’s activities.530 
Wolf Blitzer, then the Washington correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, was the 
only reporter who gained access to Pollard while he was awaiting trial. As Blitzer 
recounted in his book Territory of Lies, Pollard specifically sought him out because, as an 
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American journalist writing for an Israeli paper, Blitzer could speak to both American 
and Israeli audiences. In addition to the breach of American national security, Pollard’s 
case also represented a challenge for the American Jewish community. As Blitzer wrote, 
“For the American Jewish community, it was a nightmare come true—an America Jew 
spying for Israel.”531 Blitzer later concluded that Pollard was motivated by a genuine 
desire to aid Israel by providing the Jewish state with information that the United States 
was not providing to its ally. But he also believed that the Israelis had been reckless to 
run Pollard as an agent in the first place, and that the whole incident did serious damage 
to the U.S.-Israeli relationship.   
Born in 1954, Pollard went to work for the U.S. Naval Intelligence Service as an 
intelligence research specialist in September 1979. As a watch officer at the Anti-
Terrorist Intelligence Alert Center in Suitland, Maryland, Pollard had access to an 
enormous amount of information, much of it highly classified. As a watch officer, Pollard 
carried a “courier card,” which allowed him to come and go from his office without being 
searched by security guards. For more than a year from June 1984 to November 21, 1985, 
when he and his wife were arrested outside the Israeli embassy in Washington while 
seeking political asylum, Pollard provided the Israelis with thousands of pages of highly 
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classified materials. For his efforts, Pollard received monthly payments from his Israeli 
handlers, who also paid for several international trips taken by Pollard and his wife.532  
Pollard’s Israeli contact was a man named Aviem Sella, an officer in the Israeli 
Air Force and a veteran of the Israeli raid on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak. After 
meeting Pollard at a party in April 1984, Sella reported his contact with an American 
Jewish intelligence analyst to his superiors. The news eventually made its way to Rafi 
Eitan, an experienced Mossad case officer, counterterrorism adviser to Israeli prime 
ministers, and chief of Israel’s scientific intelligence bureau, LAKAM. Eitan approved 
running Pollard as an agent, and for nearly a year Pollard provided the Israelis with 
valuable intelligence, including details on Soviet weaponry in Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian 
arsenals and on U.S. intelligence sources and methods. Eitan, Sella, and two other junior 
Israeli diplomats were named in the indictment of Pollard.533 Pollard also gave the 
Israelis information on security of the PLO’s headquarters in Tunis, where it had 
relocated after leaving Beirut. Israeli aircraft bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunis on 
October 1, 1985, killing dozens of PLO personnel and Tunisian workers but missing 
Arafat himself.534 
Six months after his arrest, Pollard agreed to plead guilty to a single charge of 
conspiring to deliver national defense information to a foreign government, a crime that 
carried with it a $250,000 fine and a sentence of life imprisonment. As part of his guilty 
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plea, Pollard agreed to fully cooperate with U.S. government investigators, but did not 
receive a reduced sentence.535 After Pollard’s arrest, Aviem Sella and the two other 
Israeli officials involved in running Pollard left the United States and returned for Israel. 
Leonard Garment, the lawyer who had worked in the Nixon administration and conveyed 
Nixon’s rejection of the Rogers Plan to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, was briefly 
retained to represent Sella. With Pollard pleading guilty, U.S. officials decided not to 
pursue criminal charges against Sella and the other Israelis involved in the Pollard 
episode.536 In a heavily redacted assessment obtained by the National Security Archive at 
Georgetown University, U.S. intelligence officials acknowledged that there were red 
flags in Pollard’s background that should have prevented him from obtaining a security 
clearance or getting a job dealing with sensitive intelligence, including failed polygraph 
tests, lies about his background, and drug use. They also concluded that Pollard’s 
activities had done real damage to U.S. national security, putting “at risk important US 
intelligence and foreign-policy interests.”537 
Israel and the Iran-Contra Affair 
Israel was at the center of the most serious scandal in American politics since the 
Watergate affair of 1972-1974, which had brought an end to Richard Nixon’s presidency 
and fueled a crisis of confidence in the country’s leadership. On October 26, 1986, the 
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Lebanese magazine al-Shiraa published a report that the United States had sold military 
supplies to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. As later 
investigations revealed, a junior Marine officer on the staff of the National Security 
Council, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, had taken some of the Iranian funds and sent 
them to the Contras, a right-wing anticommunist rebel group in Nicaragua. This was a 
direct violation of several laws passed by Congress that prohibited the U.S. government 
from giving aid to the Contra rebels. But this was no rogue operation carried out by a 
junior officer without the President’s knowledge. Over the objections of senior advisers, 
Reagan authorized North’s efforts and misled the public on his part in this effort.538 
One of the key figures in the Iran-Contra scandal was Robert McFarlane, a former 
Marine officer and State Department official who served as President Reagan’s third 
National Security Adviser. According to McFarlane’s 1994 memoir, in July of 1985, he 
was approached by David Kimche, an experienced Israeli intelligence officer and 
diplomat, who told him that the Israelis were in contact with “dissidents” in the Iranian 
government who wanted to repair relations with the United States and might be able to 
obtain the release of Americans being held hostage in Lebanon.539 Unbeknownst to the 
Americans, these intermediaries, including Iranian Manucher Ghorbanifar and Saudi 
businessman Adnan Khahoggi, were lying about these “moderate” forces in Iran, and 
instead were out to make a profit by acquiring arms for the Iranian government. This was 
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a high priority for the Iranian government, which at the time was fighting a brutal and 
destructive war with Iraq. One weapon that the Iranians were eager to acquire was the 
American TOW missile, which Israel had in its arsenal, courtesy of U.S. military 
assistance, but it could not sell those weapons to a third country without U.S. 
authorization.  
According to journalist Theodore Draper, a number of factors combined to 
produce the arms-for-hostages scheme, including the United States’ deepening ties to 
Israel in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon. These factors included concerns about the 
fate of American hostages being held in Lebanon, and the U.S. government’s respect for 
Israel’s intelligence services. In his memoirs McFarlane confirmed this, recalling that 
despite the obvious dangers of the operation, “I maintained rock-solid confidence in 
Kimche’s assurances about the people involved.”540 Another was the fact that both the 
Americans and the Israelis wanted to believe that there were moderate forces in Iran with 
whom they could negotiate. In Draper’s words, “Israeli receptiveness fed into American 
receptiveness, and they reinforced each other.”541 During the 1980s, senior Israeli 
officials, including Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, were aware of these efforts and 
supported them out of a desire to rebuild relations with Iran and to assist their American 
allies.542 Israel was, in the words of historian Malcolm Byrne, “a crucial and enthusiastic 
partner” of the Reagan administration.543 
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The joint American-Israeli plan was to transport TOW missiles from Israeli 
arsenals to Iran, and for the United States to replenish Israel’s stocks with new missiles. 
In return, the Iranian government would use its contacts with Islamist groups in Lebanon 
to secure the release of American hostages. On September 15, 1985, after two planeloads 
of approximately 500 missiles were delivered to Tehran, a single American hostage, 
Benjamin Weir, was released. A third missile delivery in November was a fiasco and 
nearly brought the whole scheme to an end. But instead of halting the operation, the 
Americans decided that more such deliveries should go forward, this time with more 
direct American involvement and less Israeli participation.544 This proved to be a serious 
mistake because, as American involvement deepened, the arms-for-hostages scheme 
became wrapped up in the Reagan administration’s efforts to supply arms to the Contras, 
when Oliver North began diverting profits from the arms sales to Iran to the Contras. The 
subsequent scandal was a major embarrassment for the Reagan administration and nearly 
brought down his entire presidency. Subsequent investigations and the documentary 
record reveal that, despite his denials, President Reagan knew of and authorized the arms-
for-hostages scheme.  
“Devoted and Sincere Friends of Israel:” American Conservatives Embrace Israel 
in the 1980s 
One final aspect of U.S.-Israeli relations during the 1980s must be addressed. 
While Reagan’s support from the American Jewish community declined throughout his 
presidency after winning more than 40% of the Jewish vote in 1980, another group, 
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conservative evangelical Christians, were becoming more active in supporting Israel. One 
of the key figures in this effort was the Reverend Jerry Falwell, a prominent evangelical 
pastor at the Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell was one of 
the founders of the conservative political organization called the Moral Majority and key 
figure in the Religious Right, which since the 1970s had become a powerful force in 
conservative politics and the Republican Party.545 From the 1970s onwards, he emerged 
as a prominent evangelical defender and advocate of Israel. 
During the early 1980s, the Moral Majority Report, the official publication of the 
Moral Majority group, published numerous articles highlighting the deep connection 
between American evangelicals and the State of Israel. These articles often coincided 
with significant moments in U.S.-Israeli relations during the 1980s. For instance, one 
article from March 1981 celebrated the inclusion of pro-Israel members of the Reagan 
administration, including National Security Adviser Richard Allen and Alexander Haig. 
“With appointments such as these by President Reagan,” wrote associate editor Deryl 
Edwards, “the views of the vast majority of moral Americans, channeled through a 
friendly and unimpeding government, can be upheld.”546 Moral Majority Report also 
trumpeted the close relationship between Jerry Falwell and Menachem Begin. A month 
after Israeli planes destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor, MMR described how Menachem 
Begin telephoned Falwell personally to explain Israel’s rationale for the attack. Falwell 
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told the Israeli prime minister that the United States should be congratulating Israel, not 
condemning it, and assured him that Israel had the support of “millions of Bible-believing 
Christians in America.” The article also included a picture of a telegram from Begin to 
Falwell thanking the American preacher for his friendship with Israel and for his 
“incessant efforts in the service of a just cause.”547  
The following year, after Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, authors in MMR came to 
Israel’s defense. Cal Thomas, a conservative columnist and vice president of the Moral 
Majority, wrote in August 1982 that the PLO, and not Israel, was to blame for civilian 
deaths. Accusing the PLO of deliberately forcing Israeli forces to enter areas where there 
were large numbers of civilians, Thomas wrote that “The PLO is nothing more than a 
terrorist organization whose central aim has been, is and probably will continue to be the 
liquidation of Israel and the Jewish people of that region.”548 At other times, MMR 
highlighted the plight of Lebanese Christians, including Saad Haddad, the leader of the 
South Lebanese Army, a Christian militia allied with Israel.  
Ever since the State of Israel was founded in 1948, the United States had 
maintained its embassy in Tel Aviv. This continued even after the Israeli government 
voted to make Jerusalem the official capital of Israel, over American objections. In 
September 1983, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of Washington State called for the 
U.S. to accept Israel’s decision and move its embassy to Jerusalem. The following month 
on October 31, a bill calling for the U.S. embassy to be moved from Tel Aviv to 
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Jerusalem was introduced in the Senate. Jerry Falwell strongly endorsed this decision bill. 
Testifying before Congress in May 1984, Falwell asserted that Israel was being treated 
unfairly and had the right to move its capital wherever it wanted. He argued that moving 
the American embassy to Jerusalem would demonstrate the United States’ strong 
commitment to Israel, and that Americans, “regardless of economic or political 
conditions, we stand behind Israel’s right to exist, free from outside predators, and that no 
surplus or shortage of oil or any other reason will allow us to sacrifice our friend on the 
altar of expediency.”549 
In addition to calling for the United States to adopt pro-Israel policies and 
defending Israel’s actions in the Middle East, Falwell and MMR were also strong 
proponents of Christian tourism to Israel. The issues of MMR and its successor the 
Liberty Report contain numerous advertisements for guided trips to Israel, including 
some led by Falwell himself. In her analysis of Jerry Falwell and the rhetoric of 
conservative Christians during the 1980s, anthropologist Susan Friend Harding noted that 
in some ways, a Falwell-sponsored tour of Israel had a lot in common with a secular 
tourist excursion to Greece. Both allowed visitors to walk through historical places, 
which gave one the sense of walking through history. But in one very specific way, a tour 
of the Holy Land with prophecy-minded evangelical Christians was nothing like secular 
historical tourism. According to Harding, “Jerry Falwell’s Holy Land tourists also find 
themselves inside the future, walking upon its landscape, knowing its actors, foreseeing 
its events. They know that they are living in the last days, the end-times, and that shortly 
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Christ will rapture them, bodily lift them up, off the earth.”550  But while these trips were 
nominally focused on history and faith, politics was never far from the surface.   
During the 1980s, journalist Grace Halsell accompanied several evangelical trips 
to Israel organized by the Reverend Jerry Falwell. On one such trip in 1989, she observed 
that present-day politics often overshadowed the experience of traveling to places 
mentioned in the Bible. “On each tour,” Halsell wrote, “Falwell gave the impression he 
was more interested in selling us on the idea that Israel needs more U.S. weapons … than 
he was in promoting reconciliation and peace.”551 Likewise, historian Melani McAlister 
recently argued that Falwell “explicitly linked his American nationalism to an evangelical 
form of nationalism-for-Israel.”552  
Another American who traveled to Israel as a religious tourist was Dorothy 
Helms, the wife of the powerful Republican Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina. A 
deeply conservative politician and a staunch opponent of civil rights legislation, Helms 
was an important Republican voice on foreign policy and later rose to become chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In 1985 he made a private visit to Israel 
during which he and his party “decided to follow in the footsteps of the prophets” by 
visiting the cities of Hebron and Bethlehem in the West Bank, which Helms referred to as 
Judea and Samaria. In addition to the religious significance of his trip, Helms also called 
Israel “our only reliable ally in the Middle East” and defended American military aid to 
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Israel as a defense cost akin to American aid to allies in the Pacific Ocean or in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).553 This was a significant change for Helms, who 
had initially been skeptical of a close U.S.-Israeli alliance, but by the end of the 1980s he 
had become a strong defender of Israel.554  
Jesse Helms’ embrace of Israel in the second half of the 1980s was echoed by 
other major voices of American conservatism. Writing in the flagship conservative 
journal National Review, Joshua Muravchik, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, celebrated the success of Israel’s military, as well as the American 
military hardware the Israelis employed. But he also argued that Israel’s military success 
also derived from qualities that Israel shared with the United States. Israel, he wrote, 
reminded Americans and Westerners of the advantages that democracies had over 
totalitarian or dictatorial regimes: “Free men raised in a society that cherishes individual 
initiative can bring to their soldiering qualities of dedication and ingenuity that the 
conscripts of dictators cannot match.”555 
Recognizing the PLO 
 For much of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the focus had been on 
military conflicts between states and militant groups or on high-level negotiations 
between national leaders. But at the end of 1987, an uprising in the Occupied Territories 
drew unprecedented international attention to the living conditions of the Palestinian 
 
553 For Helms’ account of his trip to Israel and his defense of a close U.S.-Israeli alliance, see 
Jesse Helms, “Keeping Faith: A Baptist Deacon Reflects on American Policy Toward Israel,” Policy 
Review 35 (Winter, 1985), 26-30.  
554 On Helms’ changing views of Israel, see William A. Link, Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms 
and the Rise of Modern Conservatism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 318-319.  
555 Joshua Muravchik, “Is Israel Good for America?” National Review (March 28, 1986), 43.  
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people in the West Bank and Gaza. Months before the uprising, which became known as 
the First Intifada, erupted, Israeli journalist and writer David Grossman traveled 
extensively in the West Bank and wrote extensively about the Palestinian experience 
living under Israeli occupation.556 
 The last year of the Reagan presidency saw one of the most important 
developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty in 1979. Throughout the 1980s, Jordan’s King Hussein had been working 
with the PLO on an agreement on the future of Palestine. But those talks broke down in 
1988, and on July 31, Hussein renounced any legal or administrative ties to the West 
Bank. This ended any possibility of an independent Palestinian entity associated with 
Jordan. This had been a key component of multiple American peace initiatives, including 
the autonomy talks and the Reagan peace plan.557  
After years of rejecting Israel’s right to exist, Yasser Arafat, the longtime 
chairman of the PLO, announced that the PLO leadership was changing its position on 
this critical issue. In a statement at a press conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on 
December 14, 1988, Arafat not only accepted Israel’s right to exist, but he also renounced 
terrorism as a tactic for achieving Palestinian statehood.558 These developments cleared 
the way for direct talks between the United States and the Palestinians, something that 
 
556 Grossman’s observations of the West Bank were initially published in the left-leaning 
magazine Koteret Rashit and then later as a book. See David Grossman, The Yellow Wind (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002).  
557 See Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2007), Chapter 22 and Nigel J. Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), Chapter 13.  
558 For the full text of Arafat’s statement, see “Statement by Arafat on Peace in Mideast,” New 
York Times, December 15, 1988.  
319 
 
American officials since the Ford administration had promised Israel would not take 
place.   
U.S. intelligence officials had informal contacts with the PLO throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. These discussions were always carried out covertly by officials from 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), especially case officer Robert Ames. Ames, who 
was killed in the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, had cultivated a 
relationship with PLO official Ali Hassan Salameh, who was killed by the Israeli Mossad 
in 1979. Under this covert relationship, the PLO pledged not to target Americans and 
even provided security to American diplomats in Beirut during the 1970s, all in hopes of 
winning American recognition of their cause.559  
Conclusion 
One of the most common criticisms of the Reagan administration was its internal 
divisions. This was especially true when it came to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East. Writing at the end of the 1980s, historian Avi Shlaim wrote that “the Reagan 
administration was split in so many ways that its factionalism began to resemble that of 
the Middle East.”560 This was especially apparent in the clashes between Reagan’s pro-
Israel secretaries of State, first Alexander Haig and then George Shultz, and Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger.  
While American support for Israel remained strong throughout the 1980s, the 
decade was a turning point for American Jews and Israel. Following events such as the 
 
559 For a contemporary review of covert U.S.-PLO cooperation, see David Ignatius, “The Secret 
History of U.S.-PLO Terror Talks,” Washington Post, December 4, 1988.  
560 Avi Shlaim, “The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, V 
ol.17, No. 2 (Winer, 1988), 22.  
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Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the arrest of Jonathan Pollard for espionage, and Palestinian 
uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, American Jews’ views of Israel were 
becoming more circumspect and critical.561 Likewise, despite the Reagan 
administration’s consistently pro-Israel stance, American Jews never voted in such high 
numbers for a Republican candidate again after 1980.  
Near the end of Reagan’s presidency, David Ignatius published a novel about 
American spies in the Middle East. Titled Agents of Innocence, the book told the story of 
a fictional American CIA case officer, Tom Rogers, and his relationship with the also-
fictional Jamal Ramlawi, a senior aid to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. Ignatius, an 
experienced journalist who covered the Middle East for the Wall Street Journal and the 
Washington Post, based his fictional espionage tale on the real relationship between Ali 
Hassan Salameh and Robert Ames. Though Ignatius’ novel was praised on the dust jacket 
for its grasp of intelligence tradecraft, it was criticized for its depictions of Palestinians 
and other Arabs, who, apart from Ignatius’ protagonist Ramlawi, are often portrayed as 
sex-crazed, liars, or religious fanatics.562  
Ignatius’ negative portrayals of Arabs are matched by his positive depictions of 
Israelis, who mostly appear in the novel as operatives of the Mossad, Israel’s secretive 
intelligence service. Despite the very real tensions between the United States and Israel in 
the 1980s, including the fact that, both in real life and in the novel, the Israelis were 
furious at the CIA for developing a covert relationship with the Palestinians, Israelis are 
 
561 See, for instance, Jonathan Marcus, “Discordant Voices: The US Jewish Community and Israel 
During the 1980s,” International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3 (1990), pp. 545-558.  
562 For an insightful critique of Agents of Innocence, see William H. Brubeck, “Review: An 
Exegesis on Arabs,” Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer, 1988), pp. 125-129.  
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invariably depicted as competent and respectable, in stark contrast to the Arabs. One 
fictional CIA official went so far as to call the Mossad “the most competent intelligence 
service in the world.”563 The Israelis in turn respect and admire the Americans, even if 
they have serious disagreements with them. But there is another moment near the end of 
the novel that further emphasizes the complex but inseparable bond between the United 
States and Israel. Tom Rogers’ agent Fuad, who often served as an intermediary between 
the CIA and their PLO contact Ramlawi, laments that despite his fondness for the 
American Rogers and the United States as a whole, Palestinians and Arabs would never 
be as valued and respected by the Americans as the Israelis were. If the Arabs were the 
Americans’ mistress, Fuad sadly concluded, the Israelis were their wife, and the 
Americans would always return to their wife.564  
  
 
563 David Ignatius, Agents of Innocence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 385.  




On his 2006 album Orphans: Brawlers, Bawlers, & Bastards, the American 
singer-songwriter Tom Waits included a rare topical song entitled “Road to Peace.” 
Written during the Second Intifada, a period of intense violence between Israelis and 
Palestinians from 2000-2005 in which thousands of people were killed and wounded, the 
song used the story of one suicide bombing in Jerusalem and Israel’s violent response the 
following day to highlight what was, to American eyes, the futility of Israeli-Palestinian 
violence.565 Waits’ lyrics describe how actions on both sides lead to the deaths of 
innocent civilians and convey despair that there seems to be no end to this violence in 
sight. But the song also grappled with the United States’ role in Middle East violence 
during the early twenty-first century. To start, Waits denounced former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and then-President George W. Bush for prioritizing national interests 
and domestic political concerns over peace in the Middle East. Moments later, Waits 
sang about how fundamentalists on both sides stood in the path of peace, but then 
addressed the American role in the ongoing violence, asking “why are we arming the 
Israeli army with guns and tanks and bullets?”566 After decades of U.S. military aid for 
Israel totaling more than a billion dollars per year and in the aftermath of yet another 
round of violence between Israel and Hamas which has prompted some members of 
Congress to call for limits on U.S. aid to Israel, Waits’ question remains a relevant one.  
 
565 For a contemporary account of the events described in Waits’ song, see Ian Fisher, “The 
Mideast Turmoil: Suicide Bomber; A Sudden, Violent End for a Promising Youth,” New York Times, June 
13, 2003.  
566 Tom Waits, “Road to Peace,” Track 10 on Disc 1 of the album Orphans: Brawlers, Bawlers, 
and Bastards (ANTI Records, 2006).  
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Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the U.S.-Israeli relationship 
underwent an enormous transformation during the 1970s and 1980s, one that continues to 
shape this important and controversial relationship up until today. These years saw a 
significant increase in American economic and especially military aid to Israel, and a 
deepening level of military and strategic cooperation between the two allies. This 
occurred despite serious differences between successive American and Israeli 
governments of different political parties and ideologies.   
The remaining pages will briefly survey how U.S.-Israeli relations have evolved 
in the decades since the end of the Cold War. Those years saw important new 
developments in Arab-Israeli negotiations, including direct talks between Israelis and 
Yasser Arafat of the PLO and a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. But efforts to 
build a comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis were derailed by renewed 
violence and declining Israeli enthusiasm for the peace process. The period since the end 
of the Cold War also saw important continuities in the bilateral U.S.-Israeli relationship 
as American aid continued and U.S.-Israeli cooperation remained close even when the 
Soviet Union no longer threatened American interests in the Middle East. Finally, I will 
suggest three avenues for future research that have emerged from my study of U.S.-
Israeli relations.  
The United States and Israel Since 1989 
The post-Cold War years initially saw the United States return to playing a key 
role in facilitating Arab-Israeli negotiations. Under Ronald Reagan’s successor, George 
H.W. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker made a concerted effort to bring Arab and 
Israeli leaders together for comprehensive peace talks in Madrid, Spain. Baker had 
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initially stayed away from Middle East peace talks, but that changed in the wake of the 
end of the Cold War, which left the United States as the only remaining superpower in 
the world, and after the overwhelming U.S. and coalition victory over Iraqi forces in the 
Persian Gulf War. These efforts eventually produced the Madrid peace conference, an 
important milestone but one that did not produce any new agreements. Unlike his two 
predecessors at the State Department, James Baker was willing to press Israel for 
concessions. At one point, Bush and Baker delayed $10 billion in loans for Israel to 
resettle Jews from the former Soviet Union in retaliation for the Israeli government’s 
refusal to halt settlement construction in the West Bank.567 
Bush’s successor, President Bill Clinton, made Middle East peace talks a top 
foreign policy priority, and throughout his presidency a core group of American 
diplomats worked constantly to conclude agreements between Israeli and Palestinian 
leaders.568 But the major breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations came not as a result 
of American-mediated talks, but rather secret discussions between Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiators in Norway. The “Oslo Talks,” as they became known, were the first direct 
talks between the Israeli government and the PLO, and eventually led to the PLO taking a 
direct role in governing the Occupied Territories. The talks culminated in a dramatic 
ceremony at the White House on September 13, 1993, when Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin shook hands with Yasser Arafat and called for an end to bloodshed. The 
 
567 On James Baker’s involvement in Middle East peace talks, see Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, 
The Man Who Ran Washington: The Life and Times of James Baker (New York: Doubleday, 2020), 
especially Chapter 24.  
568 For extensive interviews with those American negotiators, who included Martin Indyk, Aaron 
David Miller, and Dennis Ross, see the 2021 documentary The Human Factor, directed by Dror Moreh.  
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Israelis however never fully surrendered their influence in the Occupied Territories, 
maintaining security forces within Gaza and the West Bank and refusing to uproot Israeli 
settlements. This tension between the Palestinians’ desire for an independent state and 
Israel’s refusal to grant full autonomy to the Palestinians remained unresolved. 
Furthermore, American negotiators’ unwillingness to press Israel to make difficult 
choices and concessions undermined Israeli-Palestinian talks during the 1990s and the 
United States’ image as a neutral arbiter.569 
The new level of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian authorities was 
undermined by forces who opposed any concessions to the other side. Attacks by 
Palestinian Islamist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad who opposed talks with Israel killed 
dozens of Israeli citizens in the months following Rabin’s handshake with Arafat. Within 
Israel itself, right-wing and pro-settler groups loudly protested the Rabin government’s 
agreements with the Palestinians, and their cries only grew louder when terrorist attacks 
against Israeli civilians seemed to confirm their warnings. One Israeli took his opposition 
to the Oslo peace process even further when, on November 4, 1995, Yigal Amir shot and 
killed Yitzhak Rabin after the Prime Minister finished addressing a rally for peace. 
Subsequent Israeli prime ministers Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak 
made varying efforts to continue negotiations in coordination with the United States, but 
momentum had stalled.570 
 
569 American negotiator Aaron David Miller made this point in 2005, see Miller, “Israel’s 
Lawyer,” Washington Post, May 23, 2005.  
570 For an excellent account of the events leading up to Rabin’s assassination and its aftermath, see 
Dan Ephron, Killing a King: The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the Remaking of Israel (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2015).  
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Little progress was made on Middle East peace during the administration of 
George W. Bush. While Bush accepted the need for a Palestinian state, his administration 
also had a poor relationship with Palestinian leaders (especially Yasser Arafat). On the 
other hand, Bush developed a close relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, 
who emphasized the common battle that Israel and the U.S. were fighting against 
terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Political scientist 
Daniel Zoughbie, who conducted dozens of interviews for his book Indecision Points, 
argues that the Bush administration’s Middle East policy was crippled by the conflict 
between U.S. officials’ vision of a democratic Middle East and the harsh reality of the 
region’s politics in the early twenty-first century. Elliot Abrams, who had extensive 
foreign policy experience in multiple Republican administrations, defended the Bush 
administration, arguing that some progress was made toward reducing violence even 
though the fundamental conflict between Israelis and Palestinians remained 
unresolved.571  
President Barak Obama came into office hoping to reinvigorate the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, but when his efforts to pressure Israel into concessions met 
intense resistance, he backed off.572 One member of his administration who consistently 
 
571 On the idea that U.S. and Israel faced a common enemy in terrorism, see Amy Kaplan, Our 
American Israel: The Story of an Entangled Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 
especially Chapter 7. For a critical account of the Bush administration’s Middle East policy, see Daniel E. 
Zoughbie, Indecision Points: George W. Bush and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2014). For a defense of the Bush administration, see Elliot Abrams, Tested by Zion: The Bush 
Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
572 For a useful analysis of Obama’s record on Israel during his first term in office, see Peter 
Beinart, The Crisis of Zionism (New York: Picador, 2012). See also Dana H. Allin and Steven N. Simon, 
Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the Future of the U.S. Israeli Alliance (New York: Public Affairs, 
2016), especially Chapters 3-6.  
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opposed putting pressure on Israel was then-Vice President Joe Biden, a longtime 
Democratic senator with a strong pro-Israel record.573  
One of the Obama administration’s most important diplomatic initiatives was a 
2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. Formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA, or simply the “Iran nuclear deal), this agreement laid out a path for Iran 
to develop peaceful nuclear energy resources and for preventing Iran from developing 
nuclear weapons. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was a vocal critic of the 
Iran nuclear deal, calling it a “historic mistake.”574 Many Republicans in the United 
States shared this view and invited Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress in 
March of 2015. To assuage Israel’s concerns about the threat from Iran, the Obama 
administration signed a new Memorandum of Understanding with Israel in September of 
2016, under which the United States would provide Israel with $38 billion in military aid 
over the next ten years.575 
The presidency of Donald Trump was unique for a host of reasons, but one of its 
distinguishing features was an extremely close relationship between Trump and Israeli 
Benjamin Netanyahu. The Trump administration took a number of steps that aligned the 
United States even more closely with Netanyahu’s right-wing government, including 
recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s official capital and moving the U.S. embassy from Tel 
 
573 On Joe Biden’s views of Israel, see Peter Beinart, “Joe Biden’s Alarming Record on Israel,” 
Jewish Currents, January 27, 2020. (URL: https://jewishcurrents.org/joe-bidens-alarming-record-on-
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Aviv to Jerusalem, a move that previous American administrations had delayed out of 
deference to the ongoing peace process.576 This move, which broke with years of 
American diplomatic precedent, was celebrated by both Israeli leaders and by many 
American evangelicals, who were both strong backers of the move and among President 
Trump’s strongest supporters. Days after the new embassy was dedicated, Netanyahu met 
with a group of American evangelical leaders to thank them for their support.577  
The Trump administration also launched its own Middle East peace initiatives, 
including one that aimed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and several others that 
established diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations for the first time 
since the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994. Under the Trump administration’s plan, 
which was drafted by President Trump’s adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner, Israel 
would achieve several of its long-standing goals, including control of a unified Jerusalem 
and sovereignty over Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinians, who unlike 
the Israelis were not involved in drafting the plan, in turn would be grated limited 
autonomy in the remaining West Bank territory and billions of dollars in development 
money from the international community. Unsurprisingly for a deal tilted so heavily in 
Israel’s favor, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas rejected the proposal outright.578 In 
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the words of political scientist James Stocker, the Trump administration’s peace plan “did 
not even pretend to be balanced” and “offered Israel almost only carrots, most of which 
were delivered in advance of the deal’s announcement.”579 U.S. officials were also deeply 
involved in between Israel and the leaders of several Arab countries, including Bahrain 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to establish full diplomatic ties between them and 
Israel. While the normalization of relations between Israel and any Arab country is 
notable, these moves were more a recognition of the status quo rather than a real 
diplomatic coup. What they definitely did not do was resolve the fundamental issue of the 
Arab-Israeli peace process, the fate of the Palestinians.580 Despite all the efforts of 
American negotiators and all the military aid the United States has given to Israel to 
ensure its security, this problem remains unresolved.  
This question of American complicity in the ongoing violence between Israelis 
and Palestinians is an important one in light of the history discussed in this dissertation 
and in light of recent events. In his 2020 analysis of the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, political scientist Jerome Slater argues that the nearly-unconditional American 
support extended to Israel has been a detriment to both Israeli and U.S. national 
interests.581 In the aftermath of fighting between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, some 
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progressive politicians in the United States called for restrictions on American military 
aid to Israel, something that has been rare in the history of this relationship.582  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was a significant 
turning point in global history and for U.S. foreign policy. Without an enemy to contest 
its influence in regions like the Middle East, one might think that the United States could 
reduce its military aid to allies such as Israel. But this did not happen. On the contrary, 
American aid to Israel has remained steady and significant ever since the end of the Cold 
War. According to the Congressional Research Service, Israel received nearly $4 billion 
in economic and military aid from the United States in 2020.583 As historian Douglas 
Little has recently argued, one reason was that from the 1990s onward the threat of 
violent Islamic extremism gradually replaced the Soviet Union in the minds of many 
Americans as a serious threat to U.S. national security.584  
Studying the history of U.S.-Israeli relations forces historians to grapple with the 
issue of Israel’s “special” relationship with the United States. Given the high level of 
U.S. aid Israel receives every year and the deep well of support Americans have for Israel 
from average citizens to presidents, this term is very much appropriate. Within this 
framework, the U.S.-Israeli relationship is distinct from U.S. relations with all other 
countries. But it is also worth exploring the areas where U.S. support for Israel resembles 
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U.S. relationships with other countries, especially during the Cold War. In backing 
leaders and groups who are culturally, religiously, ideologically, ethnically similar to 
cultures in the United States (in this case, an Israeli society seen as rooted in Europe, anti-
communist, and adhering to a Judeo-Christian faith), U.S. support of Israel looks less 
unique and more like U.S. support for Christian anti-communist leaders in East Asia 
during the Cold War.585  
Things look very different from the Israeli perspective. Two recent books situate 
Israel’s relationship with the United States into the broader history of Israel’s foreign 
relations. In his 2020 study of Jewish diplomacy from ancient times to the present day, 
political scientist Emanuel Navon notes that Israel’s importance to the United States has 
declined since the end of the Cold War but that in two areas, military aid and public 
opinion, the U.S.-Israeli relationship has remained remarkably stable since the 1970s. 
Likewise, Uri Bialer argues that the United States has been a full ally of Israel since the 
late 1960s and that Israel’s relationship to the U.S. is at the core of its foreign and defense 
policy.586  
While a close alliance with the United States has clearly been a boon to Israel’s 
national security, some observers noted how this close association with the U.S. could 
have a negative effect on Israeli society. In his 2002 extended essay Elvis in Jerusalem, 
the Israeli journalist and historian Tom Segev argued that Israel’s close relationship to the 
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United States has contributed to the rise of a “post-Zionist” stage of development in 
Israel’s history. “Americanization,” Segev wrote, “has weakened social solidarity and, in 
contrast with original Israeli Zionism, has made the individual the centerpoint of life.”587 
This is in keeping with Israel’s transition from a labor/socialist economy in its early 
history to today’s “start-up nation,” the global rise of neoliberalism, and the decline of 
state power since the 1970s.588  
In addition to its enduring political and diplomatic alliance with Israel, the United 
States and especially its citizens remain deeply connected to Israel after the Cold War 
ended and into the twenty-first century. This is particularly true of American Jews who 
have made their homes in Israeli settlements. After the first Americans settled in the 
Occupied Territories after the 1967 war, many became key contributors to and defenders 
of the settlement project. In her study of American Jews’ participation in the Israeli 
settler movement, Sara Yael Hirschhorn points to their increasingly prominent role as 
defenders of settlements before American and international audiences. Following the 
horrific massacre of twenty-nine Palestinian Muslims at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in 
Hebron on the West Bank on February 25, 1994, most American Jewish settlers quickly 
distanced themselves from its perpetrator, Dr. Baruch Goldstein. Goldstein was born in 
Brooklyn, New York, and in 1983 emigrated to the Israeli settlement of Kiryat Arba in 
the West Bank. Goldstein’s identity as an American-born settler drew attention to 
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American Jews living in the Occupied Territories and exposed rifts between American 
and native Israeli settlers. To push back against efforts to connect them with Goldstein’s 
actions, some prominent American Jewish settlers became active defenders of settlements 
in the media. As Americans who spoke English, they were effective spokespersons for 
the U.S. and international media.589  
The deep connection between Americans and Israeli settlements in the Occupied 
Territories has also found its way into contemporary Israeli fiction. In his 2013 novel The 
Hilltop, Israeli novelist Assaf Gavron tells the story of daily life in a small settlement in 
the West Bank. Living in the fictional illegal settlement of Ma’aleh Hermesh C., 
Gavron’s characters live their lives in the face of hostility from nearby Palestinian 
communities and threats of eviction from the Israeli military. While this is very much an 
Israeli story, there are numerous links to the world beyond the Middle East, including the 
United States. Several of the settler characters are from the U.S., or spent significant time 
there, but it is an American journalist from the Washington Post who creates a minor 
crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations when he reports that U.S. taxpayer dollars are indirectly 
funding illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. In an attempt to control the 
damage from the journalist’s report, the Israeli defense minister travels to Washington to 
meet with senior U.S. officials and to accompany the U.S. ambassador to Israel on a visit 
to Ma’aleh Hermesh C. To the defense minister’s annoyance, the settlers of Ma’aleh 
 
589 See Sara Yael Hirschhorn, City on a Hilltop: American Jews and the Israeli Settler Movement 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), Chapter Five.  
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Hermesh C. are less than welcoming, accusing him of bowing to American pressure to 
remove them.590  
American evangelicals remain deeply engaged with Israel, especially through 
religious tourism and pilgrimages. According to a 2014 report from the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, evangelical Christians from the United States were among the largest 
groups of tourists who visited Israel in 2013.591 Academics and journalists have become 
deeply interested in the American evangelical experience of traveling to Israel, often 
accompanying large groups of American Christians to Israel on trips organized by their 
churches. There is of course a strong political element to such trips, and journalists’ 
accounts of American Christian pilgrimages to Israel tend to concentrate on this element. 
For instance, the writer Tom Bissell wrote about his experience traveling to Israel with a 
group of American evangelicals on a trip organized by Dennis Praeger, a popular 
conservative talk-radio host who is also Jewish. In an essay for Harper’s Magazine, 
Bissell reflects that for many Americans Israel is “just another way for Americans to 
refract their own views of America.” To the conservative Christians he encountered on 
this trip, Israel and the United States were similarly blessed by God, and this Israel “lies 
beyond history, beyond the deaths and wars that made it, beyond the United Nations, 
beyond the Oslo Accords, beyond any conventional morality.”592 
 
590 See Assaf Gavron, The Hilltop: A Novel (New York: Scribner, 2014), 190-193, 207-208, and 
219-226.  
591 That same report stated that, in 2013, Christians from all over the world represented more than 
half of all tourists visiting Israel. See “Christian tourism to Israel,” 23 Dec 2014, Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. (URL: https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Spotlight/Pages/Christian-tourism-to-Israel.aspx). 
(Accessed 6/5/21).  
592 Tom Bissell, “My Holy Land Vacation: Touring Israel with 450 Christian Zionists,” Harper’s 
Magazine (July 2016), 29-30.  
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For some American evangelicals, Israel retains a very real place in their vision of 
the future and the coming fulfillment of Biblical prophecies. Interpreting the history of 
Israel through the lens of Biblical prophecy, fundamentalist Christians saw the seizure of 
the Temple Mount by Israeli forces in June 1967 as the next important step after the 
establishment of Israel. For them, writes journalist Lawrence Wright, “the Jewish 
possession of the Temple Mount meant that the clock of the apocalypse had begun to 
tick.”593 Wright and Gershom Gorenberg also found that these American Christians were 
not the only ones to hold apocalyptic views related to possession of the Temple Mount, 
some Jews and Muslims did as well, albeit in different form.594   
But American Christians’ trips to Israel are about more than prophecy or politics. 
In 2008, for instance, Faydra Shapiro found that on her travels to Israel with Christian 
Zionists from the United States, the Americans were as interested in and affected by their 
experience of Israel as a modern developed state as they were by the religious sites they 
visited.595 Hillary Kaell further argues that traveling to the Holy Land is a powerful 
experience for American Christians for reasons that sometimes have very little to do with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict or U.S. military support of the Jewish State. After taking part in 
multiple trips to Israel with both Catholics and Protestants from the United States, Kaell 
wrote that these pilgrimages to Israel were spiritually powerful because they juxtaposed 
 
593 Lawrence Wright, “Why do a Pentecostal cattle breeder from Mississippi and an Orthodox 
rabbi from Jerusalem believes that a red heifer can change the world?” The New Yorker, Vol. 74, No. 20 
(July 1998), 46.  
594 In addition to Wright, see Gershom Gorenberg, The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the 
Struggle for the Temple Mount (New York: The Free Press, 2000).  
595 Faydra L. Shapiro, “To the Apple of God’s Eye: Christian Zionist Travel to Israel,” Journal of 
Contemporary Religion, 23:3 (2008), 307-320.  
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the pilgrims’ religious beliefs with the experience of tourism, international travel, and 
commercialism.596  
American Jews’ views of Israel have also shifted greatly in recent decades. While 
Israel had long been an important source of unity within the American Jewish 
community, a distinct generational divide has emerged between older American Jews, 
who argue for Israel’s importance to American Jewry and feel deeply connected to the 
Jewish state, and younger Jews, feel less connected to Israel. Younger American Jews are 
also more likely to be critical of specific Israeli government policies than previous 
generations, while still recognizing the significance of Israel’s existence.597 Two recent 
reports from the Pew Research Center underscore the generational difference among 
American Jews over their views of Israel.598 
Directions for Future Research 
Just as the image that appears in a microscope changes as we adjust its focus, 
research into one topic inevitably reveals many more subjects that are worthy of further 
investigation. Like any research project, this investigation into U.S.-Israeli relations since 
1948 has raised new questions about the history of U.S. foreign relations even as it seeks 
to answer those posed at the outset. Here I will outline three avenues of future research 
 
596 See Hillary Kaell, Walking Where Jesus Walked: American Christians and Holy Land 
Pilgrimage (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 5.  
597 For an important early study of divisions between American Jews and Israeli Jews, see Charles 
S. Liebman, and Steven M. Cohen, Two Worlds of Judaism: The Israeli and American Experiences (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). For more recent discussions, see Samuel G. Freedman, Jew vs. 
Jew: The Struggle for the Soul of American Jewry (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), Beinart, The 
Crisis of Zionism, and Daniel Gordis, We Stand Divide: The Rift Between American Jews and Israel (New 
York: Ecco, 2019).   
598 For the 2013 study, see “A Portrait of American Jews,” October 21, 2013, Pew Research 
Center (URL: https://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-culture-survey/); 
for the 2020 study, see “Jewish Americans in 2020,” May 21, 2021, Ibid. (URL: 
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that I believe would be particularly fruitful, though this is by no means a comprehensive 
list.  
Oftentimes, zeroing in on one very specific topic, such as U.S.-Israeli relations 
during the 1970s and 1980s, illuminates smaller pieces of a larger story that merit only a 
short mention in one research project but are worthy of a dedicated study of their own. 
One example that leaps out from this project is the Jewish Defense League (JDL), the 
violent Jewish militant group formed in New York City during the early 1970s and 
discussed briefly in Chapter 3. Apart from one dissertation in sociology from 1981 and 
one journalist’s 1990 biography of JDL leader and extremist rabbi Meir Kahane, there is 
no comprehensive study of this organization.599 Though only a small organization that by 
no means represented the views of the majority of Jewish Americans, studying this one 
group can tell us more about divisions within American Judaism and why some 
American Jews took such a different path from most of their contemporaries. There is 
also an international component to the story of the JDL: several NSC memos from the 
Ford administration reveal that the American embassy in Israel was contacted by 
members of the JDL who had moved to Israel (as did Meir Kahane, where he was briefly 
elected to the Knesset).  
Zooming further out from a single group in a specific moment in time, this 
dissertation also underscores the fact that there has been no comprehensive history of 
U.S.-Israeli relations since David Schoenbaum’s The United States and the State of Israel 
 
599 See Shlomo Modechai Russ, “The ‘Zionist Hooligans:’ The Jewish Defense League,” PhD 
Dissertation in Sociology (City University of New York, 1981) and Robert I. Friedman, The False Prophet: 
Rabbi Meir Kahane – From FBI Informant to Knesset Member (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1990).  
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was published in 1993. In the nearly thirty years since, many more primary sources have 
become available from archives in the United States and around the world that can shed 
new light on events of the 1970s and early 1980s. Furthermore, even more documents 
will become available from the late 1980s and early 1990s from the Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush presidential libraries in the coming years which will illuminate how the end 
of the Cold War affected this important diplomatic relationship. New analytical lenses, 
especially cultural history, can also provide new insights into the history of U.S.-Israeli 
relations.  
Finally, by zooming out even further, exploring the history of U.S.-Israeli 
relations forces historians to grapple with the broader subject of U.S. foreign aid, 
especially military aid, as a key feature of U.S. foreign policy. As these chapters have 
demonstrated. Israel not only received massive amounts of U.S. military aid throughout 
its history, especially from the 1970s to the present, but also received that aid on 
extremely favorable terms. This is one particularly notable feature of the “special” 
relationship Israel enjoys with the United States, but it is important to remember that 
Israel is not the only recipient of U.S. military aid in the world. By broadening their 
analysis to include other countries, historians can explore how the United States has 
sought to use military aid to support its allies around the world. They can also explore 
how the introduction of American weaponry and equipment has shaped the lives and 
experiences of people around the world, especially in conflict zones.   
Finally, an analysis of U.S. military aid to countries around the world gives 
scholars an opportunity to explore what President Dwight Eisenhower called the 
“military-industrial complex.” One notable feature of American military aid to Israel is 
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that it was often extended in the form of grants, not loans, which did not have to be paid 
back. This meant that the U.S. administrations from the 1970s onwards were essentially 
giving American funds to Israel for Israel to use to purchase American military 
equipment. Since that money then went to American defense contractors, the U.S.-Israeli 
aid relationship was in part a subsidy to the American defense industry. This topic reveals 
an explicit financial link between American foreign policy and the domestic economy in 
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